Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 2026 Elections: What Kind of Shared Future?

Bosnia and Herzegovina goes to the polls on 4 October 2026. Elections for the Presidency, the state and entity parliaments, the presidency of Republika Srpska, and the cantonal assemblies in the Federation will reshape the country’s various levels of government. Yet the issue I want to address extends beyond who will occupy which office: what kind of life is being offered to citizens by those who claim to represent Bosnia and Herzegovina’s future? Unless defending the state’s continued existence is connected to demanding that it be fair, functional and accountable, elections may simply perpetuate existing problems under new representatives.

When discussing Bosnia and Herzegovina in Türkiye, we should complement the concern arising from our historical ties with a responsibility to understand the details of its contemporary politics. Sensitivity to the security of Bosniaks and the country’s territorial integrity does not oblige us to endorse every decision of a particular party. I value Bosnia and Herzegovina’s unity as the foundation of a shared political future that all its citizens can claim equally as their own. This approach requires taking Bosniaks’ historical experiences and security concerns seriously while also recognising the belonging of Serb and Croat citizens as integral to the future of the same state.

The institutional structure of the election illustrates the difficulty of building this shared future. Voters in the Federation may vote in either the Bosniak or the Croat contest for the Presidency, while the Serb member is elected from Republika Srpska. The shared state’s most prominent institution thus emerges from separate contests that tie ethnic identity to geography. It should also be noted that Željka Cvijanović, the current Serb member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, kissed the coffin of convicted genocide perpetrator Mladić just fifteen days ago. Someone holding the highest office in the state regards a person who sought to destroy that state as a hero. Within such a system, candidates must both persuade their own constituencies and speak on behalf of the entire country. When figures who will need to work together after the election undermine one another’s legitimacy during the campaign, they further weaken the capacity to govern before voting has even begun.

The visibility of the presidential contests should not overshadow the importance of the parliaments and cantons. As voters elect representatives at different levels on the same day, responsibility must remain traceable across these institutions after the election. Knowing who has authority when a service fails is the first condition of accountability. When a complex system of government is used to explain every failure, politicians can distance themselves from the consequences of their own decisions. This is why I value election journalism that goes beyond reporting candidates’ statements to identify which institution has the authority to deliver each promise. It must be clear where, and by whom, the changes promised to citizens will be implemented. Otherwise, voters will struggle to assess which public policies their votes can actually change.

Reducing the competition to a simple contest among three peoples is misleading. Denis Bećirović, Bakir Izetbegović, Semir Efendić and Fahrudin Radončić are competing for the Bosniak seat. Darijana Filipović, Zdenko Lučić and Slaven Kovačević are contesting the Croat seat, while Željka Cvijanović, Marinko Božović and Nebojša Vukanović are competing for the Serb seat. This picture shows that each community contains different political alternatives. Ethnic identities matter in understanding voting behaviour, but they cannot explain the full range of political choices.

The contest for the Bosniak seat is particularly revealing in this respect. In his speech in Tuzla on 20 September, as reported by N1, Izetbegović argued that only the SDA could steer the country through the difficult period ahead. Meanwhile, the SDP’s statement about its meeting in Velika Kladuša on the same day emphasised support for families, services, development and keeping young people in the country. These are the parties’ own campaign narratives; they cannot be treated as independent evidence of their achievements. My question to both is the same: what budget, implementation timetable and oversight mechanism will turn the promise of protecting the state or improving citizens’ lives into reality?

Assessing the contest for the Croat seat likewise requires an approach that takes concerns about representation seriously while upholding the principle of citizenship. When a community feels politically marginalised, its confidence in shared institutions suffers. (My impression is that Croats’ allegiance to Zagreb already exceeds their allegiance to Sarajevo.) At the same time, any party’s claim to be that community’s sole legitimate voice also restricts democratic pluralism. Bosnia and Herzegovina needs a political space in which safeguards for collective identities and individual rights can be discussed together. (A person who does not identify as Bosniak, Croat or Serb cannot even stand for many offices, most notably the Presidency.) When voters are constantly presented with existential choices, scrutinising their representatives’ actual performance becomes increasingly difficult.

Debates within the opposition in Republika Srpska demonstrate that change involves more than simply putting forward candidates. According to N1’s report of 21 September, Igor Crnadak is demanding an explicit assurance from the opposition that it will not form a government with the SNSD after the election. He is also calling for a clear commitment to supporting Branko Blanuša’s candidacy for the entity presidency. This appeal suggests that the uncertainty facing voters extends to post-election alliances. When a movement challenging the government fails to explain the principles on which it would govern with others, the political outcome of the demand for change remains unclear.

I believe we must uphold two distinct standards here. A party’s approach to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s shared institutions is a fundamental indicator of its democratic responsibility. Yet claiming to defend the country’s unity cannot exempt that party from criticism over corruption, favouritism or poor governance. Similarly, opposing the ruling party in one entity does not automatically produce a democratic programme for the country as a whole. The value of post-election partnerships should be judged not only by which leaders they bring together, but also by whether they explain in advance the rules they will uphold.

One tangible innovation in these elections is the technological transformation of voting and counting. Biometric voter verification, optical ballot scanners and electronic transmission of results will be used for the first time in this election. However, the Central Election Commission also announced that some polling stations could not open during the mock elections on 11 September because test ballots had not arrived on time. This setback does not demonstrate that the elections will fail; it demonstrates the importance of preparation and logistics. Technology’s ability to build trust depends on support from independent observation, transparent procedures and clear avenues for complaints and appeals.

The language of the campaign is also part of that trust. Before the official campaign began, the Central Election Commission reiterated the prohibition on hate speech and emphasised its authority to sanction violations. The significance of this warning lies in setting the boundaries of political competition. Criticising an opponent’s programme enriches democratic debate, whereas calling a community’s existence or belonging into question generates distrust that will persist beyond the election. Any claim of commitment to a shared country must also entail a responsibility to protect the security and political participation of citizens with opposing views. This responsibility cannot be postponed until an election has been won.

Debates about electoral integrity should not obscure the quality of policy programmes. An investigation published on 16 September by Detektor, BIRN Bosnia and Herzegovina’s news outlet, examined parties’ education pledges. The experts it interviewed stressed that education was not receiving sufficient priority in the campaigns. Although the investigation identified promises concerning digitalisation, equal opportunities and links to employment, it questioned the willingness to implement them. In my view, this provides a strong starting point for assessing the elections. If political actors cannot offer a concrete policy for children’s education, what substance is there to their defence of the country’s future? Education budgets and teachers’ working conditions should be central to any discussion of the state’s future. Detektor

Migration and the diaspora matter for the same reason. In its decision of 30 July, the Central Election Commission announced that 48,074 people would be included on the register of voters casting their ballots from abroad. This figure does not indicate the diaspora’s total size or electoral turnout; it reflects the outcome of a specific registration process. Indeed, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s diaspora is almost as large as the country’s resident population. It would therefore be wrong to infer either apathy or strong mobilisation directly from this figure. The real question is how political institutions respond to the ties that citizens living abroad maintain with Bosnia and Herzegovina.

It is insufficient to view the diaspora merely as a community that sends remittances, visits home in the summer or is remembered during election campaigns. Transnational ties can carry professional knowledge, social experience and different expectations of governance, alongside economic resources. Living abroad does not, however, automatically make anyone more democratic. The diaspora also encompasses diverse political orientations. What is needed is a relationship that recognises this diversity and does not confine participation to election day. Setting the sense of belonging of citizens who have left against the everyday expectations of those who remain narrows the scope of a shared future.

For this reason, assessing post-election promises to reduce emigration requires looking beyond the number of new jobs. We must also ask whether access to employment is fair, whether career advancement depends on party connections and whether public services are reliable. Reducing people’s decisions to build lives elsewhere to wage differences alone overlooks the role of political trust. My proposal is that parties set out measurable targets for retaining young people in the country and report regularly on progress. Migration could then move beyond being a source of regret in election speeches and become a policy area subject to meaningful scrutiny.

The prospect of European Union membership and Türkiye’s approach should also be assessed against these concrete criteria. European institutions should not allow democratic standards in Bosnia and Herzegovina to become demands invoked only during crises. For Türkiye, the strongest expression of historical affinity would be to support the country’s institutional capacity and social pluralism alongside its unity. Education, local development and economic cooperation can expand the areas in which different communities benefit from the shared state. Ensuring that our relationship with Bosnia and Herzegovina does not become excessively dependent on particular individuals or election results is also essential to a lasting friendship.

On the evening of 4 October, we will, of course, discuss vote shares and the names of the winners. My main concern will be how the resulting political landscape translates into responsibility for governing. Will coalition negotiations produce publicly stated objectives? Will the mechanisms introduced to safeguard electoral integrity increase confidence in the results? Will education, migration and public services once again be relegated to secondary concerns? Claims to represent Bosnia and Herzegovina’s future should be tested against the answers to these questions. The state’s continued existence is strengthened when its citizens believe they can build a fair and dignified life within it.