

TÜRKİYE AT 100

One hundred years of the Republic of Türkiye

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TÜRKIYE at 100

One hundred years of the Republic of Türkiye

“The articles assembled in this volume provide a better understanding of modern Türkiye against the background of the country’s rich and often turbulent history, and as a major global player in the emerging multipolar order.”

(Hans Köchler)

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TÜRKIYE AT 100

Preface by Prof. Dr. Hans Köchler

President of the International Progress Organization

As Türkiye's republic enters its second century, it looks back at one of the most remarkable sequences of constitutional and political transformation, and reconfiguration, in the history of states. When the Ottoman Empire – a dominant player in the European concert of powers over half a millennium – had begun to collapse, it was the young Mustafa Kemal who saved the Turkish state under the onslaught of the victorious imperialist forces upon the end of World War I. Through his military successes and diplomatic skills, he was able to prevent a looming occupation and partitioning of the Turkish homeland, establishing a republican state that by now, under the circumstances of the 21st century, has become a major global player. After the traumatic transformation post-World War I, and the difficult period of World War II, the second major transformation of the Turkish polity – in the wake of the collapse of the bipolar order of the Cold War – saw the country gradually emerge as an actor of stability and peace at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. Political developments on the basis of the republic's by now well-established democratic procedures resulted in a historic reconciliation, indeed synthesis, of the country's Islamic heritage and secular modernity. Going back to the roots while opening up to the world has become the essence of the *Turkish renaissance* that has enabled the country to play a constructive role in international politics. As major player in its own right, Türkiye has emerged as a stabilizing force in a geopolitically sensitive region, along the fault lines between the Muslim world and the West. The joint initiative of Türkiye and Spain for the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations is testimony to this. Also, in the face of a weakened and fractured Arab world, Türkiye is one of the few countries that have the courage – and leverage – to insist on upholding the rights of the Arab people in Palestine. As one of the most influential members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the country has become an indispensable mediator not only in matters of concern to NATO (such as the war between Ukraine and Russia), but also, more generally, between the West and the emerging countries of the South.

Türkiye's role in the G20 is further evidence of its influence at the global level. As skilled and successful mediator – e.g. in the grain deal between Russia and Ukraine or the largest prisoner exchange between Russia and the United States since the Cold War – the Turkish republic has been actively, and constructively, taking part in what can be described as negotiating a new balance of power in the geopolitical minefield of the 21st century. In the face of the threat of a return of 19th century power politics – indeed an old-world imperialism the signs of which cannot be overlooked in the blatant neglect by some of the great powers for international law – Türkiye has become a driving force in the efforts for a more just and equitable international order. In the emerging multipolar world, it has been a consistent and steadfast, indeed the most outspoken, advocate of United Nations reform on the basis of the sovereign equality of *all* nations. This particularly applies to Türkiye's critique of the outdated privileges of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Highlighting global imbalances as cause of tension and conflict, and addressing them with specific initiatives and a novel form of public diplomacy, Türkiye's outreach to the world goes well beyond a traditional policy of the status quo. Under increasingly unpredictable circumstances of regional upheavals – indeed a major realignment of the global balance of power – the republic's foundational maxim of “Peace at home, peace in the world,” creatively and constructively applied by the leaders of today, gains new momentum – and holds new promise – in Türkiye's second century.

Vienna, March 2025

PRESENTING

In a rapidly changing world, it's more important than ever to take a step back and reflect on the history and current challenges of nations. This book offers a valuable perspective, created to honor the centenary of the Republic of Türkiye. It brings together the full proceedings of an important conference, alongside thoughtful contributions from esteemed academics.

On the occasion of this milestone, the conference entitled Türkiye 100 - One Hundred Years of the Republic of Türkiye was held on 23-24 November 2023. It was jointly organized by the ELTE Department of Modern and Contemporary World History, the Yunus Emre Institute, and TUIÇ – International Relations Studies Association. The conference brought together leading scholars to assess the pressing issues facing Türkiye today while offering perspectives that illuminate the way forward for future generations.

This book also holds special meaning because it was compiled and published in Hungary. As we have just behind the 2024, it connects with the centenary of Türkiye-Hungary relations, celebrated under the theme “A Century of Friendship and Cooperation” during the Türkiye-Hungary Cultural Year. By exploring both national and shared milestones, this book offers a chance to understand these connected histories and their importance for the future.

We hope it starts interesting conversations and adds something meaningful to both academic and public discussions.

With contributions from the organization committee;

Dr. Ágnes Judit Szilágyi

Dr. Ramachandra Byrappa

Burak Yalım

Mustafa Burak Şener

Dávid Biró

OPENING REMARKS BY DR. SZILÁGYI ÁGNES JUDIT

23 November 2023

First of all, I welcome the representatives of the Yunus Emre Institute, the colleagues and guests present. I am very pleased that the ELTE Department of Modern and Contemporary World History and its Turkish partner cooperated in an extremely effective way to organize this academic event for today and tomorrow. The Turkish Cultural Center provides a worthy venue and generous hospitality to the participants of this conference. I sincerely hope that our programme titled „Türkye 100” organised in the centenary year of the Republic of Türkiye and the rise of the project of its first president, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who modernized the independent country into a secular, industrializing nation. So, I hope that our academic event will be successful, and the international array of lecturers will present the audience with many new research results here.

Turkish - Hungarian cooperation is not new, as we know it well. Allow me to recall just one episode. The world-famous Hungarian composer, pianist, and folclorist Béla Bartók's music collecting trip to Anatolia. In the 1930s the Turkish government developed the musical institutions of the country in an extremely rapid way, and very often with the help of foreigners. Towards the end of October in 1936 Béla Bartók arrived in Istanbul, and from the day after his arrival went to work in the archives of the Conservatory, hearing folk pieces recorded on disks one after another. His next stop was Ankara, where he had given three lectures on folk music (the first in French, the second in German, and the third in Hungarian) and he performed three concerts. During his stay in Türkiye, he collected not only professional material, but also personal experiences. As he said in a radio speech after he got home: „We were so lovingly cared for everywhere that I can only look back on this trip with warm emotion.” This is the same care we enjoyed during our preparations from the Turkish Cultural Centre, and hopefully you will as well over the next two days. I hereby open the academic part of the conference. I wish you a good time and fruitful cooperation.

Associate Prof. Dr. habil. Ágnes Judit Szilágyi

Eötvös Loránd University

Head of the Department of Modern and Contemporary World History

OPENING REMARKS BY DR. RAMACHANDRA BYRAPPA

PEACE AND PROSPERITY IN THE EYE OF THE CYCLONE

23 November 2023

Distinguished guests, eminent colleagues, dear audience: first of all, I would like to congratulate the great Turkish nation on the 100th anniversary of the Republic. This is a great cause for celebration. It shows that the Turkish nation has a very strong and resilient foundations to accelerate to greater heights in the next 100 years.

The republican form of state and society is considered one of the highest forms of human association. Whenever I think about the concept of republic, the first two examples that come to my mind are the United States of America and the Republic of Türkiye. One belongs to the Western sphere and the other to the Eastern world.

The Republic of Türkiye has been a dream and a model for many nations oppressed by colonialism and continues to be the leading light, from many respects. From this perspective, Türkiye has a great responsibility to keep the flame of republicanism burning bright.

In his famous political treatise, *The Republic*, Plato is quoted as saying that "the beginning is the most important part of the work". This means that whenever we are in doubt about what a republic is, or what its essential pillars are, we should go back to the beginning, when it all started.

We must do so in order to share the reasons and dreams of those who laid the foundations. The great Chinese statesman Sun Yat-sen is quoted as saying: "If we want the Republic to be solid, we must first build its foundation. We need not look abroad for that foundation; we should seek it in the hearts of all the people of the nation."

For no nation can be strong until it feels the strength of its roots; no nation can end its suffering until it tends to its wounds; and no nation can know where it is going until it knows where it really came from.

When I was a student of International Relations at the University of Kent, I had an academic hobby. I tried to see if there was a parallel between the occurrence of natural disasters and

political ripples in that region or country. At my amateur level, I realised that there was some kind of correlation between the two.

Unfortunately, due to its geological and tectonic position, Türkiye is a regular victim of earthquakes. The tragic earthquake of 2022 is still fresh in our minds. Interestingly, political tribulations have occurred with more or less the same frequency.

Türkiye is surrounded by crises in its immediate neighbourhood. Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Libya, the list is becoming bigger each year. Currently, 60% of the world's crises are taking place in the vicinity of Türkiye. It is in the eye of a geopolitical cyclone.

The ingenuity of the Turkish nation dictates that after every earthquake, the country wipes away its tears and moves forward by rebuilding itself. Similarly, after every political hardship, the Turkish socio-political system gains strength to take this great nation to the next level of development.

This land of tectonic movements produces earthquakes, but the nation remains stable by producing great leaders to lead the nation through difficult times. Founding father Atatürk laid the foundations for a strong and universal republic that even inspired India's freedom fighters.

And President Erdogan has transformed the country into a trillion-dollar economic and budding technological powerhouse. All this in a particularly difficult international environment. The next goal is a two-trillion-dollar economy, and I am confident that this goal will be achieved in the near future. Türkiye has many strengths to build on.

The road ahead for this strong and ambitious Republic is full of challenges and opportunities. The question often asked is: does Türkiye have the necessary resources to meet these challenges?

As an academic and geopolitical specialist, I have a vague idea of what the challenges might be. The world is changing so fast that it is difficult to predict what will happen next week, let alone what will happen in the next decade. But I am certain of one thing. Today's young generation in Türkiye is better prepared to face the future than any generation before it.

This generation is estimated to be around 13 million young Turks. Their growing international awareness and willingness to compete with the world's best talent means that they have all the qualities to fulfil the dreams of their fathers and forefathers. They are a force to be reckoned with. Türkiye has world-class universities to provide this generation with a quality education. Many of them also travel abroad to acquire diverse skills and international experience.

According to official statistics, there are 1138 Turkish students studying in Hungarian universities, most of them on the Stipendium Hungaricum scholarship program. I am proud to say that we regularly welcome talented young Turks to ELTE and to our department. One of our excellent PhD students, Burak Mustafa Sener, is here today.

I hope that by nurturing the talents of these versatile young generations, Hungary can contribute to preserving the enterprising and universalist spirit of the Great Republic of Türkiye for the next 100 years!

On behalf of the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs and my department at ELTE-Humanities, I would like to thank you for this opportunity to express my admiration for the Turkish Nation and Republic.

May the Republic of Türkiye make its citizens proud and prosperous!

Assistant Prof. Dr. Ramachandra Byrappa

Coordinator of the Conference

Eötvös Loránd University

Department of Modern and Contemporary World History

CONTENTS

PREFACE	
HANS KÖCHLER.....	2
PRESENTING	
.....	4
OPENING INSIGHTS BY DISTINGUISHED PROFESSORS	
SZILÁGYI ÁGNES JUDIT.....	5
RAMACHANDRA BYRAPPA	6
THE ROLE OF ATATURK IN STRENGTHENING TURKEY'S EUROPEAN RELATIONS	
ADRIENN DÓRA PRIEGER.....	10
THE ROLE OF MEHMET AKIF ERSOY IN THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM	
AYŞEGÜL ADANIR	25
DONKEY RIDE TO ISTANBUL: THE ZION MULE CORPS AND THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN	
CSAPÓ GERGELY	39
ITALY'S PLANS AND ROLE IN THE PARTITION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE	
BALÁZS JUHÁSZ	48
THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC OF TÜRKIYE FROM A BRAZILIAN PERSPECTIVE AND THE BRAZILIAN ARAB DIASPORA	
MÁRK JONATÁN ZÁMBORI.....	60
THE ORDER OF MEDJIDIE AND ITS CONNECTIONS TO HUNGARY	
PÉRI ÁKOS ÁJBÉK.....	75
HUMANITARIAN FOOD ASSISTANCE TO SYRIAN REFUGEES IN TURKEY: MODALITIES, CHALLENGES, FLUCTUATING COOPERATION BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ACTORS	
SÁRA GIBÁRTI.....	85
TURKEY'S INFLUENCE ON KOSOVO'S EU MIGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION	
NİHAN GAMZE ALİOĞLU	108
TURKISH DECISION TO JOIN WORLD WAR II AND THE EFFECTS OF WORLD WAR II ON TURKEY	
YAĞMUR TUĞBA KARAGÜLLE.....	118

THE ROLE OF ATATURK IN STRENGTHENING TURKEY'S EUROPEAN RELATIONS

Dr. Adrienn Dóra Prieger¹

Abstract

At the beginning of the 21st century, Turkey's accession to the European Union is still a pending issue. Turkey first submitted its application for membership to the European Economic Community in 1959, but the exact date of acquiring full membership remains uncertain to this day. This process cannot be understood without recalling the reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder and first president of the Republic of Turkey, as Atatürk analyzed the relationship between Turkey and Europe in numerous speeches and articles. He consistently advocated for Turkey's Western European-style modernization. Atatürk aimed to create a new identity and national concept instead of the old Ottoman identity. He believed that the Turkish people could only fit into the family of European nations as an equal partner. Atatürk had a significant impact on the Turkish legal system; he laid the foundations of a secular state. Without him, Turkey could not have embarked on the path towards eventual EU membership. Atatürk's reforms established democratic principles in the Turkish legal system, providing a solid foundation for the later approach to the EU.

I prepared my study on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the Republic of Turkey, and by recalling the significance of Atatürk, my goal is to draw attention to the crucial importance of Turkish-EU relations.

Keywords: Atatürk, EU, Turkey, Turkish-EU relations, Integration

I. Introduction

At the beginning of the 21st century, Turkey's accession to the European Union is still a pending issue. Turkey first submitted its application for membership to the European Economic Community in 1959, but the exact date of acquiring full membership remains uncertain to this day.

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This process cannot be understood without recalling the reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder and first president of the Republic of Turkey, as Atatürk analyzed the relationship between Turkey and Europe in numerous speeches and articles. He consistently advocated for Turkey's Western European-style modernization (Prieger, A. & Paár, Á, 2018, p. 32). This extraordinary figure, whose framed portrait still looks down upon us from the walls of Turkish institutions, embassies, streets, schools, and millions of offices, received the surname 'Atatürk' from the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1934. Since then, he has been referred to as the 'Father of the Turks.'

Atatürk aimed to create a new identity and national concept instead of the old Ottoman identity. He believed that the Turkish people could only fit into the family of European nations as an equal partner. Atatürk had a significant impact on the Turkish legal system; he laid the foundations of a secular state. Without him, Turkey could not have embarked on the path towards eventual EU membership. Atatürk's reforms established democratic principles in the Turkish legal system, providing a solid foundation for the later approach to the EU.

Since the birth of European integration organizations, Turkey has been striving for increasing levels of integration, thanks to one of the main objectives of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, which was to make Turkey a part of the family of European nations. The accession process, initiated in 1998, has not yet concluded, but the perspective of accession has significantly contributed to the modernization of the country. The reports of the European Commission and resolutions of the European Parliament regularly confront the country with evolving European standards.

I prepared my study on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the Republic of Turkey, and by recalling the significance of Atatürk, my goal is to draw attention to the crucial importance of Turkish-EU relations. Turkey continues to be under intense international scrutiny today, playing a central role in managing the European immigration issue. As a NATO member with a significant military force, it is also a key player in the Middle East conflict. Furthermore, due to the development of the Turkish Stream, it plays a prominent role in the natural gas supply to Hungary (Magyarország Kormánya, 2023).

Turkey's relationship with the EU remains a constant topic of discussion, as Turkey is a decisive player in shaping the future of Europe. Despite Turkey's outstanding importance, there

has been no decision to date on its accession to the European Union, nor has there been a rejection of its membership application.

The highlighted relevance of the topic is emphasized by the fact that the 18-month program of the rotating presidency of the Council includes the objective that 'the presidency trio will work to fully exploit the new framework between the EU and the United Kingdom, as well as partnerships established with the European Economic Area and Switzerland. Additionally, it aims to strengthen partnerships with the Eastern Partnership, Southern Neighbors, and the Western Balkans, including at the leadership level in the second half of 2023 and the second half of 2024. The presidency trio will also strive for a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Turkey that fits within the framework defined by the European Council.' (Az Európai Unió Tanácsa, 2023)

My research is also topical because this year, on December 18, marks the centenary of the signing of the Turkish-Hungarian Friendship Treaty. The modern diplomatic relations between Hungary and Turkey began in 1923, as Turkey, following its international isolation after the Treaty of Trianon, was among the first to establish a friendship and cooperation treaty with Hungary. As a result, in my opinion, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Turkey and the figure of Atatürk have special significance for us, Hungarians.

II. The role of Atatürk in the establishment of the independent Republic of Turkey

"Atatürk said, 'Every great movement must send its roots deep into the soul of the people: this is the source of all strength and greatness. Everything else is ruins and dust. I will lead my people hand in hand as long as their steps are not certain and they do not know the way. Then, they will freely choose their leader and govern themselves. By that time, my people will be prepared, and I can step back. Before that, however, in no way!'" (Flesch, I, 2007, p. 37-38.)

Atatürk was born in Thessaloniki (in the present-day territory of Greece) on March 12, 1881, and from his early childhood, he aspired to become a soldier. During his military academy studies in France in 1910, Atatürk acquired knowledge through the study of European lifestyle, traditions, customs, as well as European political thinking and attitudes. This knowledge played

a role in the development of his later reforms. Through his oratorical talent, Atatürk also touched the hearts of Turkish youth, emerging as an example of courage for all Turkish youngsters. Few individuals like him have deeply influenced the masses of young people.

Atatürk stated, "I do not like a person who talks about greatness, who believes that to save the country, one must first be a great person. The savior will not be the one who first chooses a role model and says that the country cannot be saved until it becomes like him. There are two Mustafa Kemals. One is me, the mortal Mustafa Kemal; the other is the idea of Mustafa Kemals living eternally in the soul of the nation. I embody him. I appeared at the moment of danger, but wasn't I also born of a Turkish mother? Will not Turkish mothers give birth to new Mustafa Kemals? Fertility belongs to the nation." (Kansu, C. A. 2017, p. 5.)

In the despair of the Turkish defeat after World War I, Mustafa Kemal Pasha did not give up the struggle. Through a War of Independence, he reclaimed the Turkish-majority territories detached as a result of the Sevres Peace Treaty, which aimed to partition Turkey (Prieger, A, 2018/3. p. 68.). Thanks to his efforts, the Treaty of Lausanne took place, allowing Turkey to retain the territories recaptured during the War of Independence led by Atatürk.

After the proclamation of the republic on October 29, 1923, Mustafa Kemal was elected as the head of state (Flesch, I 2007, p. 34.). Following his assumption of power, he initiated a series of reforms to reshape Turkish culture and daily life. In April 1924, a law was passed to abolish the caliphate, and members of the Ottoman dynasty were expelled from the country. Another law eliminated the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Flesch, I 2007, p. 34.). In 1925, the wearing of the distinctive Turkish headgear, the fez, was banned, as Atatürk considered it a symbol of Eastern backwardness (Kansu, C. A. 2017, p. 73-74.). Specifically, in November 1925, under Atatürk's influence, the Turkish Grand National Assembly passed a law mandating all men to wear hats and declared wearing the fez a criminal offense. However, there was a problem as there were not enough hats available, as Turkey did not have factories capable of producing European-style hats at that time. Some resorted to wearing women's hats. To address this issue, Atatürk invited foreign craftsmen to Turkey to start local hat production. A Hungarian connection is seen in the case of József Ürményházi, a hat maker who learned about this through an advertisement by the Hungarian Hatters Association. As a result, he arrived in Turkey in 1927 and established a workshop as a renowned hat creator; he passed away in Istanbul in 1957 (Flesh, I 2004, p. 306.)

Ataturk abolished the Arabic script and instead made the Latin alphabet mandatory. This move highlighted Ataturk's aspiration for Western modernization, setting Turkey on the path of European integration. On August 9, 1928, in Istanbul's Sarayburnu, Ataturk first spoke to the people surrounding him about the new alphabet. He was convinced that every revolutionary measure should be discussed with the people first. At that time, he addressed the Turkish people, saying, "I want you to learn it within two weeks. With the help of the new Turkish letters, our rich and euphonic language will truly be revealed. You must understand the necessity of freeing ourselves from the incomprehensible symbols that have imprisoned our mother tongue for centuries." (Kansu, C. A. 2017, p. 81.)

On December 26, 1925, the Grand National Assembly in Turkey introduced the international (Christian) calendar and the daily time schedule consisting of 24 hours starting at midnight. As a result, the system of calculating hours from sunset, which previously regulated the five mandatory Muslim prayer times, was abolished. Additionally, Sunday was designated as the day of rest (Kansu, C. A. 2017, p. 81.).

In 1923, Ataturk founded his own party called the Republican People's Party. He wrote the party's programme in 1931, summarizing the most important objectives. These principles were collectively referred to as Kemalism (Prieger, A. 2018). Among the principles were *the homeland, the nation, the constitution of the state, and citizens' rights*. The document declared that the party would not make distinctions between men and women regarding rights and obligations. It was in this document that the "Six Arrows of Kemalism" first appeared, which are still considered Ataturk's fundamental principles to this day.

The six principles encapsulating Kemalism, symbolized as arrows in the party emblem and later integrated into the constitution in 1937, encompassed commitments to Republicanism, Secularism, Nationalism, Populism, Statism, and Revolutionism (or Reformism) (Ataturk Arastirma Merkezi 2014). Republicanism signifies loyalty to the republican form of government and identity. Secularism involves the removal of religion from politics, the economy, and the military. Nationalism supports the unity and independence of the Turkish nation. Populism means that the Turkish government exclusively represents the interests of the "People." and only belongs to the "People". Statism interprets the state as the engine of economic development (thus, the republic restrains free competition), and revolutionism represents the means to achieve all these goals.

These principles collectively aimed at swiftly transforming Turkey and its people into a modern, European entity". As Atatürk stated, „We are Westerners. Even if we are proud of our conquering past, we break its chains and strive to surpass its level by following the path of the culture of the past century." (Kerekesházy, J 2000).

Dr. Katalin Siska, in her study, recalls the following thoughts of Atatürk regarding the Six Arrows, which I believe encapsulate crucial perspectives on the Six Arrows: "What I expect without exception from my entire nation: complete obedience to the government's directives. [...] The entire nation has accepted the principles that I have announced, and it is clear that those who oppose these principles or even my person have no chance of becoming representatives elected by the nation." (Kemal G. M. 2007; Siska K. 2017, p. 201–213.)

The fundamental principle of Atatürk's politics can be succinctly summarized in the slogan: "Either freedom or death." This sentiment is reflected in one of Atatürk's speeches to the youth: "Oh, Turkish youth! Your first duty is to forever safeguard and defend Turkish freedom and the Turkish Republic. This is the foundation of your existence and your future. This foundation is your most valuable asset. There may come a day when they want to strip you of this asset, and there will be external and internal detractors. One day, when you have to participate in the salvation of freedom and the Republic, do not think about the opportunities or conditions provided by the situation. Because it is possible that these opportunities and conditions may not arise favorably. It is possible that the enemies aiming at freedom and the Republic will become heralds of an unprecedented victory in the world. It may happen that these enemies, through force and deception, infiltrate all our fortresses, occupy all our ships, subjugate our military forces one by one, and even effectively invade our country." (T.C: Caniri Valilgi 2016) The populist leader's common strategy is to address the youth, positioning themselves as defenders of the younger generation against the ossified elders. Atatürk knew well that the youth is the easiest to shape.

In the spirit of populism, Atatürk considered himself the articulate advocate of the nation's interests. He believed that since the people were not yet ready to voluntarily embrace the values of democracy, it was necessary to lead the Turkish nation with a strong hand. For Atatürk, the unity of the leader (himself) and the people was indivisible. However, he also identified an enemy against these two, making his politics not only popularist but also populist. One fundamental aspect of all populism is a belief in conspiracy theories: someone secretly

conspires against the unity of the People and power (Bogdanor, 2001, p. 557.). In North American populism, bankers, financial circles, and oligarchy played the role of the enemy, while in Ataturk's populism, it was conservative, religious forces that sought the return of the pre-1923 order. These monarchist, deeply devout Muslim forces, closely connected to the peasantry through the Sufi orders, opposed Ataturk's reforms, seeing them as irreligious. They rejected the adoption of the "guilty" European culture, threatening the success of Ataturk's Europeanization program. Against them, Ataturk took a firm and sometimes ruthless stance, brutally suppressing the rebellion that erupted in Menemen in 1930 (Flesch, 2007, p. 39.) The uprising instigated by the Sufis achieved the opposite of its goals: it did not shake Ataturk's power; on the contrary, the Republic's president tightened his control over the state and society even more.

Ataturk, therefore, anticipated that "internal power dynamics within the country might commit treason through their indifference, misguidance, and abandonment. Moreover, it might even happen that the members in power prioritize their own selfish interests over the nation. The nation may find itself tired and ruined." Ataturk unequivocally asserted that, for freedom, if necessary, one must be prepared to fight with weapons: "Oh, child of Turkish freedom! Under such circumstances, you have only one task: to defend Turkish freedom and the Turkish Republic! The strength you need flows in the noble blood within you!" (T.C: Caniri Valilgi 2016) Article 6 of the Turkish Constitution states: sovereignty unconditionally belongs to the people, and the use of sovereignty cannot be transferred to any community in any way (Milliyet, 2006).

For Ataturk, the realization of secularization was an extremely crucial element in the construction and preservation of an independent Turkey, which is also an important criterion in practice for its accession to the European Union. Ataturk stated: "I am pleased to see that we all agree on the idea of a secular republic. This has always been the foundation of my policy and always will be." He also explained: "Just as there have been throughout the centuries, there are still those both here and abroad who exploit the ignorance and fanaticism of peoples, and, driven by a thousand different political and personal interests, want to use us as tools. Unfortunately, I cannot refrain from speaking on this topic. As long as humanity does not arm itself with scientific knowledge that reveals the essence of religions, does not free itself from superstitions, and does not mature through the achievements of true science and technology, there will always be those who play with religion." (Kansu, C. A. 2017, p. 128.)

III. Ataturk's Impact on Turkish Society

Ataturk had a significant impact on the Turkish legal system, laying the foundations for a secularized state. Without him, Turkey could not have embarked on the path toward later integration into the European Union. Ataturk's reforms established democratic principles in the Turkish legal system, providing a solid foundation for future proximity to the EU and greatly transforming the internal structure of Turkish society.

In the Republic of Turkey, religious and state affairs were separated, Sharia courts were abolished on April 8, 1924. On March 1, 1926, they adopted the Turkish Penal Code based on the Italian model, followed by the Turkish Civil Code crafted based on the Swiss model in the same year. Additionally, a three-part Commercial Code was established following the Belgian, Chilean, German, French, Italian, and Moroccan models (Hamza, G. 2002, pp. 234-235.).

Mustafa Kemal played a crucial role in the abolition of titles such as "bej" and "pasha" in 1934, introducing a compulsory surname law for all Turkish citizens. Before this, surnames were not in use in Turkey. Equal rights were granted to men and women in the family, and divorce was no longer solely based on the husband's will. Thanks to Ataturk's reforms, universities were opened to female students (Flesch, I 2007, p. 34.).

Before the Republic, women faced limited opportunities and struggled to assert themselves in society. However, the era of the democratic republic ensured equal opportunities for women. Let's illustrate the opportunities available to women with a few examples. The first female judge in Turkey was Suat Berk (1901-2002), who began her career at the age of 21. When she became a judge, she remarked, "I thought people came to court to settle their cases, but it turned out they came to see the female judge." These thoughts reflect the uniqueness and unprecedented nature of having a woman in a judicial position in Turkey at that time. Thanks to Ataturk's reforms, several positive examples of women in such roles emerged.

Süreyya Agaoglu (1903-1989) was the first female Turkish lawyer and legal advocate. Known for her extensive knowledge, she spoke English and French and represented Turkey at numerous international conferences during her career. She was the first female student to enroll in law school, setting an example that women could fill such positions. From 1952, she was a

member of the International Federation of Women Lawyers and played a role in establishing important civil organizations. She published several successful books, two of the most significant being "I Saw You in London" and "Thus Passed a Life."

Muazzez Halet Isikpinar became Turkey's first female criminal judge in 1931 (Onedio, 2015).

These renowned Turkish women began their activities during the time of Ataturk's Republic, an era that offered opportunities not available during the Sultanate. Shortly thereafter, in 1934, women gained the right to vote (Hargittai, M 2015). The value of the suffrage was somewhat diminished by the fact that, in practice, only one party, the Republican People's Party, had a chance of winning and forming a government. As Ataturk expressed it: "Everything we see in the world is the creative work of women." (Goodreads, 2023)

Ataturk's modernization reforms brought significant changes in women's rights in Turkey, and this process gained further momentum with an eye towards EU accession in the 2000s. Turkey was the first to ratify the Istanbul Convention on March 12, 2012, focusing on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Council of Europe, 2011).

The preamble of the current Constitution of the Republic of Turkey pays tribute to the founder of the Turkish Republic, Ataturk, and his "immortal leader and unparalleled hero" reforms and principles. It states, "This Constitution, in line with the concept of nationalism introduced by the founder of the Turkish Republic, Ataturk, the immortal leader and unparalleled hero, and his reforms and principles."

Examining the preambles of European Union Constitutions, it can be observed that it is rare for a Constitution to refer to an individual and their ideas as one of the sources of national constitutionalism. It must be a unique personality deserving of being commemorated in the constitution of their homeland. Interestingly, among the EU member states, only Hungary remembers Saint Stephen in the preamble of its Fundamental Law, and the Slovak Constitution refers to Cyril and Methodius, acknowledging the spiritual legacy of these exemplary figures in their history.

IV. Ataturk's relationship with Europe

Ataturk's perspective on Westernization in 1923 was expressed as follows: "We don't adopt Western civilization to imitate them. What we find good in it, because it corresponds to our own characteristics, we will embrace at a global level. Countries may differ, but there is only one civilization, and it is inevitable for us to join it for national upliftment. The decline of the Ottoman Empire began when, in its arrogance from victories over Europe, it severed the ties that bound it to European nations. This was a mistake, and we will not fall into this error again... The Turkish people are friends with every cultured nation."

As early as 1922, Ataturk analyzed and considered the relationship between Turkey and Europe to be of paramount importance. In his speech on March 6, 1922, he conveyed the following message to Europe: "You all know that the most important states in Europe were created at the expense of Turkey's rise. Today, everything that affects the world, the strongest development reaching our people's lives and our country, was created while Turkey suffered losses. If Turkey had always been strong, today's policies could not have emerged. If Turkey had not first lost against Vienna, then against Budapest and Belgrade, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would never have been established. Due to all this, France, Italy, and Germany developed and strengthened. So, the things that caused harm throughout history partially consumed the strength of the damaged party."

Ataturk argued in a unique way in favor of belonging to Europe. He believed that the Turkish nation could only integrate into the family of European nations as an equal if the political, military, economic, and cultural dependence characterizing the preceding two hundred years of Ottoman history were eliminated. As Ataturk put it, "In fact, while Europe reached and developed to a higher level, Turkey only fell and continued to fall. As a result, much intelligence, emotion, and thought were focused on destroying Turkey, and by doing so, the generations that emerged after hundreds of years continued to devastate Turkey. This destruction was aimed at bringing Turkey into a more civilized state, but it was only used as an excuse for Europeans to infiltrate Turkey's internal affairs. Advice had to be sought from Europe. Every matter had to be handled according to European goals, and lessons had to be learned from Europe. But what kind of independence develops with the advice and plans of foreigners? History has never seen such a thing." (Milliyet, 2006)

On October 29, 1923, Ataturk stated: "We want to make the country more civilized and more cultured. Which country has not turned to the West for the development of civilization?" However, Ataturk emphasized that this line of thinking should not influence the Turkish stance to turn into resistance against the world. In an article published in *Vakit Gazetesi* on February 11, 1924, Ataturk wrote: "[the] Turk is a friend of cultured nations. Peoples are different, and culture, civilization is unique. In order for the Republic of Turkey to develop, it must work together with civilization." - These words seem to justify that the creation of a customs union was the first step towards Turkey's full membership in the European Union.

In Ataturk's speech in March 1933, we can find almost visionary thoughts: "Colonial politics and imperialism will disappear from the Earth, a cooperative era will begin, where color, religion, and nationality will no longer be decisive among nations." Ataturk stated that the Republic of Turkey must collaborate with Europe to achieve significant progress in the economy, science, and technology.

In one of Ataturk's articles, he also predicted the fate of Europe: "As it was yesterday, so will be tomorrow for Europe. The fate of Europe will depend on Germany. Germany has tremendous dynamism, they are extremely diligent and precise, and if »political draft« captures this 70-million population, then many things may happen." (1932, *Cumhuriyet Gazetesi*) (Ataturk Arastirma Merkezi (2014); Prieger, A. 2019.)

V. Conclusion

Ataturk is surrounded by unconditional and enduring respect in his homeland. His presence was commemorated through statues since 1926, and from 1934, the subject "History of the Turkish Revolution" was taught with Ataturk as its central figure (Flesch, 2007. p. 41). Ataturk sought to break Turkish society away from its Ottoman past and promoted a new nationalist ideology. In this nationalist vision, joining Europe played a crucial role. Ataturk leveraged the trust vested in him as a charismatic leader and tried to justify Turkey's belonging to Europe by his own example: he publicly wore a hat and European suits, and he travelled across the country with a board and chalk to teach people the new writing system.

Ataturk's message for future generations, which remains an important idea to this day, clearly expresses his intentions: "We must elevate our country to the level of flourishing and civilized nations in the world." (Atatürk Society of America, 2022)

The preamble of the 1982 constitution, which is still in effect, remembers Ataturk as the "immortal leader and unparalleled hero, founder of the republic," whose principles continue to guide the nation to present day (LSE Theses Online, 2007). These principles unequivocally point towards Europe.

Ataturk's speeches were highly informative and significant, with "Nutuk" (modern Turkish: Söylev; "Speech") being a famous speech he delivered during the second congress of the Republican People's Party between October 15 and 20, 1927. The speech covered the events between the beginning of the Turkish War of Independence (May 19, 1919) and the establishment of the Turkish Republic (1923). The document serves as an important source for the study of Kemalism. The recitation of the speech took approximately 36 hours in total. Scholars have identified the speech as a foundational source for the official history of the Turkish Republic (Siska, K. 2017/2., p. 201-214.). Ataturk's speeches had a significant impact on societal life, as evidenced by the fact that various universities in Turkey have established independent institutes to analyze his speeches. The Ataturk Research Centers, established by the Turkish government, publish writings analyzing Ataturk's speeches in various languages and from different perspectives (Siska, K. 2017/2., p. 201-214.).

At the entrance of Haydarpaşa Railway Station in Istanbul, one of Ataturk's well-known sayings is still displayed: "Ne mutlu Türk'üm diyene" – "How happy is the one who can call themselves a Turk." (Egeresi, Z , 2011). It is evident that Ataturk's ideology continues to resonate in our present day, and we can feel its influence everywhere. Ataturk's memory is also significant for us Hungarians, as he had an excellent understanding of Hungarian culture and the history of the development of the Hungarian language. According to his views, Hungarian culture and language were the ones most closely resembling ancient Turkish culture and language. He considered the Hungarian language reform programs as values to be followed. The Hungarian institute at Ankara University, Dil ve Tarih — Coğrafya Fakültesi (Faculty of Humanities at Ankara University), was established at the personal request of Ataturk (Nemzetközi Magyar Filológiai Társaság, 1993, p. 1298).

In summary, Atatürk aimed to create a European Turkey characterized by a strong national consciousness and a robust national character. Thanks to Atatürk, the administration in Turkey became European, as did the legal system, education, and scientific life. European laws replaced Islamic family law, and the process of women's emancipation began. The introduction of the Latin alphabet was another step towards Europeanization (Kansu, C. A. 2017, p. 144-145.).

Although the geopolitical relations between Europe and the Middle East have significantly changed in the past century, Turkey continues to move forward on the foundations laid by Atatürk. The development of neo-Ottoman foreign policy does not signify a return to the Ottoman past but rather a renewed orientation towards a Western-oriented Turkey, as the respect for Atatürk remains unwavering. Turkey remains an important partner for Europe today, and it is expected to play a crucial role in the future Europe, regardless of when it gains full admission to the organization of European integration.

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THE ROLE OF MEHMET AKIF ERSOY IN THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM

Ayşegül Adanır²

Abstract

Along with the social and political developments that occurred in the last century of the Ottoman Empire, significant changes were observed in the realm of ideological thought. The awakening around Islamic and nationalist ideas prompted society to seek solutions for the crumbling empire's salvation. Mehmet Akif Ersoy, a prominent figure in the national struggle and known for his national-Islamic identity, is recognized as a leading figure in this struggle through his poems and writings. Mehmet Akif Ersoy as a so-called national anthem writer considered a prominent name in the defense of national struggle with epic vision and patriotic sense of his poems. Mehmet Akif Ersoy was acknowledged by his motivative poems for Turkish Muslims during the national struggle. The political circumstances during the break of the imperial lands are influenced intellectuals' position and developed their stance about the ongoing ideological strands. He was well known for his published writings on columns and mostly by his poems that made him to be named as "the poet of Islam". Being called in this symbolic figure had a missionary role to affect and lead the Islamic society. From this point of view, Akif as a literary identity, his rhetoric and writings were considered to be the religious and national symbol among Muslim Turks in Turkey.

Keywords: Mehmet Akif Ersoy, Nationalism, Islamism, Turkism, Turkish Nationalism

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Mehmet Akif Ersoy, often referred to as a national anthem writer, emerges as a prominent figure in the defense of the Turkish national struggle, disposing of his poems with an epic vision and a deep sense of patriotism. Understanding the changes that occurred at various stages of Mehmet Akif's life is crucial. These changes shed light on the evolution of his thoughts, particularly concerning nationalism.

In his early years, Akif advocated for the unity of the Islamic community (ummah) while vehemently opposing racial nationalism, instead advocating for Pan-Islamism. However, events such as the Balkan War and the aftermath of World War I prompted shifts in his views towards unity. These experiences sparked an ideological transformation in Akif, evident in his poetry, where the sentiment of nationalism becomes increasingly prominent in his expressions.

Akif's life, shaped by the circumstances of his time, provides insight into the evaluation of his ideas, which are inherently intertwined with the context of his era. His life journey reflects various shifts in his ideologies, particularly regarding Turkish nationalism and Islamism. Born in Istanbul, Mehmet Akif hailed from a family of Albanian origin, setting the backdrop for his upbringing and worldview. Through the fusion of his liberal education from academic institutions and the religious teachings provided by his father, Mehmet Akif Ersoy developed a synthesis of modernization and Islamic fundamentalism, realism with religious conviction. Notably, he wrote the Turkish national anthem, however, in 1923, during Atatürk's rule, he moved to Egypt. Upon his return, he was approached to participate in a Qur'an translation project initiated by Diyanet, albeit reluctantly. However, he became suspenseful about the project's potential alignment with the liberal regime's agenda and ultimately declined to take role (Fergan 1938, 190).

Mehmet Akif Ersoy was a key figure in 20th-century Turkish intellectual circles, making significant contributions to literature, politics, and Turkish history. He often criticized the Muslim East for lagging behind the West in modernity through his poetry and speeches. His poetic journey began in 1893, and his famous work "Safahat" (1911-1933) contains epic and satirical poems reflecting the times. In 1908, he started editing the Islamic journal "Sırat-ı Mustakim," later known as "Sebilürreşad." Known as "the poet of Islam," his writings played a role in shaping religious and national identity among Turkish Muslims.

Mehmet Akif Ersoy was known for his debates with Turkish nationalists, whom he criticized for promoting nationalism. Interestingly, despite his later role as a national poet and anthem writer, he initially viewed nationalism as incompatible with Islam. In his Islamic journal, *Sebilürreşad*, he urged Muslims to resist nationalist ideas and cautioned against divisive ideologies within the Muslim community. Initially, the journal *Sırâtımüstakîm* published articles without aligning with any specific ideology.

Considering Mehmet Akif Ersoy's earlier engagements with debates surrounding Turkism and Pan-Islamism, his embrace of nationalist ideology was somewhat ambiguous. However, following the emergence of the Turkish nationalist movement led by the Young Turks, he began to critique nationalist theories and advocate for Ottoman nationalism in his anti-racist poems (Düzdağ, 1996: 71). During World War I, Akif joined the *Teşkilat-i Mahsusa*, an intellectual service supporting the Turkish Independence War through public discourse. His activism for national salvation coincided with the rule of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). He aligned with new assemblies opposing the authority of Abdulhamid II, whom he opposed due to his anti-Abdulhamis stance. While some argue that Akif's involvement with the CUP was out of necessity (Kara, 2011), there are reservations about labeling him solely as an Islamist or Muslim pioneer. Sinan Meydan suggests that Muslims' perception of Akif may not fully reflect his true identity and beliefs.

Influenced by the global spread of Islamism, from Pakistan to India, Mehmet Akif Ersoy was inspired by the leading figures of Islamic modernist thought, who developed ideas based on both national and religious grounds. Akif was particularly impressed by the cultural and religious defenders of Islamism, whose ideologies shaped his own participation in Islamism. Notably, he expressed admiration for pioneers such as Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, who initiator of the Islamism project. In his later writings, Akif openly acknowledged being influenced by the ideas of Islamic modernism, often referencing Afghani and Abduh as sources of inspiration.

The transformation in Mehmet Akif Ersoy's views becomes evident in his work "*Safahat*," where no objections to nationalism are apparent before the emergence of the Turkism movement in 1912. However, starting from 1912, following the Balkan Wars and the subsequent independence of Albania, his criticism of nationalism, particularly Turkism, reaches

its peak (Düzdağ, 1997). Akif critiques Turkist Muslims, arguing that their advocacy for Turkism contradicts Islamic principles. Among fervent Islamist figures like Babanzade, who was both a friend of Akif and a vocal critic of nationalism for causing division and harming Muslim unity, Akif stands out for his stance against nationalist ideologies.

In Mehmet Akif Ersoy's references to the Muslim Nation and Ottoman Nation, there is a clear emphasis on unity rather than ethnic-based divisions. However, towards the end of his life, Akif's views on nationalism evolved, and he came to accept nationalism as a prevailing reality. Following the national war, he embraced nationalist sentiments, albeit without endorsing irredentist nationalism. Notably, Akif introduced the novel concept of blending nationalism with religion, merging the two ideologies into a unified framework.

The Turkish national anthem written by Mehmet Akif Ersoy during World War I serves as a concise and focused expression of his beliefs regarding Turkish nationalism and promoting of religious nationalism. During this period, themes of independence and freedom were obvious and serving a rejection against Western attack on Muslim Anatolia. Akif idealized Anatolia as the homeland, reminding of the glorious history and achievements of Turkish Muslims, as reflected in the national anthem. However, Akif's conception of independence and freedom differs from that of his contemporaries, such as Namık Kemal and other Turkish nationalists who espoused Turanian ideology. While they emphasized Turkish nationalism, Akif strengthened the characteristics of freedom and independence within Turk-Islam by rooting them in the history of Turkishness.

The anthem also exhibits a great importance in point of emphasizing the Islamic notions that was obviously seen in dominance in the anthem. The repeat over the religious references considers the concept of vatan (homeland) is depicted more religious and a sacred place rather than national and a political territory. In these sentences that he specifically attributes homeland:

O my friend! Do not let the villain desecrate my land
To curb this indecent incursion, do make thyself a shield
For soon shall rise the sun of the promise of Heaven
Maybe tomorrow, who knoweth? Maybe sooner even!

Do know that the ground thou treadest is not mere soil
Do think about the thousands lying in graves without veil
Thou art the son of a martyr, do honor your sire
Never cede this vatan, even with the promise of the whole sky

For this heavenly vatan, who would not lay down his life?
Should one squeeze the soil, martyrs would burst, sure enough
Of my soul, my beloved, of all what I have, May God me deprive
But not separate me from the only vatan I need to survive

O Lord, here is the sole wish of my pain- stricken heart
Let no heathen hands ever touch my shrine's chest
These adhans, witnessing the pillars of my faith
Should be heard upon my immortal homeland day and night (Özkan 2012, 93-4)

It is crucial to note that Mehmet Akif Ersoy frequently emphasized the connection between Islam and Turkish identity by prioritizing Islamism over mere Islamic ideology, suggesting that being a Turk necessitates being a Muslim simultaneously. Akif implies that prior to embracing Islam, Turks did not truly embody their Turkishness. He considers that Turkish history commenced only after embracing Islam and becoming Muslims, thus dismissing any pre-Islamic Turkish history. Akif's articulation of nationalism among Turks originated as a reactionary response to early proponents of nationalism who opposed Turks.

Earlier of Turkish nationalism when it was rooted in Islamic values and played a pivotal role in shaping republican ideology, this influence gradually evolved into Islamic nationalism, considered a precursor to nationalism. Mehmet Akif Ersoy's nationalism is imbued with patriotism, emphasizing the importance of the country and national unity. In his national anthem, there is a strong sense of religious patriotism, blending religious and national symbolism. The National Struggle held profound significance for the future of Islam, as the collapse of the country would also signify the decline of Islam. Akif emphasized the importance of Turkish soldiers, praising their bravery with lines such as "Such is your greatness, that your blood saves God's unity/ Even the lions of Bedr could have won only so much glory" (Ersoy 1915). For Mehmet Akif Ersoy, the country serves as a crucial bastion for the existence and

perpetuation of religion. Therefore, Turkey holds a special significance as a homeland of Islam. Akif believed that the collapse of other countries would not only signify the loss of their national identity but also threaten the Islam itself. However, he cautioned against the inappropriate use of terms and the used an inappropriate comparison between Turkish soldiers and the companions of Prophet Muhammad from early Islamic history. The use of the word "ırk" (race) in Mehmet Akif Ersoy's national anthem suggests his embrace of Turkish nationalism ideas over time (Akyüz, 2012). However, some argue that when the anthem was written, "ırk" did not specifically refer to race, but rather encompassed the entire society regardless of racial or national differences. Instead, it symbolized people sharing a common historical background and uniting under imperial flags. While the current usage of "ırk" may imply race in English, its original meaning in the anthem was more inclusive, reflecting unity beyond racial or national distinctions.

Mehmet Akif Ersoy makes a distinction between two words that currently hold similar meanings: nationality (milliyet) and ethnicity (kavmiyet). Initially, he uses these terms interchangeably, but later he differentiates between them by expressing opposition only to ideas of ethnicity (kavmiyet), not nationalism (milliyet). Akif frequently employs the term "milliyetçilik" (nationalism) with religious tones in defense of Islamism. In his poems, the effort required for the national struggle is coupled with religious concerns. His efforts to preserve cultural identity emphasize the ethno-religious nature of nationalism.

Fickle crescent! Do not frown on us with such stern visage, I beg;
Grant my heroic race a smile... why all this rage, this violence?
If it be so, we would not our spilled blood on you gladly bestow.
For it is the right of my God-fearing nation to be independent
(Ersoy, Turkish National Anthem).

The phrases "Grant my heroic race" (Kahraman ırkıma) and "Abide your word, abide yourself and take after your race" (Sözü sağlam, özü sağlam ol, ırkına çek) specifically refer to the Turkish people and Turkishness (Ersoy, 2008, 466; Çetin, 2012). Mehmet Akif Ersoy's narrative in the national anthem highlights cultural values within a heroic history with religious connections. He intertwines religious symbols such as the call to prayer, martyrdom, and the crescent as explanations for religious nationalism. Despite his sympathy for Turkish

nationalism and the Ottoman Empire, Akif undertakes a mission as the savior of Islam and the Islamic nation. His reactions, as portrayed in his poems, are often attributed to religious symbols and references. Akif places great value on soldiers and martyrs in the national struggle for salvation as seen in the passages:

Now lie stretched out, hit in the middle of their spotless foreheads;
My God, my God, what suns are setting for the sake of a crescent!
You, soldier, who has fallen to the ground for the sake of this land!
Your ancestors might well descend from heaven to kiss that pure forehead.
Such is your greatness, that your blood saves God's unity...
Even the lions of Bedr could have won only so much glory (Ersoy 1915).

In addition to emphasizing the significance of Turkish soldiers and their contributions, Mehmet Akif Ersoy's depiction often extends beyond boundaries, leading him to intertwine sacred and religious figures in an unconventional manner:

If I were to place the Kaaba at your head as your tombstone;
If I were to write my soul's illumination into your inscription;
If I were then to take the heavens, and wrap them
Around your bleeding grave as a holy, star-spangled drape (Ersoy 1915).

As depiction of a religious symbol, Kaaba is a highly revered symbol in Islam. Being allegorically suggested as a tombstone to honor the martyrs of the national war, poses a significant dilemma for Muslims in these passages. While the narration is figurative, the notion of the Kaaba being in service to Turkish martyrs may raise concerns among Muslims. Mehmet Akif Ersoy portrays Turkish martyrs as having a religious mission to save the Muslim country, which some may view as excessive. Furthermore, calling upon religion to be the savior of Muslims contradicts the idea of Muslims being tasked with preserving Islam.

In similar descriptions, Mehmet Akif Ersoy's calls for God's intervention may also be viewed within the same dilemma. In moments of fervor or intense emotion, he may invoke divine assistance, which some may interpret as exceeding of boundaries:

Oh God! These lands were the last home of those innocent people...
How your rage confirmed the vile to hit them
Sure, from the worst of nations, three villain army
Just came and hit us right from our chest, watch what a strike was it:
You did not manifest once, with your kindness, Oh God!
You killed those three hundred and fifty million souls with your rage!
Even while having fun with your decadence (Safahat 2008, 176-8)

From these passages on Surah Ali Imran, Mehmet Akif Ersoy aims to invoke divine intervention, particularly reflecting on verse 186. He emphasizes the responsibility for divine action to safeguard God's religion, portraying the country as the ultimate sanctuary. However, he laments that despite being a sacred place, it has fallen victim to the curse of non-believers. Akif questions why God's wrath has led to the deaths of three hundred and fifty million people, pondering the intention behind.

The forms of nationalism as it is depicted in Mehmet Akif Ersoy's embrace of Turkish nationalism is evolved alongside a cultural and religious synthesis. Similarly, Smith argues that nationalism extends beyond mere political entities and nation-based territories. He suggests that classification should focus on the type of separation that emphasizes political independence and autonomy rather than ethnicity and culture-based nationalism. According to Smith, nationalism encompasses more than just politics; it encompasses various forms that emerge from cultural combinations. These multiple derivations of nationalism can lead to different directions.

Mehmet Akif Ersoy frequently attributes symbolism of Islam to the country of Turkey, viewing its formation as instrumental in the preservation of religion. His statement "The country is falling apart, so is the religion" as described in original lines "Memleket mahvoluyor, din de berâber gidiyor" directly links the fate of the country with the fate of religion, suggesting that

Turkey's historical destiny offers the opportunity for the revival of Islam. However, Akif also emphasizes that the maintenance of religiosity in society depends on the strength of the state. He expresses fear of non-Muslim occupation of Turkey as a Muslim land, underscoring the importance of Turkey's identity as a stronghold for Islam. Mehmet Akif Ersoy stands with the notion that a religion proclaiming itself as universal cannot ensure the same destiny for a specific territory, society, or nation. Timurtaş characterizes Mehmet Akif Ersoy as a nationalist intellectual poet, but notes that his nationalism differs from the concept of ummah and the Islamic nation. Akif's idea of unity is rooted more in patriotic and religious principles, drawing strength from history and the current condition of the Empire. Instead of a contemporary sense of nationalism, Akif adopts a synthesis of Turkish-Islamic nationalism, which does not encompass a global vision that includes the entire Islamic world and Muslim people within the empire's domain.

Mehmet Akif Ersoy's identity as an essential nationalist poet and intellectual whose concept of nationalism deviates somewhat from the prevailing and general understanding. Unlike the concept of ummah, Akif's sense of unity is based on homeland (vatan) and religion, drawing inspiration from history and nationhood. Timurtaş argues that Turkish nationalism emerged as a necessity arising from the conditions of the Ottoman Empire. He emphasizes that Turkish nationalism had a distinct vision from the ummah sense, as it was specific to Muslims residing within the Ottoman Empire rather than encompassing the entire Islamic community (Timurtaş, 1987).

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the national government, Mehmet Akif Ersoy's poem, written as the national anthem, clearly uses the words "race" (ırk) and "millet" in the context of the Turkish race and the Turkish nation (Timurtaş, 1987, 56). Akif's conception of nationalism, as briefly described by Topçu, revolves around a consciousness of history rooted in a nostalgic reverence for the past and the land. Topçu argues that Akif's synthesis of religious and national consciousness stands in contrast to the nationalism of liberal concepts, which often includes racist or religious extremist approaches. However, Akif underscores the inseparability of Turks from Islam and Turkish nationalism from Islam. Topçu defends this nationalism, steering it towards a direction focused on morality and virtue.

Kabaklı (1986) views Akif's conservative identity as that of a "moral nationalist," emphasizing a conscience grounded in patriotic and folkloric notions that embrace nationalism while rejecting racism (Kabaklı, 1986, 52). Akif's project of nationalism vehemently opposes racism, which he sees as incompatible with Muslim identity. This rejection extends to any form of Islamism that defends racist or tribalist claims.

Furthermore, Mehmet Akif Ersoy transitioned from Ottomanism to becoming a "Turk-Islam nationalist" (Çetin, 2012, p.85). This shift is seen as a consequence of World War I, where nationalism intertwined with Islam as a legacy from Islamism (Kara, 2004, p.30). Although Ottomanism ideology persisted among Ottoman Muslims for some time, nationalism ideas eventually gained widespread acceptance (Hanioglu, 1985, p.1390). Akif believed that the West accelerated the rise of nationalism to undermine the Ottoman state and weaken Muslim countries. He advocated for Islamic unity (Pan-Islamism) as the path to liberation and Muslim unity. Thus, during the late Ottoman Empire, Akif assessed the political harm of Turkish policy on the trajectory of Turkish nationalist movements.

Kabaklı (1986) argues that Mehmet Akif Ersoy's ideas revolve around two main points: the idea of nation and Islam. Akif believed that the Turkish nation should lead and safeguard Islam, asserting that the destruction of Turks would lead to the demise of Islam. The term "ummah" is considered inadequate to describe Akif, as his reaction to nationalism is aligned with opposition to racism while supporting religious nationalism. He emphasized culture and civilization, similar to Ziya Gökalp, favoring an indigenous civilization rather than a direct imitation of Western style. However, Akif's primary focus lies on culture that embodies true and well-understood Islam at its core.

Moreover, Kabaklı suggests that Akif and Ziya Gökalp converge on similar grounds by embracing cultural nationalism and Turkish folkloric tradition in their nationalist ideals. Akif sought to establish political unity among Muslims, leading Kabaklı to categorize him as an Islamic nationalist, while Gökalp is classified as a Turkish nationalist (Güneş, 2011, p.164).

The debate between Mehmet Akif Ersoy and Tefik Fikret began when Fikret, a Westernist intellectual, expressed his cosmopolitan view of nationalism as "the whole earth is my country, my nation is humankind" in original words "Milliyetim nev'i beşer, vatanım ruy-i zemindir" (Fikret 2006).

Fikret's humanist and anti-nationalist stance was defined by this approach. However, Akif satirized Fikret's ideas, labeling them as deceitful and suggesting that those who believe in them would lose both their homeland and their humanity "Bu yalana inanırsan ne vatanın kalır ne ruy-i zemin" (Ünsal, 2005). For Akif, there was no place for cosmopolitanism in reality. He deliberately embraced nationalism and felt the need for nationalist ideology in practice. During this period, Akif indicated that he supported nationalist suggestions and was willing to endorse local nationalism when it served his anti-imperialist purposes.

CONCLUSION

In the final century of the Ottoman Sultanate, there were intense national struggles amid World War I. Turkish writers and poets of that era were dedicated to gather both internal and external support for these struggles in pursuit of national independence. Notably, history and literature intertwined during this period, in search of a collective solidarity. Epic literature and heroic narratives used to raise the sense of community, honoring soldiers who defended against invaders threatening Islamic lands. The empire, as the core of the Islamic nation, faced the threat of Western occupation, seen as a jeopardy to the broader Muslim world. This danger was perceived universally among Muslim nations, transcending national boundaries. Thus, the aspiration for Turkish sovereignty and the empire's preservation was deemed essential for all Muslim nations, symbolizing the defense of Islam itself.

Mehmet Akif Ersoy, known for his role as a national anthem writer, emerged as a prominent figure in the defense of the national struggle, primarily through his epic poetry and patriotic sentiments. Beyond his literary works, Akif actively participated in society, aiming to foster national unity by instilling a religious sense of duty. He delivered sermons to awaken national consciousness among the people. His mission was centered on serving the welfare of the Muslim community and promoting recognition of national values with a patriotic fervor. During World War I in the Ottoman Empire, Muslim intellectuals advocated for national salvation through Islamic unity, steadfastly supporting the concept of an Ottoman nation.

Mehmet Akif Ersoy takes a distinct position among Muslim Ottoman intellectuals, renowned for his contributions to Islamic literature and the Turkish independence movement. He is widely known as the "national poet" in Turkey. Akif's works, including poems, articles, and sermons, reflect his acute sensitivity to social events and contemporary issues of his time. He vehemently opposed sociopolitical movements that contradicted his faith and moral principles. His response

to social corruption within the Muslim community was rooted in his vision for the empire's salvation and the revival of the Muslim nation. Consequently, he consistently emphasized the importance of truth and the embrace of Islamic and Turkish identity in his speeches, maintaining his activism throughout. His writings often revolve around the concept of the Islamic nation and society. Living through the late years of the late Ottoman Empire, Akif witnessed firsthand the chaos and stress of his era as well.

The challenges Mehmet Akif Ersoy encountered throughout his life were profoundly influenced by the evolving landscape of the Ottoman Empire, particularly as Western territories, such as the Balkans, began to depart from Muslim rule. Akif recognized the threat posed by Western expansion into Ottoman territories and identified nationalism as the primary catalyst for upheaval and decline in the Islamic world. He vigorously criticized and condemned the rising ideologies of nationalism and Westernism, which were influenced by Western progress and the French Revolution. Akif viewed these ideologies as imported threats that, following the loss of the Balkans, would ultimately lead to defeat across the entire empire. The hardships he faced following the Balkan losses prompted a shift in his ideology from Ottomanism to Islamism.

While Mehmet Akif Ersoy's patriotism doctrine is indeed associated with nationalism, his approach to nationalism diverges from conventional nationalist claims. He seeks to broaden the understanding of nationalism by emphasizing its role in shaping national consciousness and identity. Akif's perspective acknowledges the various sources that contribute to building a sense of national identity and consciousness. Whether expressed through loyalty to one's country or obedience to the nation, this exercise of national expression is crucial for fostering national discourse.

It is important to recognize that Akif's contributions extend beyond mere patriotism; they serve to stimulate Turkish introspection and self-awareness. His critiques of societal issues and challenges helped to cultivate a growing national consciousness among the Turkish people. Through his writings and activism, Akif played a significant role in encouraging Turks to reflect on their national identity and heritage.

Nationalism has undergone a transformation since the time of the Ottoman Empire, frequently finding its roots in Islamic sources. However, there are diverse perspectives and approaches to nationalism, ranging from direct rejection to embracing it in its cultural, religious, and patriotic forms. Mehmet Akif, as a devout Muslim and genuine patriot, viewed nationalism through the

lens of Muslim awakening, resistance against Western imperialism, and the salvation of all Muslims.

For Akif, nationalism transcended mere political or cultural boundaries; it evolved into a synthesis of cultural and religious values, where neither aspect was sacrificed. His concept of nationalism integrated religious and patriotic sentiments, nurturing each other to form a profound sense of love and commitment. Akif's perspective represents a unique blend of cultural-religious nationalism, wherein both aspects complement and reinforce one another.

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DONKEY RIDE TO ISTANBUL: THE ZION MULE CORPS AND THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

Csapó Gergely³

Abstract

It is undisputed that the Gallipoli campaign was a crucial moment for the birth of the Republic of Turkey. During the campaign however, a military unit distinguished itself, which was organized on the side of the Entente Powers. It could only be established due to the late Ottoman Empire's hostile policy towards internal religious and ethnic minorities. Mentioned unit was a rather small combat detachment, the Zion Mule Corps, from a modern view the precursors of the modern Israel Defense Force. The precursor of the Corps was the idea of a pro-turkish Jewish militia in Palestine, proposed by Zionist leaders living under Ottoman rule in 1914. Among its members were Joseph Trumpeldor, who became an ideal of modern the Israeli soldier, Ze'ev Jabotinsky, who developed the principle of revisionist Zionism, and David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first Prime Minister. The plan of the militia was thwarted by the political maneuvering of Djemal Pasha, a pillar member of the so-called Young Turk Triumvirate, what basically controlled the Ottoman Empire in its final years. Djemal vehemently opposed the Zionist Movement, and furthermore, following the Ottoman Empire's alignment to the Central Powers, he masterminded the mass deportation of Jewish settlers, most of whom came from the territories of Entente and associated powers. Eventually, the Zion Mule Corps was formed from numerous Jewish volunteers deported to Egypt, in spite of Djemal's anti-semitic policies, serving as a British-leaning auxiliary unit. The Corps served during the Gallipoli campaign and laid the groundwork for the Jewish Legion organized in 1917.

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I. Historical Background

In order to understand the significance behind the Zion Mule Corps, I have to provide some necessary contexts about the overall international conditions of the Jewish world at the dawn of the 20th century.

The ideology of Zionism was on the rise and the nationalistic urge inside Jewish communities to return back to their ancestral homeland grew even stronger and stronger. The end of the 19th century already saw a large wave of Jewish settlers moving to the Levantine Coast en-masse, mainly as part of a romantic peasant movement, known only as the First Aliyah. From this humble beginnings, the Zionist Movement started to take root and grew stronger in the following decades.

The Russian Empire was the state housing the largest quantities of Jewish communities in the whole world, inheriting the majority of them from the late Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Russian imperial regime was worldwide known about its anti-Semitic tendencies and the Russian defeat at the Russo-Japanese war, then the Russian Revolution of 1905 just poured gasoline onto the fire. Extremist groups in Russia felt like, that the Jewish population stabbed the Bear in the Back, causing its humiliating defeat against the Japanese Empire. Then, following the same rhetoric, these groups of diversants, most notably Jews and Poles were the cause of the recent instability and growing revolutionary sentiment within the Empire.

The years before and after these two events were not kind to the Jewish community. Russia became a home to extreme pogroms, mostly organized and executed by the radical ultranationalist and ultramonarchist group known as the Black Hundreds.

The most known out of all of these atrocities were the Kishinev Pogroms between 1903 and 1905. These atrocities were unpopular abroad, turning Russia into an international pariah and even the 26th President of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt raised strong words against the Russian leadership for not just letting, but indirectly supporting the practice.

The harsher conditions in Russia gave space to the Second Aliyah Movement, what saw even bigger numbers of Jews leaving for the Levantine Coast, predominantly to Palestine. These settlers usually came from underdeveloped rural communities, just to find their ancestral homeland to be the same, if not even worse. An underdeveloped rural region, with close-to-medieval life conditions, no electricity or running water, where the countryside was always ravaged by marauding bandits and vagabonds. Many of these settlers turned to form a type of

armed agricultural peasant community, known as the kibbutz. The man who developed the idea was Joseph Trumpeldor. A veteran and hero of the Russo-Japanese conflict and one of the few Jewish soldiers, who got a royal exception from the Russian tsar to become commissioned officers within the Russian Army. Trumpeldor entered service just to prove the equal values of the Jewish soldiers to the Russian military leadership, but after losing an arm during the Siege of Port Arthur and getting captured by the Japanese, what he returned to Russia after the war was a state, further plagued by anti-Semitic violence and a leadership even more closed towards the equality of their Jewish subjects than before. Trumpeldor turned down the offer to become an officer, alongside with several high military decorations, then made the Aliyah himself. Trumpeldor was next to several other influential Zionist leaders, who became the ruling voice of the Levantine Jewish community, better known as: The Yishuv.

II. From Loyalist Militia to Deportation

In June of 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir apparent of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was assassinated by a Serbian nationalist in Sarajevo. After months of back and forth diplomatic talks, the Austrians declared war on Serbia, which triggered a domino effect in international alliances and guarantees, eventually dragging all of the European Great Powers into a conflict. A 100 years after Napoleon, a continent spanning conflict broke out, known as the Great War, with Germany and Austria-Hungary on one side, with France, Russia and the United Kingdoms on the other.

The Ottoman Empire at the time saw a period of reform attempts and internal strife, what dominated the policies of the Porte. In 1908 the Young Turk Revolution saw the rise of a more liberal minded, constitutionalist system, what unfortunately lost its popular support after the Kingdom of Italy defeated the Ottoman Empire in 1911, then due to loss against the Italians a coalition of Balkan states rose up to throw the Turkish yoke back to the other side of the Bosphorus. The greatest winner of the first conflict was Bulgaria, even securing the city of Edirne for herself, what completely delegitimized the leading Turkish government, what was coup'd shortly after by a military junta, led by an army officer named Enver Pasha. The new militaristic dictatorship turned towards the German sphere in order to secure economical and military aid for the future. It also marked a period of rising Turkish nationalism, what was in

direct contrast of the more likeminded and tolerant attitude, what defied turkish internal policies towards religious minorities for centuries. The new system became increasingly more hostile towards it's jewish population as well.

When the World War broke out, the Ottoman Empire remained neutral, but with Enver at the helm it was obvious, that Istanbul only waited for an opportunity to enter the war on the side of the Central Powers. With this, several highly influential members of the Yishuv saw the writing on the wall and started to take action accordingly. If the Ottoman Empire enters the war on the german side, that means war with the Russian Empire. A war with the state, that the overwhelming majority of the Yishuv community fled from and saw it as the modern equivalent of Babylon or Emperor Hadrian's Roman Empire. The leadership of the Yishuv was afraid from the fact of a possible russian victory over the turks. Even more because it lagged the possibility of a russian power-grab over the Middle East, what would place them under the rule of the russians again. Three of the most prominent jewish leaders, Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, David Ben-Gurion and Ze'ev Jabotinsky thought, that ensuring a turkish victory in the conflict might be their best interest and by directly helping the turks to achieve this, they might be able to better the view of the turkish leadership on the jewish question. A plan was raised and with majority support, the Yishuv accepted the idea of trying to raise a self-defense militia and present the idea to Istanbul. The plan was about an armed self-defense force, raised from the already armed rural jewish settlers from the Levantine Coast, mainly from Palestine to fight against any possible hostile foreign incursions. The militia was planned to be placed under the direct command of the turkish governor of Jerusalem. Turkish leadership at first was supportive towards the idea and organization was bestowed upon a circle of war veterans, mainly from the Russo-Japanese war, including Joseph Trumpeldor. The unit however never saw duty, as the Middle Eastern theater and the 4th Turkish Army came under the command of the minister of the Navy and a member of the leading Three Pashas, Djemal Pasha.

Djemal actively opposed any idea of an armed jewish military unit. This sentiment was mainly attributed to his antisemitic views, but was legitimized by the simple fact, that the majority of the Yishuv community hailed from Entente countries, primarily from Russia. By pressure from Djemal, any jewish settlers without turkish citizenship hailing from entente countries were labeled as hostile aliens and were deemed to deportations in the near future. Though international support, mainly the protesting of the american embassy in Istanbul, a quick system for naturalization was established, but ineffective and unwilling civil servants were unable to

process thousands of applications for turkish citizenship just in a few weeks and even then the majority of these were denied. The idea of the militia was scrapped, the jewish settlers were disarmed, their wealth was confiscated and in a few short months, a huge portion of the yishuv's population found themselves on steamers under neutral flags sailing towards Alexandria.

Ben Gurion and Ben Zvi remained pro-ottoman despite this sudden betrayal, arguing that an oppressing turkish victory might still be better, than letting even a fracture of Palestine being seized by the russian bear, while Jabotinsky with the support of Trumpeldor came to the conclusion, that maybe they will have a better chance with the western allies.

III. The Establishment of the Zion Mule Corps

Jabotinsky presented the idea of a foreign volunteer corps to the british military governor of Egypt, General John Maxwell. Maxwell was open to consider the idea, but eventually had to deny it on the ground of british army laws. The 1881 Army Act forbade non-british citizens to enter into the service of the British Army and he alone couldn't do anything to change it. However, he was able to find a loophole and offered the formation of a colonial auxiliary unit, more precisely, a muleteer corps. Tasked to carry ammunition and water for frontline troops and in ideal circumstances never engage in any combat. Jabotinsky was against the idea and abandoned Egypt, going to tour France and the United Kingdoms to lobby for the establishment of a larger jewish unit. At the same time Trumpeldor stayed in Alexandria and his clique of war veterans eventually met with an unlikely patron.

Lieutenant-Colonel John Henry Patterson took an interest in a possible jewish military unit after he arrived to Alexandria in February of 1915. Born from a protestant southern-irish aristocratic family, Patterson already had a rather adventurous life behind him. Serving in Canada with the mounted police, touring the United States in the staff of Theodore Roosevelt, fighting in the Second Boer War and hunting for a pair of man-eating lions alongside the Uganda railways, better known as the Tsavo Man-Eaters, the Ghost and the Darkness. Patterson wrote a novel about his adventures in East Africa, what got him international fame and recognition. He became an influential voice in the british military due to his international recognition and knew perfectly, how to use public support to achieve his goals. Rather coincidental, that he was symphatetic towards the jewish cause, having philosemitic values and made the case of the mule corps as his own.

Patterson and Trumpeldor quickly came into an agreement, with the latter supporting Patterson's argument, that the alexandrian refugees might take Maxwell's offer and enlist for the mule corps. Patterson's argument was, that even a unit of transportation was important for the war effort and that even the smallest help it could provide would lead to Zion. An agreement was reached and an overwhelming number of volunteers made applications, giving the opportunity to Maxwell to issue for the establishment of the unit. Originally it was an unarmed transportation detachment known as the Assyrian-Jewish Refugee Mule Corps, but with Patterson's lobbying, the unit soon got an order to be armed and renamed into the Zion Mule Corps.

The unit received british uniforms and equipment, but was armed with 1887-pattern Mauser rifles brought up from egyptian weapon depots and through neutral weapon traders. The reasoning behind this was, that it was a commonly available weapon in the Ottoman Empire and most of the volunteers, who worked on the agricultural sector usually kept these weapons for self-defense against the rampant banditry problem, what plagued the dry hills of Palestine. Due to restrictions in british army laws, the unit could only had 500 members maximum. The language used for communication was modern hebrew, revived by Ben Yehuda only a few decades earlier. Patterson became the leading officer with Trumpeldor, now with a rank of Captain in the british army as his deputy.

Patterson knew the significance of the unit and with his influence over the press british newspapers wrote about the Zion Mule Corps as a huge achievement in human history, as they labeled it the first jewish military unit ever since the Bar Kokhba Revolt. However it was not true, as true jewish military units served in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and even on both sides during the American Civil War.

Due to the already progressing Gallipoli campaign and shortage in transportation detachments, british leadership ordered all available transportation units to be immediately shipped to Gallipoli. Those who were just under organization could only receive a few weeks of training before being shipped into the frontlines. Due to this fact, the Zion Mule Corps only had a chance to receive a shortened, 3-weeks long training, before boarding the ships and being sent to Gallipoli. During the route morale was high, despite constant marginalization due to the corps official colonial auxiliary unit status.

IV. Gallipoli

The invasion at Gallipoli was already 4-months into its progress, when the Zion Mule Corps was deployed. The previous 4-months saw desperate fightings from both sides. The allied troops tried to break out of the bridgeheads and push towards Istanbul, while the turks without any meaningful foreign help stood their own and tried to push the Entente powers back into the Aegean Sea. Due to poor local infrastructure allied troops had problems to get supplies out of the ports to the frontlines. The already present muleteers, overwhelmingly indian units were overworked and constant turkish artillery bombardment made their work even more dangerous. The Zion Mule Corps officially arrived in 27th of April, 1915 and was immediately ordered to the frontlines. The unit shortly got separated into two parts and the lesser half was sent to the Anzac Cove, where they arrived at May 15. Their story got short, as the australians quickly seized the animals and sent the members back to Alexandria. The reasons behind this decision is unclear to this day.

The bigger half of the unit stayed on the southern side of the frontline and was present until the last day of the campaign. Their bravery was even noted by other allied soldiers, when they saw jewish soldiers pulling scared mules throughout artillery bombardments or riding their animals out in the No Man's Land.

At May 1st, a stray artillery shell fell near a group of resting mules. The animals started to run amok, stampeding through a group of hiding turkish soldiers preparing for an ambush attack. The turkish soldiers anticipated the mules as british cavalry charge and ran away, basically making this comedic incident the first combat engagement of the Zion Mule Corps. However, the most important combat engagement the unit took part in was during the Second Battle of Krithia at May 5, where portions of the Mule Corps had to take arms and plug the gap in a heavily tattered line of the british defenses to prevent an ottoman breakthrough. The jewish muleteers stood their ground valiantly. Their stand in this battle was greatly covered by the international jewish media, making the Corps highly popular with the global jewish community. The Corps continued to serve valiantly, despite sometimes being the sole group to transport supplies in their immediate area. The muleteers were generally overworked and ironically the time they could find some rest was, when they had to hide from turkish artillery bombardments, when members of the unit found some time to sleep, write letters to home, cook or in the case

of Trumpeldor, sitting in the open and gather inspiration to write poems or love-letters to his many mistresses.

In the following months allied advancements were halted due to increased turkish resistance and diminishing support from both british public and leadership. The campaign eventually came to a grinding halt, after Kemal Pasha thwarted an opportunistic allied invasion at Suvla Bay. In October, with the entry of Bulgaria in the war on the german side all remaining hope was lost for an allied victory. Entente leadership anticipating massive bulgarian reinforcements to strenghten turkish defenses at the Dardanelles eventually decided on complete evacuation, what was successfully concluded in the next months. The Zion Mule Corps was evacuated in January, with Trumpeldor being the last member to board a ship on January 9.

V. The Aftermath

After the evacuation both Trumpeldor and Patterson fought to keep the unit and redeploy it in different parts of the turkish frontline. However at January 10 an order arrived, that parts of the Corps will be redeployed to Dublin to help out the british garrison in case of a potential irish revolt. It caused a mutiny between the muleteers, as they wanted to fight against the turks and denied to be shipped to fight against the irish. The unit was disarmed and after a few months of bureaucratic back and forth, eventually disbanded. However, the achievements of the unit were not gone unnoticed and it became a platform to gain both public and political support. The 1881 Army Act was eventually repelled and Trumpeldor with some of his friends were able to join the british army as fully integrated soldiers in 1916. It also provided the really needed precedent for Jabotinsky during his lobbying to eventuall establish a full fighting unit of jews, known as the Jewish Legion in 1917, where many members of Mule Corps enlisted as well. The success of the Corps and the Legion what came to be due to it's existence eventually inspired other states to start organising their own jewish units. Even the russians, where Trumpeldor returned in 1917 to help organize a jewish military unit under the Kerensky Government, though due to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the eventual collapse of Russia into a bloody civil war would put an unfortunate stop to that plan.

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ITALY'S PLANS AND ROLE IN THE PARTITION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Balázs JUHÁSZ⁴

Abstract

Italian foreign policy, when forcing through the Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne agreement, made its intentions in the Middle East quite clear. The Italian interest in Ottoman affairs did not begin with the First World War, but the first Italian interest in the partition of the empire came in the 1915 Treaty of London. Although the Italian plans set out in that treaty seemed rather unrealistic in 1915, the foreign policy direction taken by Sidney Sonnino mobilised the full spectrum of wartime diplomacy to achieve its aims. To the outside observer, after a rather unsuccessful colonial adventure, Italian expansionist plans for the Middle East did not promise much success, but there was a logical explanation for the resounding interest.

Keywords: Italy, Ottoman Empire, Palestine, world war I, imperialism

I. The beginnings

In the wake of the Italian overproduction crisis of 1907, the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire were spontaneously seen as a market by many Italian economic actors. This was a nationalism in a difficult terrain, as Italian capital had to contend with much stronger opponents in the region. Nevertheless, on 19th February 1907, the Società Commerciale d'Oriente was founded in Venice, with its first investment in the exploitation of the Heraclea (Zonguldak or Ereğli) coal basin (Tanborra, 1974: 105 et passim). Ironically, the Italians were already known here as a workforce because the Italian emigration at the end of the 19th century brought Italians here (Quataert, 2006: 59). Italian economic operators also wanted to take their share of the Ottoman military orders. For example, Ansaldo of Genoa wanted to win orders to modernise the Turkish fleet. To do so, it even took on the production of its own products locally, in the Golden Horn, but using Italian workers. The 1907 request was refused by the Sultan, who did not wish, “for

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reasons of peace and personal safety, to have a colony of Italian workmen in the capital of his Empire” (Tanborra, 1974: 109). Despite all these difficulties, according to a French report, in 1910 the share of the major European states in the trade of the Ottoman Empire was as follows (Montgomery, 1972: 777):

England	35%
Austria-Hungary	21/0%
Germany	21%
Italy	12%
France	11%
Total 81%	

Despite the economic interest, and apart from the Libyan war, Italian political expansionist plans did not include the acquisition of the Ottoman Empire's core territories. At most, we can speak of a kind of economic imperialism, nothing more. The Italian occupation of the Dodecanese was approved by the Treaty of London of 1913, and in 1913–14 the Italians acquired railway concessions in the port of Antalya covering the surrounding area. Meanwhile, in August 1913, Giacomo Agnesa, head of the political department of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, did not mention the Ottoman Empire's core territory as a target for acquisition in any of his Italian colonial expansion memoranda. At the most, Yemen, but that was considered a periphery. Despite this, and aware of the outcome of the Balkan wars, Italy, like the other European powers, expected the rapid collapse of the Ottoman Empire and wanted to build up its sphere of interest in the Levant as soon as possible. Antalya still appeared to be free, but this economic expansion in Asia Minor also increased tensions between the Italians and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which had its own plans for the region.⁵

II. Plans for expansion: the First World War and the surprises

⁵ Albrecht-Carrié, 1946: 127. For Italian interests in the area before the First World War, see also: Petricioli, 1983. For a contrast with the Monarchy, see *ibidem* p. 441 et passim.

During the negotiations with Entente, resumed on 4th March 1915, on the instructions of the Italian Foreign Minister Sidney Sonnino, the Italian delegation demanded, among other things, a proportional share for Italy in the event of a partition of the Ottoman Empire: along with Mendelia (today Muğla), Makri (now Fetiye), Marmaris and Antalya, they would have extended as far as Mersinia (today Mersin), but this was not stated, leaving the rather general wording, which did not clarify the form of the Italian share. It was far more precise, however, on the finalisation of Italian rule over Dodecanese, the defence of Yemeni independence, the principle of the consensual division of Arab territories, or the abolition of the Sultan's jurisdiction over Libya.⁶ The Treaty of London ended up containing a very general formula for the possible partition of the Ottoman Empire, while the Entente powers had already been talking among themselves about concrete plans for the Straits and Constantinople before the conclusion of the Treaty of London. In the Italian context, the question of the partition of Asia Minor only became a practical one at the beginning of 1917, after Sidney Sonnino had learned in September 1916 from Antonin de Margerie, head of the political department of the French Foreign Ministry, of the agreements that had been concluded without him and which had governed the partition of the East (Toscano, 1934: 137–140; Helmreich, 1976: 104). The Italian historian Mario Toscano, in his work between the two world wars, spoke in a rather offended tone about the Allied silence, but the Treaty of London actually approved without question all the previous Entente agreements, i.e. only the conclusion of the Sykes-Picot Agreement (3rd January 1916) was “conspicuous”, because the diplomatic note exchange of 4th March – 10th April 1915, also known as the Treaty of Constantinople, was signed before the Treaty of London (Woodward & Butler, 1952, n. 635–638, p. 245–247). In January 1917, preliminary negotiations began, and it became clear that the difficulty was caused by the Italian claim to the Adana-Konia railway line and the port of Mersina, which the French also claimed. A compromise was reached on 19 April 1917 (Helmreich, 1976: 106–109). This gave the Italians a lot of ground, because by satisfying the demands in Turkey they also wanted to prepare the ground for a willingness to make a special peace with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Indeed, one of the weak points of the Austro-Hungarian negotiations through Prince Sixtus of Bourbon-Parma was Italy, which

⁶ Toscano, 1934, p. 82 Anchieri & Pastorelli, 1984, n. 164, p. 132–140; n. 816, p. 692–696; n. 851, p. 726–728; n. 856, p. 732; n. 884, p. 759; Anchieri & Pastorelli, 1985, n. 46, p. 29; n. 128, p. 104–105; n. 138, p. 111–112; n. 162, p. 132–133; n. 183, p. 152; n. 195, p. 164.

would have gained nothing in Europe from such a separate treaty.⁷ Overcoming his resentment, Sonnino was satisfied with the agreements, because it put into concrete terms what had previously been a very general promise of the Treaty of London (Albrecht-Carrié, 1946: 141–142). More precisely, it began to put it into concrete terms, because the negotiations did not end, so the Saint Jean de Maurienne agreement was supplemented by the London Agreement of August 1917.⁸ On the Italian side, the appetite went far beyond that. Leopoldo Franchetti and Tommaso Sillani, for example, asked for almost the whole of Asia Minor in their memorandum, but it was obvious to Sonnino that this was not possible (Grassi, 1996: 20–24; Albrecht-Carrié, 1946: 142). Sonnino's expansion plans in the East followed the principles laid down by his predecessor, the Marquis of San Giuliani, but there are two personal reasons for this. Sonnino feared that, with the excessive strengthening of the French, British and Russian powers in the Eastern Mediterranean, Italian interests would be ignored, and Italy would be squeezed out of important raw material deposits, further limiting the Italian government's room for manoeuvre. The other reason was ideological: he saw the Ottoman Empire as a reactionary political structure that had outlived its purpose, a repressor and prison of nations. In this context, it is remarkable how limited the political horizons of Sonnino, San Giuliano and many of their contemporaries were: they completely ignored Turkish nationalism and saw the feasibility of imposing colonial dependence on a people accustomed to domination. They also ignored the impact of nationalism as an ideology on the other nationalities in the region, which caused, and in some cases still causes, problems, for example, in the post-World War I settlement of Arab territories (Monzali, 2018: 41–42).

III. The Italian military presence in Palestine

The Saint Jean de Maurienne agreement had conditions, including that Italian soldiers should take part in the fighting in the theatre of operations in the Middle East (Anchieri, 1978, n. 817, p. 602–603). On this basis, Italian soldiers were sent to the Palestinian theatre of operations. Of course, the decision was also helped by the fact that the French were also sending, and the

⁷ Lloyd George, 1934: 236–238; Lloyd George, 1939: 506–507; Anchieri, 1978, n. 778, p. 574–577; Helmreich, 1976: 108.

⁸ Lugosi, 2006: 39–40; Anchieri, 1980, n. 809, p. 541–561; n. 835, p. 576–577; n. 841, p. 581; n. 849, p. 587; n. 858–859, p. 593–594; n. 870, p. 601; n. 877, p. 605; n. 945, p. 649; n. 975, p. 665–666; n. 981, p. 667–668; n. 996, p. 678–679; Toscano, 1936.

Italian compulsion to conform, the constant desire to prove their great power status, meant that the Italians had to participate in everything that their allies did.

After repeated assurances from the Foreign Office that no more than a representative mission would be welcome, it was decided on 24 April 1917 that the Italian authorities would transfer from Libya to the Palestinian theatre of operations nearly 300 bersaglieri, accompanied by about 100 carabinieri from Italy. Meanwhile, the French were sending two Algerian rifle battalions and a platoon of Spahis to help, but the Italian authorities did not try to get approval for an increase in their own contingent because the British said the French soldiers would not have taken part in the fighting. The Italian contingent thus consisted of 352 bersaglieri and 103 carabinieri. The supply of arms, uniforms and ammunition fell to the Italian side, who provided the bersaglieri with the then very obsolete 1870/87 Vetterli rifle, while the carabinieri were given the 1891 Carcano. After preparations, the Italians finally arrived in Port Said on 19 May 1917 (Battaglia, 2015: 119–124). From there, they were shipped by wagon on 11 June to their assigned position in Rafah. By this time they had already lost a bersagliero who refused to continue the journey, so he was left in the care of a court martial at home (Battaglia, 2015: 129).

The Rafah camp did nothing to strengthen good relations with the Allies. The British liaison officer was soon found to be opening the Italians' camp mail and reporting its contents to Cairo. In addition, there was a problem with supplies when the British officer in question was in charge. Yet at first the Italians had such a good opinion of him: the son of the British ambassador in Rome, Rennel Rodd, was considered an Italophile with whom they were at ease. This, as it turned out, was a mistake. The commander of the Italian corps, Major Francesco D'Agostino, suspected an individual, not a systemic error, so he personally denounced the behaviour of reserve lieutenant Francis Rodd in Cairo. Following the report, Lt Rodd was summoned to Cairo, debriefed, and then confirmed in his post, and the exercise continued. In other words, the Lieutenant's mistake was not that he was a spy, but that he was found out (Battaglia, 2015: 119, 133–136).

Italian troops were only involved in the offensive in southern Palestine. On 4–5th November 1917, the Bersaglieri defended a vulnerable section of the British front at Atawineh Ridge and their actions were publicly praised by General Edmund Allenby (Battaglia, 2015: 149). Captain Angelo Scalfi carabinieri was later awarded the Military Cross of the British Empire for his heroic actions (Battaglia, 2015: 197). However, when Gaza was occupied, they could not

participate in the pursuit of the retreating troops for lack of adequate transport (Battaglia, 2015: 157). Among other things, they had to escort prisoners of war and protect communication lines. As a reflection of the conditions at the time, the Italians lost more men to illness or repatriation for court martial than they did to fighting (Battaglia, 2015: 160–161). Nevertheless, 10 carabinieri and 10 bersaglieri from the Italian contingent, with four officers and the Italian commander, were allowed to take part in General Allenby's entry into Jerusalem on 11th December 1917 (Battaglia, 2015: 175). After being involved in the standoff over the protection of the Christian holy sites, the Italian soldiers were deployed along the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway line, between Junction Station (the junction of the coastal and Jaffa-Jerusalem railway lines) and El Tinech, where they protected the British artillery and the drinking water supply, while about 50 men guarded the holy sites in Jerusalem (Battaglia, 2015: 197).

In February 1918 the question of increasing the Italian military contingent was raised again, and this time the British authorities did not oppose the idea. Since the Italian command did not want to transfer anyone from the Italian front, they wanted to build up a reinforcement of nearly 300 men from among the men living and conscripted in Egypt. The British, on the other hand, wanted trained and selected men, so they sabotaged this Italian conscript charade in the Middle East and capped the numbers at one company, bringing the Italian military mission to 750 men (Battaglia, 2015: 208–211). Allenby would have welcomed more Italian soldiers. In fact, the formation of two battalions of three companies was mooted. These increases were blocked by Armando Diaz, the Italian commander-in-chief. Sonnino, moreover, only advocated the increase in numbers because he wanted to justify the existence of Italian interests in Asia Minor by increasing the weight of Italian participation (Battaglia, 2015: 214–216). In any case, in May 1918, the Italian corps was joined by 30 more carabinieri, and in August by 35 native carabinieri from Eritrea, but they were not allowed to see combat, so the carabinieri were assigned to military police duties in the hinterland and the others to guard various objects (Battaglia, 2015: 220). The contingent was formally disbanded at the end of February 1919 (Battaglia, 2015: 292), but Italian soldiers may still have been in Jerusalem in March 1919, because, according to the local Italian High Commissioner, the Marquis Meli Lupi di Soragna, Major General Arthur Wigram Money, head of the British administration in Palestine, was considering the deployment of Italian soldiers in the Jaffa area to combat anti-British and anti-Jewish Arab movements. This ultimately came to nothing, so at least the Italians were not involved in the turbulent internal affairs of the region (Grispo, 2008, n. 17, p. 15; n. 124, p. 134).

IV. The question of guardianship over the holy places

The Italian presence in Jerusalem was linked to the debate on the patronage of Christian holy places. In the absence of any other local Italian authority, the commander of the Italian contingent took charge of local political affairs and, immediately after the arrival in Jerusalem, expressed his ideas, which were of course backed up by local demands. In the spirit of centuries of French patronage, Bethlehem and the Holy Sepulchre Basilica in Jerusalem were French interests, which could only be challenged by the collapsed Russian Empire. In this spirit, French monks, traditionally joined by Italians, were present in the area during the years of the First World War. The Ottoman authorities, fighting on the side of the Central Powers, interned the French and Italian clergy, who were delighted at the arrival of the Entente forces, while knowing nothing of the current great power conventions. The then promoted Lieutenant-Colonel D'Agostino was not much better informed, so in December 1917 he tried to get the Franciscan Father Eutimio Castellani recognised as a kind of supreme patron on all fronts. The local Salesians were the other "battering ram" in Lieutenant-Colonel D'Agostino's toolbox: he wanted to use them to play into Italian hands the Orthodox and Armenian religious claims that had been left without support from the Great Powers because of the turmoil in Russia. On 12th December 1917, Lieutenant Colonel D'Agostino was able to enter Bethlehem in triumph, where he was celebrated by all, but for service reasons he had to return to his soldiers. By this time, however, François Marie Denis Georges-Picot, the French High Commissioner in Palestine, had taken over the case and was building a French protectorate in the spirit of the international agreements that had been made earlier - and unknown to the local Italian clergy and to Lieutenant-Colonel D'Agostino. When Monsieur Picot was given the high place at the 1917 Christmas mass at Bethlehem, D'Agostino forbade Italian soldiers from attending and protested by staying away from the service. As a result, at the first Christmas mass in Bethlehem, conquered by the Entente forces, only the Italians were absent, while representatives of the British and French military and political authorities were in the front row. D'Agostino had other things to do besides staying away: at the solemn Mass celebrated on 17th February 1918, the first Sunday of Lent, he managed to get Father Ferdinando Diotallevi, the newly appointed protector, to stop praying for Picot's spiritual salvation during the Mass. This success lasted until the Pope ordered Cardinal Gasparri, Cardinal Secretary of State of the Holy See, to restore the status quo: until peace was concluded, the customs of the Ottoman period, i.e. the centuries-old French

patronage, had to be adhered to, and Picot was reinstated among the persons for whom the people prayed at Masses in Palestine.⁹

The failure of the Italian efforts was followed, of course, by other futile attempts: in January 1919, for example, the Italian High Commissioner in Constantinople and later Foreign Minister, Carlo Sforza, initiated secret negotiations at the Porta in order to obtain Italian patronage of the Last Supper Hall. The absurdity of the idea is shown by the fact that the Sultan had no control over the Jerusalem site at that time (Mosca, 1980, n. 19, p. 9).

V. The crisis: the challenge to the conventions

An even more important condition of the Saint Jean de Maurienne agreement was Russian approval, which never came. Sonnino feared at first that the provisional government in St Petersburg, with its non-annexationist foreign policy, would reject the agreement on the grounds that it went against its principles. He thus prevented the precise text of the agreement from being made public. At the same time, however, he was aware of the precarious position of the Russian government and was therefore also aware of the risk of a possible Russian separate peace when he wanted to acknowledge the sufficiency of Anglo-French approval of the validity of the Treaty of Saint Jean de Maurienne (Helmreich, 1976: 116–128). In the end, neither Paris nor London agreed to this, and the Saint Jean de Maurienne Agreement did not survive the end of the war. Sonnino had to argue, as early as October 1918, that the absence of Russian approval of the validity of the Saint Jean de Maurienne Agreement did not invalidate it, while the British government wanted to use this argument to denounce the agreement (Helmreich, 1976: 102–103). During the peace negotiations, Lloyd George also referred to the inadequate Italian military effort in the Middle East, but there was no valid basis for this (Helmreich, 1976: 130). Initially, the Italian military presence was limited by the British themselves to 300 troops, who could only be given a representational role and could not be accompanied by a political mission or make any other claim beyond joint, i.e. international, control of Palestinian territory (Anchieri, 1978, n. 690, p. 509). The principle of limitation was very quickly superseded by the formula of "greater military effort". Tired of Sonnino's continued protests, the British government, on 14th June 1917, dropped the "greater military

⁹ Anchieri, 1985, n. 10, p. 6; n. 27, p. 16; n. 28, p. 17–19; n. 48, p. 32; n. 209, p. 187–188; n. 269, p. 225–227; n. 460, p. 380–381; Battaglia, 2015: 191–202.

effort" formula and specified the nature and extent of the assistance it required: it was to exceed the 6,000-strong contingent in Palestine offered by the Italian side, or to send labour to the Macedonian front (Anchieri, 1980, n. 339, p. 218–219). The Italians complied in a different form, sending more troops to the Macedonian front, whose numbers almost reached 40,000 by the time of the Bulgarian armistice (Pupo, 2014: 215).

VI. Save what can be saved, or the Italian post-war attempts

When the Mudros ceasefire was concluded, the Italian authorities already knew that Italian interests in Asia Minor would be far from being automatically asserted. This desire to prove themselves led to a very active Italian presence in Anatolia (see, for example, the Italian landing in Antalya on 28th March 1919), which the British wanted to dismantle by offering Rome the Caucasus mandate. The British did not expect the offer to be accepted, but the Italians pounced anyway, they just could not do it on their own.¹⁰ As the dispute over the Adriatic question escalated in April 1919, no compromise was reached on the situation in Asia Minor. In fact, the Greek-Italian confrontation intensified when the Italian peace delegation's absence meant that the remaining three major powers allowed the Greeks to occupy Smyrna. At the same time, the Greek delegation did not feel that its interests were protected, so the two quarrelling parties came to an agreement and the Tittoni-Venizelos Treaty was signed on 29th July 1919.¹¹ In the end, even this was not enough to effectively protect Italian interests: the Treaty of Sevres allowed the Greeks to annex their sphere of interest in the long term, while the Italian sphere of interest included only economic and administrative rights.¹² Part of this compromise solution was the development, possible purchase of sections of the Anatolian railway lines of Italian interest and the construction of potential routes. At that time, the spectacular rivalry with the other members of the Entente was a distant memory, since one of the basic principles of the Italian development concept was that no one's interests should be harmed.¹³ When the powers that be in Ankara under Kemal Pasha started the armed struggle against foreigners, the Italian disarmament had already begun. The Italian mission in Asia Minor had not had sufficient

¹⁰ Goldstein, 1989: 351, Pupo, 2014: 179–194; Petricioli, 1971; Petricioli, 1972.

¹¹ Toscano, 1934: 195–200; Garzia, 2017, n. 179, p. 147–151.

¹² See the points of the Tripartite Agreement and Article 83 of the Sèvres Peace Treaty. Lugosi, 2006: 80–91; Montgomery, 1972: 783.

¹³ ASBIT, Banca d'Italia, Rapporti con l'Estero, prat. n. 315, fasc. 5, sfasc. 1, n. 3986/383. Sforza, Constantinople, 22 March 1920.

military forces at its disposal before, but from 1921 onwards, only the timing and method of withdrawal was in question. On 13 March 1921, the Italian government reached an agreement with the national forces and, in exchange for concessions over the Heraclea coalfields, Italian troops began their withdrawal from Anatolia.¹⁴

VII. Conclusion

Participation in the partition of the Ottoman Empire and the Asia Minor adventure brought little benefit to Italy: it finally succeeded in legitimizing the rule of Dodecanese, supplemented by Castelrosso (Kastellorizo, or Megisti), and a rather ambivalent relationship was established between the new Turkish state and the Mussolini government, already in power at the time of the signing of the Lausanne Peace Treaty, which alternately saw the new Turkish state as a colony to be conquered, a potential ally, a neutral power, or an outright enemy (Barlas, 2004.).

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¹⁴ Güçlü, 2001: 590. The French did the same thing on 20th October 1921 with the Franklin-Bouillon Pact, only they had fought a war beforehand, while the Italians at least did not waste lives. Ibidem p. 597.

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**THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC OF TÜRKIYE FROM A BRAZILIAN PERSPECTIVE AND THE
BRAZILIAN ARAB DIASPORA**

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Abstract

During the previous centuries, Turkish-Brazilian relations were not as intense as they are today, but there were some factors that connected the two countries. From 1880 to the Great Depression, more than a hundred thousand people came to Brazil from the territory of the Ottoman Empire. Although they were Ottoman subjects and had Ottoman documents, they were ethnically Arabs and not Turks. The territory of the states known today as Syria and Lebanon remained an integral part of the Ottoman Empire until the end of the First World War. During the years of the Great War, the members of the Arab diaspora in Brazil with pan-Arab or Arab nationalist feelings believed that the great opportunity had come for Syria to become independent. The publication basically has two goals. On the one hand, to briefly present how Brazil reacted to the birth of the Republic of Türkiye, on the other hand, to examine how the Brazilian Arab diaspora related to the Ottoman Empire during the years of the First World War.

Keywords: Brazilian Arab Diaspora, Syrian-Lebanese community in Brazil, Ottoman Empire, Republic of Türkiye, Brazil, Nami Jafet

I. Introduction

From the second half of the 19th century to the first third of the 20th century, bilateral relations between Türkiye and Brazil were understandably not too intense, in which physical distance played the main role. Despite all this, even in this early period there were some events that laid the foundation for the relationship between the two countries.

First of all, we must point out that the second ruler of the Empire of Brazil, Dom Pedro II, traveled to the territory of the Ottoman Empire twice. He went to Egypt in 1871, and 5 years later, he also visited Lebanon, Syria and the Holy Land (Khatlab, 2015: 16). Thanks to the visit

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of the educated ruler, Brazil became even more well-known among the Arab population of the Ottoman Empire and many decided to try their luck in the South American state.

Of course, the visit of Pedro II to the Middle East would have been insufficient for the mass migration of Türkiye's Arab ethnic population to the New World. Several factors contributed to the fact that, starting in 1860, the Levantine Arab population first migrated mainly to Egypt, and later to the United States, Brazil, and Argentina, among others (Ferwagner, 2013: 412). Overpopulation, food shortages, and the political consequences of the Lebanese Civil War of 1860 encouraged many Lebanese and Syrian Arabs, mostly followers of Christian denominations, to leave their homeland.¹⁶

Between 1880 and 1930, more than a hundred thousand Syrian-Lebanese immigrants arrived in Brazil, who mainly engaged in commercial activities in the country (Truzzi, 1997: 13). They could do so, because in 1858 the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation was concluded between the Ottoman Empire and Brazil (Khatlab, 2015: 16). This document gave the subjects of the two countries a legal basis to trade in each other's cities, ports and places open to foreign trade. Members of the Arab diaspora gained increasing influence in Brazil's economic sector. This was also the opinion of Talcott Williams, who said about the Syrian-Lebanese community that: *“The trade of Brazil passes more and more into his hands...”* (Hitti, 2005: VII).

The excellent student of the Syrian Protestant College,¹⁷ Nami Jafet also left Lebanon in 1893 and traveled to Brazil, where his brothers were waiting for him (Truzzi, 1995: 53). In 1907, Jafet was already a wealthy factory owner, and he used his influence to promote the independence of Syria.¹⁸

This publication basically has two goals. On the one hand, to briefly present how Brazil reacted to the birth of the Republic of Türkiye, on the other hand, to examine how the Brazilian Arab diaspora related to the Ottoman Empire during the years of the First World War. The examination of the Brazilian-Turkish relations is necessary in order to understand the

¹⁶ 85-90% of the Arabs who immigrated to Brazil between 1880 and 1930 were Christians, mostly followers of the Orthodox and Maronite churches.

¹⁷ The predecessor institution of the American University of Beirut.

¹⁸ When Nami Jafet spoke of Syria, he usually meant “Greater Syria”, which, according to a significant number of Syrian-Lebanese immigrants, included not only the territory of present-day Syria and Lebanon, but also the entire Holy Land and even Jordan.

environment in which the members of the Arab diaspora operated. For this, I primarily used articles from the *Correio Paulistano* newspaper and other secondary sources. I prefer *Correio Paulistano*, because it was a well-known newspaper published in São Paulo, and the majority of Syrian-Lebanese immigrants arrived in the state of São Paulo during the examined period.

The main subject of this paper is to show how Brazilian Arabs related to the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. Latin American experts often neglect Brazil and focus primarily on the events of Hispanic-American countries regarding the topic. This piece of writing focuses on the members of the Arab diaspora in Brazil, but I also take into account the opinion of the respected Lebanese-American professor Philip Khuri Hitti. Hitti, like the aforementioned Lebanese-Brazilian businessman Nami Jafet, was a student at the Syrian Protestant College. Later, however, he did not emigrate to Brazil, but to the United States, where he pursued an academic career. I consider it important to emphasize his opinion on the subject, because they are particularly valuable from a scientific point of view. We can discover significant parallels/similarities between the lifestyles of the Arab diaspora living in Brazil and the United States. It is also important to mention that, despite the fact that Philip Hitti lived in the US, he visited Brazil twice in 1925 and 1951, so he had the opportunity to meet the local Arab community, with whom he was in contact (Karam, 2014: 452).

Nami Jafet's speeches and writings are the most important available primary sources on the Arab diaspora in Brazil during the period under review, but of course I also voiced the opinions of other Syrian-Lebanese immigrants living in Brazil in the publication. In addition, various newspapers and secondary sources helped to refine my opinion on the subject. The books and publications of Ágnes Judit Szilágyi, John Tofik Karam, Stacy D. Fahrenthold and Oswaldo Truzzi provided a particularly great help to the birth of this article. At the beginning of my paper, I would like to propose the following hypothesis: The Arab diaspora in Brazil essentially made a greater sacrifice during the First World War than Brazil itself.

I use the words “Türkiye” and “Ottoman Empire” basically as synonyms in the text, as well as the terms “Arab diaspora” and “Syrian-Lebanese community”. As we know today, the area from which most Arab immigrants came to Brazil belongs to the territory of Syria and Lebanon. The translation of non-English (Portuguese or French) sources included in the publication was made by the author.

II. Brazil during the years of World War I and the birth of the Republic of Türkiye

As I mentioned, during the 19th century some factors already loosely linked the Ottoman Empire to Brazil. These include the visits of the Brazilian emperor Pedro II to the Middle East, the Arab diaspora in Brazil or the 1858 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the two distant countries. Despite all this, Türkiye and the South American state eventually joined opposing alliances in the Great War.

The Sublime Porte committed itself to the Central Powers quite quickly, already in October 1914, as the Ottoman fleet bombarded the Russian coast from the Black Sea (J. Nagy, 2004:29). The Sao Paulo daily, *Correio Paulistano*, informed its readers on October 31: “*Türkiye enters the war*” (*Correio Paulistano*, 1914). The newspaper also published a picture of Sultan Mehmed V, “*who ordered the start of hostilities against Russia*”. Brazilians interested in the news of the Great War could also learn that Türkiye attacked Russia without a declaration of war. The Ottoman Empire thus joined the Central Powers in the fall of 1914. The countries of the Entente powers had been causing territorial losses to the empire for decades, so the Turkish government believed that if it sided with Germany, the country could preserve its territorial integrity and perhaps even grow (Ferwagner, 2021:113).

Brazil's approach to the war was initially unclear. On the one hand, this was due to the fact that the armed conflict did not directly affect the country, and on the other hand, different sections of the population had different attitudes towards the issue. An important part of the publication is to show that, despite being Ottoman citizens, most of the Syrian-Lebanese immigrants to Brazil did not support the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, but sympathized with the Entente powers and wanted an independent Syria. Although the Brazilian Arabs, who gained considerable economic influence over the years, were mostly sympathetic to the Entente, this was not true of all immigrant groups arriving in Brazil. Between 1884 and 1943, a large number of immigrants arrived in the South American country whose sending country actively participated in the First World War. In the mentioned period, the Syrian-Lebanese constituted only the seventh largest immigrant group, after the Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, Japanese, German and Russian immigrant communities (Truzzi, 1997: 14).

During the Great War, the large number of German immigrant communities living in the south and southeast of the country posed a potential threat to Brazil, since they were generally

loyal to their homeland and thus mostly sympathized not with the Entente, but with the Central Powers (Szilágyi, 2022: 284). The Germans even operated a secret radio station during the war period, which was against Brazilian law. Considering the period from 1857 to 1924, more than 160,000 German immigrants arrived in Brazil, which means that their number significantly exceeded the Arab diaspora of approximately one hundred thousand people (Jancsó, 2018: 142).

The influence of Teuto-Brazilians on politics was also significant. Between February 1912 and May 1917, Lauro Müller, who had German immigrant parents, was the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Brazil. With his work, he tried to counterbalance the strong Entente sympathy of the Brazilian elite, which came from its Francophile attitude. It is important to take into account that, in general, members of the Brazilian leadership have always been enthusiastic about French culture. In spite all this, Lauro Müller's activities were successful, as he played an important role in ensuring that Brazil maintained its neutrality for a long time despite the standpoint of the United States and other ominous signs. (Szilágyi, 2022: 285).

In March 1917, the secret plan of the German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Arthur Zimmermann was revealed. According to the so-called Zimmermann Telegram, Germany wanted to ensure that if the USA joined the war on the side of the Entente, then Mexico would attack the USA. The plan carried the threat of extending the war to Latin America, but Lauro Müller's sympathy for Germany, among other factors, contributed to Brazil remaining neutral. The Zimmerman Telegram and the United States' attitude to the war alone would not have been enough to spoil Brazilian-German bilateral relations, but through unrestricted submarine warfare, Germany ultimately alienated the South American state, which eventually sided with the Entente.

Starting in April 1917, the Germans sank Brazilian merchant ships one after the other. Among others, Parana, Tijuca and Macau fell victim to the German aggression (Szilágyi, 2022: 286). The Brazilian answer was not left behind either. First, on April 11, 1917, economic and diplomatic relations with Berlin were severed. After the German Empire did not stop its hostile behavior, the President of the Brazilian Republic, Wenceslau Brás, initiated the seizure of German ships in Brazilian ports as compensation. It is interesting to note that the South American country also seized the ships of Türkiye and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In the meantime, the pro-German Lauro Müller resigned as head of foreign affairs. After the

destruction of the Brazilian ship Macau on October 18, Brazil accepted the fact that it was at war with Germany. In 1917, Brazil declared war on Germany (Wittman, 1978: 383).

Overall, it can be said that while bloody battles were fought on several fronts in the Ottoman Empire, the Brazilian army did not take part in the first global armed conflict of the twentieth century. Although the Brazilians under the command of Pedro de Frontin sent eight warships to Europe, but by the time they reached Gibraltar on November 10, 1918, the war was almost over (Szilágyi, 2022: 288). Brazil's military participation in the First World War therefore had only a symbolic significance, it was an expression of the Brazilian position. Although the arrival of Brazilian warships was not a significant help to the Allies in terms of winning the war, the South American country's raw material exports, the availability of its ports and the cooperation of its merchant fleet did. Brazil could be proud, as it emerged victorious from the Great War.

For the Ottoman Empire, the end of the First World War did not bring the desired peace. After the Great War, fundamentally important political changes and struggles took place in the territory of the former empire.

Correio Paulistano informed its readers in its November 1, 1918 issue that Türkiye had accepted the armistice. The newspaper claimed that under the terms of the armistice the Entente fleets were granted free passage to the Black Sea, and the victorious powers were also authorized to occupy military positions along the Turkish Straits, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

After the Armistice of Mudros was signed, the Entente wanted Türkiye to accept the Treaty of Sèvres, but the Turks ultimately rejected it. Another war broke out between the Allied powers and Türkiye, the so-called Turkish War of Independence. In this armed conflict, the Greek-Turkish antagonism also intensified, as Greece assumed a key role in enforcing the demands of the Allied powers.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who fought successfully in the Great War, did a lot to organize the Turkish resistance and gained more and more influence in the country's internal affairs. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk were two parallel and interrelated phenomena.

The newspapers of the South American country actively followed developments related to the former empire. In the already mentioned *Correio Paulistano*, in the issue of November 4, 1922, we can find headlines about “*the fall of the Ottoman Empire*” and “*the attitude of the Kemalists*” (*Correio Paulistano*, 1922). As we know, Kemal played a major role in the abolition of the sultanate at the beginning of November 1922 (Ferwagner, 2021: 695). On the other hand, he made great efforts for the birth of the modern Turkish nation-state.

On November 10, the Sao Paulo daily published a picture of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk with the following description of him and his followers:

“General Kemal-Pacha, head of the Turkish nationalists, who have just expelled the Greeks from Anatolia and Thrace, demanding the return of the Ottoman Empire to its former borders.” (*Correio Paulistano*, 1922).

Although the gazette correctly calls Kemal the “*head of the Turkish nationalists*”, it would be misleading to say that his aim was to restore the former borders of the Ottoman Empire. He was aware that the successes of the Turkish War of Independence were sufficient to create a Turkish entity, but unlike the Young Turks, he did not consider maintaining a multinational empire a realistic goal (Ferwagner, 2021: 650).

Finally, with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne on July 24, 1923, Türkiye ended its war activities under conditions more favorable than those of the Treaty of Sèvres. On October 29, the country became a republic, and on November 5, the *Correio Paulistano* also announced that “*Mustafa Kemal Pasha is the first president*” in Türkiye (*Correio Paulistano*, 1923). In 1927, the Republic of Türkiye and Brazil signed a Treaty of Friendship in Rome, and thus the diplomatic relations between the two countries were placed on a new foundation. (Güzeldere, 2017: 89).

III. The relation of the Brazilian Arab diaspora to the Ottoman Empire

As explained above, members of the Arab diaspora in Brazil lived in a country that ultimately sided with the Entente alliance, which was hostile to the Ottoman Empire. Although they had Ottoman documents and were Ottoman citizens, the Arabs basically took it as an insult when the Brazilians called them Turks (*turcos*) (Truzzi, 1995: 38). This is no wonder, since the Arabs often considered the Turkish oppression to be the main reason for their emigration. The term

“*Turkish yoke*” was a recurring element in the writings of Syrian-Lebanese intellectuals living in the diaspora.

In the same way, Philip Hitti, above all other push factors, called the lack of freedom the main reason for Arab emigration. Although he primarily examined migration to the United States, his following statements were also true for the Arab diaspora living in Brazil:

“Under the alien yoke of the Turks, the Syrians were subjected to numerous restrictions and often to active measures of persecution. Four long centuries of oppression were evidently not enough, to obliterate their yearning for freedom. Failing to enjoy it in their native land, many of them sought it abroad... In fact the bulk of the Syrian migrants look upon this as the chief cause of their emigration... The Syrian papers in this country have been practically unanimous in their anti-Turkish policy, and a glance through their files reveals that more emphasis is laid on the political than the economic cause.” (Hitti, 2005: 51).

The question arises whether all Arab immigrants were hostile to Türkiye. This obviously depended on religious factors and the attitude of the Ottoman government. John Tofik Karam draws our attention to an open letter in which members of the “*Ottoman colony in the State of S. Paulo*” (Syrian-Lebanese people)¹⁹ sent a message to the Turkish government expressing their loyalty to the government and their commitment “*to the motherland*” (Correio Paulistano, 1914). It is noteworthy that among the signatories of the letter published by Correio Paulistano on September 15, 1914, was the aforementioned businessman Nami Jafet (and one of his brothers, Basílio Jafet). The researcher then points out that three years later, the prominent Lebanese immigrant raised his voice against the Turkish occupation as he “*shifted from Ottomanist to nationalist loyalties*” (Karam, 2014: 455).

How could such a big change in Nami Jafet's attitude take place? Was he ever a loyal Ottoman citizen or did he just believe for a while that Syria could be renewed under the administration of the empire? In my opinion, Nami Jafet's change in attitude only seems surprising until we learn his true goals, and this goal is none other than gaining the independence of Syria.

¹⁹ According to Oswaldo Truzzi: “*immigration from Turkey itself to Brazil was virtually nonexistent.*” (Truzzi, 1995: 38).

The intellectual Jafet clearly rejected the despotic rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, but initially he considered the reform plans of the Young Turks promising. However, it becomes clear from his words that, unlike the Young Turks, his basic goal was not to save the Ottoman Empire, but to put Syria in a more advantageous political situation. He was always a Syrian patriot at heart, a "*nationalist*". Nevertheless, he stood up for the Ottoman constitution because at first he believed that in the post-Abdul Hamid II period, dominated by the Young Turks, the Arabs would have better opportunities for representation and political advocacy in the empire. In 1912, Nami Jafet encouraged his comrades to put linguistic, religious and racial differences aside and "*unfurl, in its place, the flag of patriotism, of Ottomanism, and shout with me: Long live the Constitution! Long live the Ottoman homeland!*" (Jafet, 1947: 247).

Ultimately, he became disappointed, as he saw that the Young Turk movement did not bring the desired political equality and emancipation to the Arabs. Later, he described the autocratic leadership of the Young Turks with the following words: "*We had just one Abdul Hamid, but now we are left with a multitude of Abdul Hamids.*" (Jafet, 1947: 247) It is a fact that the three leading pashas of the Young Turk triumvirate, Ahmed Djemal, İsmail Enver and Mehmed Talaat, were not tolerant of the empire's non-Turkish minorities (Ferwagner, 2021: 71).

Nami Jafet therefore did not change from a loyal Ottoman subject to a rebel Arab nationalist without reason, and not from one moment to the next. He did not grant unconditional support to the Sublime Porte, since his goal was always to work for the prosperity of Syria. Disappointed in the movement of the Young Turks, he turned to France, and during the years of the First World War, he considered this country as the main ally for the liberation of Syria. In 1917 he spoke of "*the liberation and independence of Syria, under the protection of France*", which was somewhat controversial (Jafet, 1947: 323).

It seems that the members of the Syrian-Lebanese diaspora were not united in their attitude towards France, several of them were suspicious of the European power. Taufik Daud Kurban was also among those who did not give credit to the promises of French officials. Although he respected Nami Jafet, since his father was Jafet's fellow student at the Syrian Protestant College, he nevertheless disagreed with him on this matter. (Khatlab, 2015: 148).

Nami Jafet argued passionately for the cooperation between the diaspora and France. From his statements, we can conclude that some members of the Syrian-Lebanese community

in Brazil would have preferred English or Russian patronage instead of French (Jafet, 1947: 340).

Ultimately, however, the pro-French attitude became dominant among the members of the Arab diaspora in Brazil. In 1916, the Central Syrian Committee (Comité Central Syrien) was established in Paris, which was supported by the French Foreign Ministry. One of the most important goals of the organization was to build an advocacy network for Syrian immigrants living in different countries (Fahrenthold, 2019: XV). Nami Jafet and the Syrian Lebanese Patriotic Society (Sociedade Patriótica Síria Libanesa), which he founded in 1917, also collaborated with the Central Syrian Committee. This fact was also confirmed by the French press. For example, the newspaper “*Journal des débats politiques et littéraires*” published the following news on December 22, 1918 under the heading “*The question of Syria* “:

“The Central Syrian Committee received the following telegram from the Federation of Syrian Lebanese Committees in Brazil.

São Paulo, December 19.

On behalf of its subsidiaries and members, the Syrian Lebanese Patriotic Society authorizes you to request the Peace Congress, to entrust France with the reconstitution of integral, independent and federative Syria.

Signed: President Nami Jafet.”

(*Journal des débats politiques et littéraires*, 1918).

It seems that a network was established in Brazil under the leadership of Nami Jafet, who entrusted the future of Syria to the goodwill of France. The Central Syrian Committee, with which they cooperated, was not only engaged in humanitarian assistance, but also recruited soldiers in countries with significant Arab minorities, including Brazil.

Under French leadership, the so-called Légion d'Orient (Eastern Legion) was established, which consisted of approximately 4,000 volunteer soldiers. Most of them were Armenians, but 550 Syrian-Lebanese immigrants from the Arab diasporas of Egypt, Europe and the Americas were also employed. (Fahrenthold, 2019: 59). Between 1916 and 1917, recruitment was also carried out in Brazilian cities such as São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.

If we approach the subject from this perspective, we will realize that the members of the Arab diaspora in Brazil made a greater sacrifice during the Great War than the Brazilian nation itself. At least from a military point of view, since some of the Syrian-Lebanese immigrants took part in the armed conflicts of the First World War, while the Brazilian army ultimately did not.

At the same time, we can see from one of Nami Jafet's speeches that he was displeased with the number of Arab volunteers in Brazil:

"The expedition is ready and volunteers are arriving in successive waves in Cyprus. It pains me to say that the Armenian volunteers in the Syrian expedition are more numerous than the Syrians themselves. What is the excuse for the Syrians' reluctance?" (Jafet, 1947: 324).

In this way, Brazil and its Syrian-Lebanese community sided with the Entente powers in the First World War. According to Salomão Jorge: *"In the 1914 war, Syrians and Lebanese put themselves body and soul on the side of the allies and they were sure that this time their long-awaited independence would come."* (Jorge, 1948: 525).

Despite all the efforts and eloquent speeches, the members of the Arab community were disappointed after the First World War. The reason for this was that in 1917 the so-called Sykes–Picot Agreement was made public. According to this, the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were divided into British and French zones (Traboulsi, 2007: 75). In 1920, the San Remo conference confirmed the Sykes–Picot Agreement (J. Nagy, 2004:29).

Mussa Kuraiem's statement perfectly describes how members of the Syrian-Lebanese community felt after the Sykes–Picot Agreement was revealed:

"How great was the astonishment and bitter disappointment of the Arabs when they saw that, instead of the promised independence, France and England were dividing their country between themselves, under the guise of mandates!" (Jorge, 1948: 443)

As an outside observer, it is difficult to decide what hurt Nami Jafet and the other Syrian-Lebanese immigrants more. The fact that the Arab territories remained under the control of foreign powers, or that *"Greater Syria"* was divided. Lebanon won its independence only in 1943 and Syria in 1946, but Jafet, who died in 1923, did not live to see it.

IV. Conclusion

From 1880 to the Great Depression, more than a hundred thousand Syrian-Lebanese immigrants arrived in Brazil from the territory of the Ottoman Empire. Between 1884 and 1943, the Arab community constituted the seventh largest immigrant group in the South American country.

As a result of their hard work, they gained significant economic influence in various segments of the Brazilian economy. The economic success of the Arab community in Brazil was considered outstanding even in the eyes of the Syrian-Lebanese diaspora in the United States.

One of the most prominent figures in the early period of Syrian-Lebanese immigration to Brazil was Nami Jafet, who left Lebanon in 1893. Jafet, who later became an influential businessman and wealthy factory owner, dreamed of an independent “Greater Syria” covering the entire Levant region.

The majority of Arabs living in the Americas had a negative attitude towards Türkiye. Jafet regarded Emperor Abdul Hamid II as a tyrant and initially believed that the reforms of the Young Turks would have a positive effect on Syria and the Arab population of the empire.

Disillusioned with the Young Turks movement, he turned to France during the years of the First World War. In 1917, the Syrian Lebanese Patriotic Society was established, with Nami Jafet as its president. The Brazilian organization cooperated with the Paris-based Central Syrian Committee.

In addition to moral and material support, members of the Arab diaspora in Brazil could join the French-led Légion d'Orient on a voluntary basis. This gave Syrian-Lebanese immigrants the opportunity to take part in the armed conflicts of the First World War. Since Brazil ultimately did not fight in the Great War, from a military point of view the Syrian-Lebanese community alone made a greater sacrifice than the Brazilian army itself. However, we must not forget that the South American country's raw material exports, the availability of its ports and the cooperation of its merchant fleet were factors that greatly supported the Entente during this period (Szilágyi, 2022: 289).

Overall, it can be said that Brazil and its Arab diaspora sided with the Allied powers during the First World War. The Brazilian press followed the events of the birth of the Turkish

Republic with great interest. In 1927, Brazil and the newly born republic signed a Treaty of Friendship in Rome.

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THE ORDER OF MEDJIDIE AND ITS CONNECTIONS TO HUNGARY

Péri Ákos Ájbek

Abstract

At the end of the 18th century the Ottoman Empire realised its need for a western-type system of decoration for diplomatic purposes as decorations were widely used at that time to strengthen the diplomatic bond between two countries. The Empire was in need of western allies and realised that handing out wearable decorations can be helpful in achieving this goal. The initial system of Ottoman decorations however was too complex, so sultan Abdul-Medjid decided it needed to be revised. As part of this process a new order of merit was created that was based on already existing western and eastern decorations thus it was suitable for diplomatic use. This decoration was named the Order of Medjidie. This paper is aimed at introducing the order and its short history to the reader as well as highlighting some of the Hungarian recipients to illustrate the connections between Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire as well as how the Ottomans used the decoration to support their diplomatic goals.

Keywords: Phaleristics, Decoration, Diplomacy, Austria-Hungary, Order of Medjidie

Till the end of the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire didn't have a system of decorations by western standards. It is of no surprise as modern-day decorations originate from the European tradition of chivalric orders and the Ottoman Empire being a state of Islamic culture it obviously did not have such traditions. The Ottoman Empire's award system relied upon the usage of valuable gifts as a means of honouring the worthy. The ottomans however had some sort of decoration that had some resemblance of European awards as it had a prototypical class system. This was the *çelenk*, a military decoration and apart from a few exceptions it was exclusively awarded to ottoman subjects. The *çelenk* was a type of turban ornament and as such it was worn mostly on turbans, however the few lucky westeners who were awarded with one, wore it on their hats instead. The prototypical class-system, this decoration used was mainly based on the appearance of the *çelenk* and the materials it was made of (Eldem, 2004). The most typical variations had three, five or seven branches and could be made of silver or gold, in some rare cases it could have been studded with diamonds as well. The higher the number of branches the *çelenk* had and the more precious materials it was made of the higher the class of the decoration

was. As the *çelenk* was a military decoration, it was solely awarded for military merits and that's one of the reasons why very few non ottoman recipients can be found. The most notable western recipient is definitely the British admiral, Lord Horatio Nelson (1758–1805). For his successful Egypt campaign against the French navy, he was awarded a seven branch *çelenk* studded with diamonds, by sultan Selim III (1789–1807) along with other valuable gifts and a large sum of money (Eldem, 2004). The reproduction of Nelson's *çelenk* was on display at the National Museum of the Royal Navy in 2017-18.²⁰ At the exhibition a reproduction was displayed not in favour of protecting the original but because of the absence of it. Nelson's original *çelenk* was stolen in 1951 by a certain George Catham from the National Maritime Museum and could not be recovered (Downer, 2017). This is usual in case of diamond studded jewellery or decorations as the diamonds are easier to sell separately than the decoration as a whole as it would definitely raise suspicion. In Nelson's time the British public displayed an extraordinary interest towards the decoration, however it was most likely because of the same reason as Catham got interested, the monetary value. The first one who realised the significance of Nelson's decoration was the British ambassador to Constantinople John Spencer Smith (1769–1845). Smith saw the *çelenk* as a parallel to western decorations and tried to "translate" it to already existing decorations to better illustrate its value to the western public (Eldem, 2004). Smith's approach did have some logic behind it however these types of decorations cannot be "translated" to western orders or medals. Not long after Nelson received his *çelenk*, the sultan bestowed another decoration on the admiral, this time however the decoration was much more resemblant of a western-type order. The new decoration was called the Order of the Crescent. To this day not much is known about the order itself or the circumstances of its institution. The commonly accepted date for its institution is 1799, the same year Nelson was decorated with it and the order was said to be a one-class decoration. Apart from that we have very little information about this order. In few of the depictions of Nelson, the admiral can be seen wearing a decoration which looks like a breast star of a western order, bearing the sign of the crescent and star on its oval centermedallion. This could have been the Order of the Crescent; it is still unknown however whether the order had any other piece of insignia. The reproduction of this decoration can be seen on Nelson's uniform at the exhibition of the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich.

²⁰ <https://www.nmrn.org.uk/news-events/nmrn-blog/vice-admiral-lord-nelson%E2%80%99s-lost-diamond-jewel-show-portsmouth-historic>

By the institution of the Order of the Crescent the Ottoman Empire began creating a system of western-type decorations, which in the first half of the 19th century due to the increasing number of decorations and their multiple variations added to it became increasingly more complex and difficult to understand and utilize. Most medals added to the system in this period could be categorized as commemorative medals,²¹ however some decorations had similarities to western orders of merit.²² It is important to mention though that despite of the similarities to western decorations, these orders did not have the institutional structure their western counterparts had. Because of this, despite calling them orders and in some cases their very high-quality insignia, these decorations can be categorized more like medals of merit, rather than actual orders of merit. Most of the decorations instituted in this period have a large number of variations. Depending on the recipient's social status, rank or position the insignia of the medal could considerably differ from one another. Due to the increasing number of decorations instituted in this period and their multiple variations, the ottoman system of decorations started to become obscure and very difficult to understand. The situation was made worse by the fact that the decorations bestowed on foreigners were also different from the ones given to ottoman subjects. The system needed to be revised. In 1851 Sultan Abdul Medjid (1839–1861) ordered the reform of the decoration system. He discontinued the use of many decorations and abolished some other. This led to a demand of a general use ottoman order of merit that is suitable for honouring ottoman and foreign subjects alike. The sultan realised the need for such decoration, so he ordered a new order of merit to be instituted. This decoration, instituted in 1852 was later known as Order of Medjidie (Eldem, 2004). The process of founding the order however wasn't without problems. The institution of such an order required precision and experience. The ottoman officials tasked with the creation of the order lacking the latter turned to other countries and started analysing their system of decorations. Looking at the Order of Medjidie, similarities with western decorations can be easily spotted. The order utilizes a five-class system, most likely based on the French Legion d'Honneur as the insignia of the different classes are very much alike. The fifth class was worn on a ribbon on the chest, the fourth class as well, but it has a rosette on the ribbon, the third class was worn around the neck, just like the second class, but the second class of the order also came with a breast star and the first class was worn on a sash and came with a larger breast star. It is interesting the statute of the Order of Medjidie

²¹ For example: Kurdistan medal, Yemen medal, Bosnia medal

²² For example: Nişân-ı İftihâr and Nişân-ı zî-şân

limits the maximum number of decorations of each class that can be distributed, it is important to mention though that this limit did not apply to foreign recipients. It is clear that Abdul Medjid realised the importance of decorations used for diplomatic purposes and he intended the Order of Medjidie to be used to strengthen the Ottoman Empire's relations with the West, that why he did not want to limit the number of decorations that can be given to foreign citizens.

The western influence can also be spotted on the shape of the medals. Most European orders use some variation of the cross as the medal and obviously this shape was not suitable for the ottomans, so they based the shape of the new order on the breast stars of European decorations. It was a logical choice even more so, because the symbol of the star was already in use by the Ottoman State and some other ottoman decorations used it as well.

The name of the new order also posed a problem. Most European decorations are named after Christian saints, biblical figures or stories or symbols of medieval origins. These obviously were not suitable for an ottoman decoration. Other western orders got their name after various royal dynasties or rulers, but in some cases the order is named to represent its function (ex. *Virtuti Militari*). From these options the name of the founding ruler was chosen, and Abdul Medjid gave his own name to the newly instituted decoration, that's how it became the Order of Medjidie.

Abdul Medjid intended to use the order to strengthen the western relations of the Ottoman Empire, so he and his successors handed out the decoration to foreign citizens in larger amounts. This led to a somewhat ambivalent situation as the large number of decorations given out inevitably inflated the prestige of the order in western eyes, but it also had a very positive effect. In western societies most people did not have a chance to obtain an order, maybe some lower ranked medals or crosses of merit but usually the orders were reserved to those with higher status, rank or position, usually in the state administration, diplomacy or the military. The larger number of Order of Medjidies distributed meant that it was easier to obtain, and it was also accessible to those who did not have a chance to get any higher-ranking western decoration. Whether knowingly or unintentionally the ottomans provided an accessible decoration to western people without high rank or a career in the state administration, diplomacy or the military. This motivated these people to do some kind of service to the Ottoman Empire and try to earn the sultan's appreciation in the form of a decoration. The Order of Medjidie did not have a particularly high prestige among the social élite, but it was very popular among lower standing

citizens who felt the need for a decoration for representative purposes. In contemporary Hungarian newspapers multiple articles can be found about firms offering their clients that they will receive the decoration of their choosing for a set price (ex. *Politikai Ujdonságok*, 1883). Some of these firms realised the increased demand for ottoman decorations and put the Order of Medjidie on their price list. This indicates that the Order of Medjidie was accepted as a western-type decoration and it was sought after, that's why these firms put it on their advertisements. Some of these advertisements turned out to be fraudulent and was only aimed at making the customer pay in advance than providing him/her some sort of wearable trinket, but not the order the customer chose and paid for. Such a fraudulent business was led by a Swedish ex-consul who used his diplomatic experience to set up such a scam. By the time he was apprehended by the authorities he has already been conducting his illegal activities for thirty years. Other firms actually delivered on their promise and could arrange that their customer was awarded with the decoration chosen and paid for. Such a business was of two ottoman gentlemen who were only mentioned in the newspapers as Tahir bey and Mehmet bey, and they offered various ottoman decorations to their customers (*Az újság*, 1904). Order of Medjidie, Order of Osmanie or even the Order of Chefakat, an exclusive decoration reserved only for women. Tahir bey was the owner of a newspaper and as such he was able to publish articles praising the client's merits no matter how little those were. Mehmet bey worked in the office of the grand vizier so he made sure that the officials responsible for decorations notice the articles about the client ensuring that a decoration would be bestowed upon him. Later Tahir bey and Mehmet bey switched methods and they didn't even need the client to have any merit to be able to get him/her decorated. Using his position in the grand vizier's office, Mehmet bey had access to the ledger containing the names of those who would be decorated, and he just simply inserted the name of their client into the list. In some cases, they even stole blank award documents and the Sultan's stamp, creating a forged document, the client could then submit to the officials demanding a medal. This method was made possible by two major factors. Firstly, when it came to the decoration of foreign subjects it was a custom at that time that only the award document was mailed to the recipient who could later have the medal made in his home country, so a foreigner with only an award document did not raise any suspicion. Secondly, the Sultan in some cases skipped the official route when it came to awarding foreign citizens, so the ottoman authorities had little possibility to verify the validity of the award documents as they had no record of every foreigner who got a decoration. This is proven by documents found

in the Hungarian National Archives in the collection preserving the documents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs' Presidential Department (HU MNL OL K 148) which was responsible for conducting a background-check as part of the process in which the recipients of foreign decoration had to ask permission from the king to be able to wear their decorations. In this collection from the year 1903 a whole dossier of documents²³ was found about ottoman decorations. Most cases presented in the dossier are about people who applied for the permit necessary for the wearing foreign decorations. In these cases, the Ministry of Internal Affairs could not find out why these people received an ottoman decoration, so it asked for assistance from the Ministry of External Affairs which tasked the Embassy of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in Istanbul to inquire about these people and the reason of their decoration at the ottoman officials. Despite the efforts of the embassy, the ottoman authorities could not tell any specifics about these decorations as they claimed that the sultan usually awards decorations without informing them, so they don't have records about these people. As it was necessary for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to be able to check the reason behind foreign decoration given to its citizens, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, Count Heinrich von Calice (1831–1912) submitted a proposal to the Hungarian Council of Ministers. In this proposal Count Calice suggests that they should force the sultan to keep to the official route by only accepting permit requests with a preliminary agreement between the Ottoman empire and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy detailing the reason behind one's decoration. The lack of this document should mean that the Ministry of Internal Affairs would automatically decline the petition of the recipient. The proposal was presented to the Council of Ministers by Hungarian prime minister Kálmán Széll (1843–1915) and passed the vote (HU MNL OL W 12 1901 1901.09.02).

Research indicates that in the period between 1867 and 1914 several hundred Hungarians received the Order of Medjidie. The recipients can be divided into two major categories:

- 1, Those who got the order as part of the diplomatic protocol. These people in most cases are either diplomats, military officers, firefighters or state officials.
- 2, Those who got their medals based on their personal merits. This group mostly includes merchants, entrepreneurs, artists, scholars etc.

²³ HU MNL OL K148 1903 II 408

From the first group firefighters stand out. The reasoning behind so many of them receiving ottoman decorations is that count Ödön Széchenyi (1839–1922), the founding father of Hungarian and ottoman organized firefighting after establishing the ottoman fire brigade he encouraged Hungarian firefighters to travel to the Ottoman Empire and help in the training of their ottoman colleagues. In this period many groups of Hungarian firefighters visited the Ottoman Empire and took part in training operations, co-joint drills, fundraisers and banquettes there. The Ottomans when western envoys visited the empire, tried to give every member of the visiting group a present in the form of a decoration, so usually each member of these groups received an ottoman order, the type of the decoration and its class however was dependent on the rank and social status of the participants. The Ottomans did this to make sure the western visitors have pleasant memories of the Ottoman Empire hence strengthening the relations with the West. A good example of such mass awarding is from 1905 when an Austro-Hungarian naval contingent arrived in Istanbul to conduct a business meeting with Sultan Abdul-Hamid II (1842–1918) regarding an order for the construction of warships (Fodor, 2009). The order was placed then cancelled by the sultan and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy wanted to convince the sultan to renew the order, to achieve this a naval contingent of six warships (three destroyers, two cruisers and a torpedo ship) were dispatched under the command of Rear Admiral Mieczyslaw Sziemuszowa-Pietruski (1845–1905). Every single member of the contingent received some kind of ottoman decoration. All of the officers and even some regular sailors and mechanics were decorated with the Order of Medjidie or Order of Osmanie, others were awarded with lower ranking medals (Budapesti Közlöny, 1905). The ottomans when it came to western visitors didn't really considers whether the western group actually was on an official diplomatic mission or not when deciding on the decorations. A great example for this is the case of the "student envoys" of 1877. A group of Hungarian university students decided to travel to Istanbul and give Abdul Kerim pasha (1807–1883), the commander of the ottoman army a decorative sword to represent the appreciation and friendship of the Hungarian people to the ottoman general. The students not only travelled without official appointment but despite the best efforts of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the background secret diplomatic meetings were taking place because the Russian Empire wanted to launch an offensive against the ottomans and asked the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy if they wanted to participate (Diószegi, 1979). The Monarchy however was not in a position to take part in such a campaign neither from financial nor from diplomatic point of view. The Monarchy however

did not want to flat out decline the Russian offer because it was afraid of the possible negative consequences, so the Austro-Hungarian diplomacy backed by Germany tried to convince the Russians to accept that the Monarchy wants to be neutral in this upcoming conflict. Finally in 1877 the Treaty of Budapest was signed in which the Austro-Hungarian State declared its neutrality in the upcoming Ottoman-Russian war, and that's why the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not want the Hungarian students to travel to Istanbul and ensure the ottomans of the friendship of the Hungarian people. The students however reached the ottoman capital and took part in many official banquets, celebrations and they even met the sultan. These events created such a diplomatic backlash that is even reflected in the contemporary newspapers and put the Austro-Hungarian diplomacy in a very uncomfortable situation. Despite the students travelling without any official approval, all of them received the Order of Medjidie. Numerous articles were published in contemporary newspapers about the students' mission in Istanbul. This was a topic the Hungarian public found interesting because at that time most Hungarians saw the ottomans as friends or even brothers. One of the articles published was about the ottoman decorations and it introduced the Order of Medjidie and the Order of Osmanie to the readers (*Vasárnapi Újság*, 1877). Later that year a group of Ottoman envoys arrived in Budapest, among them Ottoman university students who wanted to return the favour of their Hungarian counterparts by taking part in the diplomatic mission (Dávid-F. Tóth, 2001). Despite the student missions creating a very tense situation between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Russian Empire a serious conflict between the two states was successfully avoided.

As a conclusion it can be said that despite a difficult start the ottoman decoration system was successfully created and it was able to support the empire's ambitions to strengthen its western relations, as the newly created decorations such as the Order of Medjidie or Order of Osmanie were accepted by the western diplomatic community. The ottomans however chose to use these decorations in a somewhat unique way, with a pinch of "eastern generosity" as they distributed a quite significant number of decorations on a regular basis. Due to the high number of recipients these decorations inevitably lost some of their prestige and ottoman decorations were considered easy to obtain. This however was a blessing in disguise for the ottomans as the prospect of an easily obtainable decoration motivated people who because of their social status or rank would not have otherwise stood a chance at obtaining a western order. Most of these people were merchants, teachers, artists or scholars and in the hope of getting a decoration they

offered their services to the Ottoman Empire thus strengthening the bond between the ottomans and the west on not just a diplomatic but on a social level as well.

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HUMANITARIAN FOOD ASSISTANCE TO SYRIAN REFUGEES IN TURKEY: MODALITIES, CHALLENGES, FLUCTUATING COOPERATION BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

Sára Gibárti²⁴

Abstract

Due to the massive refugee influx created by the war in Syria, Turkey now is one of the world's largest refugee hosting countries, with around 3.2 million displaced Syrians on its territory. The presence of a significant refugee population, mainly in urban areas of Turkey, has not only created socio-economic, demographic, and political challenges, but has inevitably resulted in humanitarian and social obstacles among the refugee population and host communities alike. The primary aim of this book chapter is to discuss the transforming humanitarian food assistance methods by the United Nations to Syrian refugees in Turkey. In addition, the research examines the cooperation frameworks between actors involved in humanitarian food assistance, i.e., relevant UN agencies (e.g., WFP), local and international NGOs, and Turkish government institutions. One of the main findings of the research is that while cooperation between humanitarian actors can be observed, there is a strong government influence on the implementation of humanitarian aid, activities of international organisations and the overall refugee response. The results also show that the methods of humanitarian assistance have changed considerably over the studies period, with a significant difference between assistance provided outside and inside refugee camps. Beyond reviewing the essential international literature, the examination of this issue is principally based on data analysis of the reports of relevant international organisations, as well as anonym in-depth interviews with experts from the field.


Introduction

The more than a decade-long war in Syria, which unfolded in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, has created one of the most serious humanitarian crises of our time and one of the worst refugee crises since World War 2 (UNHCR, 2016; Harris, 2018; Gelvin 2019; Norwegian

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Refugee Council, 2021). Since the start of the conflict, 6.7 million people have been displaced, of whom 5.2 million are currently refugees in states bordering Syria or in neighbouring countries, mainly Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt (Figure 1). Turkey, with 3.2 million Syrian refugees on its territory, is one of the world's largest refugee hosting states (UNHCR, 2023), and is also the country most affected by the humanitarian consequences of the Syrian conflict (Erdoğan, 2020). The challenges posed by the refugee flows are placing considerable strains on the country's legal-institutional structure and social welfare system, as well as pushing the limits of international and local aid agencies' capacities. In addition, the presence of a large refugee population, concentrated mainly in urban areas, has not only caused unavoidable socio-economic, demographic and political changes, but has also resulted in humanitarian and social challenges for refugee communities and host society alike (İçduygu, 2015; International Crisis Group, 2016; Erdoğan, Çorabatır, 2019). Following the escalation of the armed conflict in Syria, it soon became clear that, contrary to expectations, the war had created a protracted crisis rather than a humanitarian and refugee crisis that would end in the foreseeable future, where humanitarian aid modalities, international relief efforts and government measures to provide immediate relief had proved inadequate. This has led the international community and the relief agencies to rethink their aid policies in a host country and in an increasingly intense refugee situation where the government's role in managing the refugee crisis is visible.

Figure 1: Refugees from Syria in neighbouring countries (2023)



Source: own editing based on UNHCR 2023

The refugee crisis in Turkey and the country's refugee policy are highly complex issues, which are addressed in a wide range of academic literature (Kirişci, 2014; Çorabatır, 2016; Donelli, 2018; Tsarouhas, 2019; Egeresi & Kacziba, 2020; İçduygu – Nimer, 2020; Sert & Daniş, 2020; Alakoc, Zarychta & Goksel, 2023; Şahin-Mencütek et al., 2023). Besides, it is undoubted that the relationship between Turkey and the Syrian war involves geopolitical, foreign policy and security factors that go far beyond the refugee issue (Öniş, 2012; Hinnebusch, 2015; Daoudy, 2016; Szymański, 2017; Saraçoğlu, 2018; Dudlák, 2020; Szigetvári, 2020; Lechner, 2021). These will not be discussed in detail below due to logical and space limitations. The main aim of this chapter is to analyse the United Nations' humanitarian food assistance programmes to Syrian refugees in Turkey, along the evolving modalities, shifting emphases and cooperation frameworks between the UN aid agencies, the Turkish government, and local organizations. This book chapter seeks to answer the questions of what food assistance mechanisms have characterized the UN relief agencies' aid programmes in Turkey, how the forms of assistance have changed with the crisis and the increase in the number of refugees. Furthermore, the chapter looks at how the actors involved in humanitarian food

assistance have distributed their responsibilities and responsibilities, and what challenges have characterised their cooperation mechanisms. The main starting point of the research is that food aid modalities have changed in line with the evolution of the refugee crisis, and that there is a relatively well-defined division of competences between actors, while at the same time a strong governmental involvement is noticeable. The analysis focuses primarily on humanitarian food aid to Syrian refugees in urban areas of Turkey and, accordingly, does not go into detail on aid programmes in refugee camps, apart from the initial period of the refugee crisis.

The first part of the chapter discusses the food assistance practices of the UN (with a particular focus on World Food Programme, WFP) between 2012 and 2015, highlighting the primary assistance modalities, instruments and challenges affecting aid allocation. The second part of the chapter analyses the assistance methods after 2015, while focusing on the main aspects of the Emergency Social Safety Net programme. The third part focuses on the cooperation framework between international and national actors. The findings on the transformation of food assistance modalities are based primarily on a qualitative analysis of the relevant international aid agencies' report; challenges of the discussed aid programmes and cooperation framework between international and domestic actors are based on semi-structured in-depth interviews with experts conducted in person and online between 2021 and 2022. Regarding the in-depth interviews, it is important to stress the interviewees' request for anonymity: respecting this, the chapter consistently refers to the time of the interviews²⁵. Regarding the chapter's terminology, it is noteworthy that the study follows the practice of international literature and uses the term *refugee* to refer to Syrians living in Turkey, even though they do not have official refugee status in the country²⁶.

I. Humanitarian food assistance programmes between 2012 and 2015

In the early days of the Syrian war, Turkey did not request humanitarian missions from UN agencies and international NGOs to address the unfolding refugee crisis (Memişoğlu & Ilgit, 2016; Yılmaz, 2019; Bélanger & Saracoglu, 2019), mainly for foreign policy and humanitarian reasons (Ferris & Kirişci, 2015; Gökalp-Aras & Şahin-Mencütek, 2015). In the refugee camps set up in the Turkish-Syrian border provinces, which were equipped with health

²⁵ Year and month.

²⁶ Their legal status is officially known as Syrians under Temporary Protection, but this will not be discussed in this chapter.


and education facilities, government agencies and local NGOs were responsible for providing humanitarian assistance to the refugee population, including food and other in-kind humanitarian aid (Turkish Red Crescent, 2011; AFAD, 2013; World Bank, 2015).

The rapid increase in the number of refugees and the challenges it has created have been a major change in Turkey's previous attitude towards the international aid mission in the country. Since the second half of 2012, the Turkish government has agreed to implement the Syria Regional Response Plan (RRP) in Turkey, a comprehensive UN assistance programme for countries hosting large refugee populations bordering Syria, creating a pathway for international humanitarian food assistance measures (WFP, 2012; UNHCR, 2013). The food aid programmes were implemented under the RRP with financial and institutional cooperation between WFP, the Turkish Red Crescent and the government's Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı, hereafter AFAD). Between 2012 and 2014, humanitarian food assistance was gradually extended to refugee camps established along the Syrian border in south-eastern Turkey, as the capacity of the infrastructure and the number of people living in the camps increased (Turkish Red Crescent, 2012, 2013). Instead of in-kind aid, the food aid modality was based on an electronic voucher-based humanitarian food assistance (Food e-card) of 80 Turkish liras per person, which could only be used for food items in local shops, and at the beginning of the programme, food aid was only provided to the Syrian refugee population living in camps (Turkish Red Crescent, 2013). However, WFP's declining resources and the rapid increase in the number of refugees continued to hinder the expansion of food aid programmes on a larger scale. To overcome this, the Turkish government proposed to share the funding costs between WFP (and the Turkish Red Crescent) and AFAD (and indirectly the Turkish government). Of the 80 Turkish liras per person voucher-based assistance, AFAD took over 20 liras, which was provided to beneficiaries on a separate card (AFAD e-Card), while WFP contributed 60 lira per family for food assistance to people in refugee camps (WFP, 2014; WFP, Turkish Red Crescent & AFAD, 2014). AFAD's financial contribution and burden-sharing allowed the WFP to expand its assistance programme to each refugee camp without reducing the amount of money it provides to Syrian families in need.

During 2014, the escalation of the armed conflict in Syria led to a dramatic increase in the number of Syrian refugees arriving in Turkey: while at the beginning of 2014, UNHCR and Turkish government agencies registered 571,000 refugees (UNHCR, 2014a), as shown in

Figure 2, by the end of 2014 this number had risen to one and a half million (Directorate General of Migration Management [DGMM], 2023).

Figure 2: Trends in the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey 2011-2023



Source: Directorate General of Migration Management (2023)

Such rapidly changing trends and their implications began to exceed the challenges of refugee populations in reception centres and the dilemmas and difficulties of humanitarian assistance programmes. The main reason for this is that the proportion of people living outside refugee camps in the country's urban areas has increased significantly as the overall number of refugees arriving in the country was rising. While only approximate figures were available in the early years of the refugee crisis (UNHCR, 2012), international organisations and the Turkish authorities estimated that by the end of 2014, 70-80% of the Syrian refugee population living in the country was living outside refugee camps (UNHCR, 2014b). This made it clear that there was an urgent need for some form of support for urban refugees – alongside the host community. However, international aid agencies could only rely on estimates or, in extreme cases, 'urban legends' to map the humanitarian needs and socio-economic challenges of urban refugees, which clearly made it difficult to allocate aid effectively and scale up assistance

programmes. This intention was further hampered, if not made impossible, by the fact that until autumn of 2014, the Turkish government had only approved assistance and needs assessments for refugees in camps. Meanwhile, it did not support the inclusion of Syrian refugees in urban areas in the humanitarian food assistance provided by the WFP and the Turkish Red Crescent (WFP, FAO & UNHCR, 2013). However, it also became clear that by the end of 2014, the number and proportion of urban refugees had far exceeded the number of refugees living in refugee camps, and thus also the number of refugees receiving humanitarian food vouchers. Recognising the growing socio-economic challenges faced by people living outside camps and their impact on the host society, the Turkish government changed its approach by autumn 2014 which was certainly a milestone for humanitarian food assistance programmes (UNHCR, 2014c). The Turkish government formally requested the WFP, and with it the two Turkish NGOs and government agencies involved in the funding and distribution of aid, to extend the voucher-based assistance beyond the camps to the most vulnerable urban refugees in need (WFP, FAO & UNHCR, 2014). The Turkish government has identified Hatay, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa and Kilis – at the time the four provinces with the largest urban refugee populations – for 'pilot' aid programmes outside refugee camps (WFP, Turkish Red Crescent & AFAD, 2015). In the first half of 2015, the WFP, together with the local aid agencies and government organizations, gradually made it possible (with needs assessment, stakeholder consultation, etc.) to expand voucher-based humanitarian food assistance to urban refugees (*ibid.*). Although the modality of urban humanitarian food assistance was the same as that used in refugee camps, the voucher-based assistance provided to each refugee living in camps was replaced by humanitarian food vouchers distributed on a means-tested basis (WFP, 2014). However, the speedy launch and allocation of humanitarian food assistance programmes required a much more differentiated and comprehensive needs assessment than the aid delivery mechanisms used in refugee camps, given the different situations and challenges faced by urban refugees (*ibid.*). While in the early years of the refugee crisis it was clear that all Syrians living in refugee camps should benefit from food assistance due to reduced self-reliance and livelihood opportunities, and the overall acute humanitarian situation, this was far from self-evident in the case of urban refugees. In addition, the assistance did not initially cover the entire urban refugee population in need, as it was much slower and more difficult to scale up humanitarian food assistance in urban areas than in refugee camps. This was partly because the needs and situation assessment processes were not well developed and were further complicated by inadequate

demographic data on the Syrian refugee population in the provinces concerned, as well as geographical, territorial, and administrative disparities. On the other hand, the reluctance of many refugees to participate in vulnerability assessments and to receive assistance, mainly due to initial mistrust, has significantly hampered the expansion and implementation of aid programmes. (WFP, 2015).

II. The Emergency Social Safety Net

The aftermath of 2015, combined with the further increasing number of refugees from Syria and the refugee crisis in Europe, significantly affected the displacement situation in Turkey (Dimitriadi & Kaya, 2021). As part of the April 2016 refugee deal between the European Union and Turkey, the European Commission allocated and secured €3+3 billion through the Facility for Refugees in Turkey to address the refugee crisis through humanitarian aid (European Commission, 2016). The agreement marked a significant turning point also in humanitarian aid mechanisms and cooperation between actors involved. On the basis of the EU-Turkey Statement and Action Plan, the Emergency Social Safety Net Programme (ESSN), which was part of the UN Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP)²⁷, was set up to support urban refugee populations in Turkey until July 2023 (Mauder et al, 2018a; Erdoğan, Kirişçi & Uysal, 2021,); replacing the urban refugee assistance programmes of I(N)GOs prior to 2015-2016 (Cetinoglu & Yılmaz, 2021; Ark-Yıldırım & Smyrl, 2021). It is important to note, however, that the ESSN aid programme in its original form was discontinued in July 2023. Its successor, the Social Safety Net, continues to provide cash assistance to urban refugees in Turkey through the EU's Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), in cooperation with Turkish government institutions and NGOs (ECHO, 2023). On the other hand, the new Social Safety Net programme is not covered by this chapter.

The European Commission's Humanitarian Aid department (ECHO) entrusted the WFP and the Turkish Red Crescent with the distribution and implementation of aid on the ground. With the involvement of relevant ministries and government agencies, the ESSN targeted the most vulnerable Syrian refugee families living in (or at risk of) considerable food insecurity

²⁷ The UN 3RP framework replaced the RRP aid programme mentioned above in 2015. The new programme continued to operate in states with large refugee populations neighbouring Syria, but humanitarian aid was complemented by long-term resilience-building aid programmes


and extreme poverty (Turkish Red Crescent & WFP, 2018). This was initially provided through unconditional, multi-purpose (i.e., not just food) cash assistance of 120 liras per family member per month on credit cards (Kızılaykart), which was considered by the EU – and other participating relief agencies – to be the most appropriate aid modality to address the most serious and urgent humanitarian challenges faced by Syrian refugees in Turkey (WFP Turkey, 2016). A key feature of the ESSN is that, although it used a humanitarian and food assistance toolkit, it also operated as a social safety net programme. As its name suggests, it was channelled through the Turkish government into the state welfare system to achieve long-term poverty reduction goals (Kirişci, 2020; Robson et al., 2022). The design and establishment of the ESSN was clearly intended to develop and implement an innovative and relevant aid modality that would be best suited to the local socio-economic context and take into regard the real needs of the refugee population concerned. It was also the explicit intention of the aid programme that cash-based humanitarian assistance should allow refugees to choose the items they most need and not limit the range of items that can be purchased with cash assistance to, for example, food or education (ECHO, 2019). It is clear, therefore, that the aim of the programme was to play a prominent role in the provision of humanitarian assistance to refugees to meet their basic needs. In addition, by promoting self-reliance and reducing negative coping strategies (e.g., exposure of school-age refugees to child labour, limited food consumption or sale of assets, etc.), the ESSN aimed to reduce economic vulnerability, extreme poverty, and exposure to extreme poverty among the refugee population in the long term. Finally, in line with the 3RP framework, building social cohesion and strengthening local economic performance was also a priority: as refugee beneficiaries could spend their cash assistance mainly in local shops, the funds on the card were reinvested in the local economy (WFP Turkey, 2016).

While the ESSN principally targeted the most deprived and vulnerable Syrian refugee population living in urban areas in Turkey, only Syrian refugees (or refugees from other countries) registered in the Turkish authorities' databases and granted temporary protection or other international protection status in the country were eligible to apply for cash assistance through the ESSN (WFP, 2019a). Since its launch, ESSN cash transfers were not distributed on a universal basis, as the programme applied means-testing criteria in addition to those related to refugees' legal status. To determine eligibility, the financial situation of Syrian refugee families, the number of family members living in one household and the number of dependents,

age composition and gender distribution were taken into consideration by the international organisations and NGOs involved in the assistance programme (WFP, 2018).

The European Commission reported that by 2020, around 1.7 million refugees received humanitarian cash assistance through the ESSN assistance programme (European Commission, 2020); by 2022, the number of beneficiaries approached 1.5 million (International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies [IFRC], 2022). A significant proportion of refugees participating in the assistance programme were Syrian, but refugees from Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries (e.g., Somalia, Iran, Pakistan, etc.) were also eligible for cash assistance, but only if they met the demographic criteria. The graph (Figure 3) below shows the proportion of refugees from different countries receiving ESSN cash grants.

Figure 3: ESSN beneficiaries by country of origin



Source: IFRC (2022)

III. Challenges and obstacles of the ESSN programme

According to the reports of participating organisations, the living conditions of the families receiving assistance have improved thanks to the monthly cash assistance provided by ESSN (WFP, 2018; WFP, 2019b). This may seem a remarkable achievement, especially given the scale and complexity of the refugee situation in Turkey. It is also undeniable that the assistance programme has focused on making cash assistance as widely available as possible to vulnerable refugees in urban areas, using innovative tools and apparently well-developed and sophisticated eligibility criteria. At the same time, evaluations of the ESSN warn of the programme's shortcomings. Since its beginning, indirect and direct challenges have hampered

its implementation and the achievement of its objectives, such as the drastic devaluation of the Turkish currency or the fact that the programme's needs assessment and aid allocation mechanisms were not in line with the Turkish socio-economic and political context. (Cetinoglu & Yilmaz, 2021; Erdoğan, Kirişci & Uysal, 2021). Nevertheless, the aid programme did not always recognise the real challenges and circumstances of the refugee population, in parallel with the fact that many refugees in need did not qualify for the cash assistance provided by the ESSN (Maunder, 2018a, 2018b). In this context, a related World Bank report highlights that the international organisations involved in the ESSN programme should have revised the eligibility criteria, as more than 30% of the vulnerable refugee population in Turkey did not meet the demographic targeting criteria applied (Cuevas et al., 2019).

In their study, Cetinoglu and Yilmaz point out that one of the primary negative aspects was the issue of refugee registration, which the ESSN aid programme were unable to address or overcome is the issue of refugee registration (Cetinoglu & Yilmaz, 2021). The programme made it a precondition that refugees were only eligible for any formal social and humanitarian assistance in the province where they have submitted and finalised their registration upon arrival in the country (Cetinoglu & Yilmaz, 2021). However, this stipulation was far from reflecting reality, as many refugees registered in one of the provinces of south-eastern Turkey moved to one of Turkey's major cities²⁸ for work or family reunification. Although refugees are allowed to transfer their registration, the process has been facing bureaucratic, administrative, and other obstacles (ibid.). Consequently, refugees living in Turkey could not apply for cash assistance from the ESSN assistance programme in the province where they were otherwise living but not registered. As a result, many refugees did not apply and were therefore not eligible for cash assistance: according to a WFP survey, 43% of those not registered in the programme cited anomalies around registration as a reason for not applying for ESSN cash assistance (WFP, 2018). The programme's requirement to have a valid and registered Turkish address in order to receive cash assistance is indirectly related to this problem. However, those without a valid address could not be registered in the ESSN programme due to the unregulated housing market in Turkey and the informal living conditions of many refugees in large cities with poor financial circumstances. There are therefore mutually reinforcing and closely linked gaps and negative impacts that prevented the most vulnerable refugees from accessing cash assistance (Maunder et al., 2018b). In addition, the fact that refugee men of working age living alone were

²⁸ Mainly Istanbul, Izmir or the capital Ankara.

not eligible for ESSN cash benefits under the programme's eligibility criteria was an obvious symptom and consequence of the demographic criteria gap used by the ESSN programme (Maunder et al, 2018a). The programme assumed, based on Turkish labour regulations, that this group of refugees would always have access to formal employment that would provide a decent living wage. However, this was far from the reality of the unregulated nature of the labour market in Turkey and the real challenges that refugees face in this context, as well as the financial hardship resulting from informal work and low wages (Erdoğan, Kirişci & Uysal, 2021).

In 2018, the Turkish government announced its intention to withdraw from the then on-going ESSN assistance programme and unilaterally terminate its application, for which an exit strategy report was prepared. Its declared aim was to strengthen and create self-reliance for refugees and to increase their integration into the labour market and consequently their employment (Government of Turkey, 2018). However, no precise date was set for the withdrawal, and no significant progress was made on the issue until the official end of the aid programme (Parker, 2019; Erdoğan, Kirişci & Uysal, 2021). According to the experts interviewed, the intention to exit could be attributed to several closely correlated reasons. Respondents pointed out that due to the protracted and persistent nature of the refugee crisis in Turkey, humanitarian assistance is no longer sufficient (Interview, November 2021), nor does it motivate the refugee population receiving cash assistance to enter the labour market (Interview, October 2021). In this context, the importance of focusing on durable solutions, including integration and/or resettlement of refugees, rather than on temporary assistance was underlined by an expert familiar with the work of UN agencies (Interview, May 2022). Furthermore, a UN aid agency staff member noted that by leaving the ESSN, “(...) the Turkish government wants to encourage aid recipients to earn their own money. This idea is supported by the UN as well as the EU, and there are already some projects to prepare for this transition.” (Interview, January 2022).

Regarding the postponement/non-implementation of the exit, an expert on Turkish refugee policy said that “(...) the Turkish government has not created the conditions for full independence of refugees. It is pointless to increase the employment rate of refugees if the conditions for their integration into the labour market are not created.” (Interview, October 2021). A respondent also highlighted that “(...) it is not easy to integrate everyone into society, especially into the economy, so these people need something to survive. Consequently, the

Turkish government did not want to end this programme without providing decent livelihood opportunities. In addition, vulnerable groups of the refugee population, such as people with disabilities, the elderly or single mothers, must be considered. (...) Government and international organisations must first be aware of the exact numbers and impacts before the ESSN is completely discontinued.” (Interview, January 2022).

While the government's desire to withdraw and the other setbacks discussed above highlight the contradictions of the aid programme, the organisations involved in the ESSN carried out a remarkable relief effort, as confirmed by the interviewees' responses. One respondent argues that “the refugee population is the main beneficiary of the aid programme, so any assistance that addresses basic humanitarian needs is useful and therefore necessary. The ESSN aid programme also indirectly and economically supports the Turkish host society to a certain extent.” (Interview, November 2021). Yet interviewees independently highlighted that the relief programme has not provided a real solution to the problems of the Syrian refugee population, nor to the wider and deep-rooted economic and social challenges that their presence has created.

IV. National and international actors in humanitarian food assistance


As shown in Figure 4 below, the international and national actors engaged in humanitarian food assistance have clearly defined roles and responsibilities. As for international organizations, the World Food Programme is one of the most prominent UN agencies regarding food assistance in Turkey. As the world's largest humanitarian organisation, it not only has a significant international presence, but also a strong lobbying power for donor contributions. The organisation also regularly engages in international awareness-raising activities to highlight the importance of humanitarian food assistance, focusing on its mission, mandate and the most pressing humanitarian crises (Shaw, 2011). As a result, the development and implementation of assistance programmes for the Syrian refugee population in Turkey has largely benefited from WFP's experience and lessons learned, as well as its expertise in food assistance practices and humanitarian logistics. In addition, since the beginning of its engagement in Turkey, WFP has emerged as the main funder of humanitarian food assistance programmes, in addition to adapting current international practices and ensuring universal humanitarian standards. However, WFP is able to fund its operations entirely through voluntary commitments from donors and member states, the negative financial impact of which has

proven unavoidable in the countries most affected by the Syrian refugee crisis, including Turkey. As it was discussed above, since 2014, the financial contribution of the Turkish government has enabled WFP to overcome its financial difficulties, prevent the suspension of food programmes and maintain and in some cases increase the number of refugees receiving assistance. At the same time, though, the sharing of humanitarian food assistance and its costs meant that WFP was not the sole provider of food assistance to refugees, but rather a secondary 'co-financier'. In addition to its typical international aid agency functions, the WFP also took on a significant share of the allocation of humanitarian food assistance programmes. It is important to note that the work of the WFP in Turkey during the reporting period was strongly supported by local NGOs, which were able to get involved in the support mechanisms for the Syrian refugees. In particular, the Turkish Red Crescent, with its strong local roots and in-depth knowledge of local conditions, was involved in the implementation of the food aid aspects of the RRP and 3RP. It also played a certain role as an intermediary between the WFP and the Turkish government. However, the presence of the Turkish Red Crescent in food aid was not just a "link" or an actor with the characteristics of a local NGO, but also a kind of reassurance to the Turkish government that a local organisation with government support and experience in aid delivery could be an equal partner in international assistance.

In addition to the Turkish Red Crescent, there are also local NGOs that, although not part of the RRP/3RP and not working with WFP or the UN in general, are providing significant assistance to Syrian refugees in Turkey, often with a focus on poverty alleviation and social cohesion (Zihnioğlu & Dalkıran, 2022). Local NGOs that are not involved in international aid programmes run smaller projects with lower budgets, but also focus on improving the livelihoods of refugees, organising leisure activities that encourage interpersonal contact and community organisation, and distributing in-kind food aid (Aras & Duman, 2019). It should also be added that most of these local NGOs are not formally part of UN and Turkish government aid programmes but have close links with UN humanitarian agencies. A UN staff member interviewed about the work of (I)NGOs in refugee assistance stressed that “(...) NGOs are trying to compensate for what UN agencies try but fail to do. Their way of thinking is very different from the UN's, they think differently about project implementation, especially the local NGOs who can reach the most vulnerable members of society.” (Interview February 2022).

Regarding the role of the Turkish government, it is noteworthy – as mentioned above – that it provided humanitarian assistance, including in-kind food aid, to the Syrian refugee population arriving on its territory at the very beginning of the refugee crisis, before the arrival of UN agencies and INGOs. After the launch of the RRP and later the 3RP, the government played the most important role in shaping and providing the (public) policy/legislative/institutional framework necessary for the effective implementation of the aid programmes, in addition to complementing the funding of humanitarian food assistance by international organisations. Furthermore, government agencies (such as AFAD) and ministries (such as DGMM) have been closely involved indirectly with the financial and bureaucratic aspects of international food aid programmes through Turkish government funds. They have also been heavily involved in administrative and operational tasks, such as setting up and managing refugee camps, which were a key pillar of refugee assistance.

Figure 4: Roles and responsibilities of actors involved in humanitarian food aid



source: own editing

V. Actors in the Emergency Social Safety Net programme


The launch of the ESSN programme not only changed the modalities of food aid, but also had a significant impact on the cooperation framework and the roles of the actors involved (Figure 5). This was closely linked to the fact that the ESSN programme was financed by the European Commission's ECHO and implemented under its responsibility. This organisation was therefore responsible for managing financial issues, delegating tasks related to implementing and allocating aid programmes, and selecting the necessary and appropriate partner organisations (Ark-Yıldırım & Smyrl, 2021). An important factor, however, is that under the EU's humanitarian aid regulation, only international and non-governmental organisations registered in the EU can benefit from ECHO's humanitarian funding (European Union, 1996). As a result, ECHO was not able to allocate funds directly under the programme to Turkish NGOs and/or governmental organisations not registered in the EU (ECHO, 2019). In line with the regulations outlined above, ECHO has entrusted the WFP, an international organisation with expertise in humanitarian aid and the management of humanitarian cash assistance, with the implementation of the ESSN programme in the field²⁹ (WFP, 2019b). In practice, this was an extension of WFP's role as a service provider, allowing it to develop and manage the ESSN's aid allocation mechanisms, although WFP's funding role in assisting urban refugees ceased with the introduction of the ESSN. The WFP was also responsible for the regular monitoring, evaluation and supervision of the humanitarian operation and ensured accountability of the implementation of the aid programme to ECHO as the funding agency (Maunder et al, 2018a). As in previous years and in other UN/WFP-led food assistance programmes in Turkey, the organisation was supported by the Turkish Red Crescent, which played an important role in the implementation of the ESSN, including reaching out to the vulnerable refugee population and mapping their main socio-economic challenges (ECHO, 2019: 6; Ark-Yıldırım & Smyrl, 2021).

Although Turkish government institutions and organisations could not directly benefit from the ESSN funding, ECHO intended to execute the aid programme in partnership with local organisations and government agencies. In particular, the competences of the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Affairs proved to be indispensable and useful for effective aid allocation (Ardittis, 2017). This government body was responsible for all regulations, laws and

²⁹ It is important to note that in April 2020 the mandate of the WFP in the ESSN aid programme expired and the IFRC took over the organisation's remit.

rules related to participation of refugees – mainly Syrians – in education and the labour market and held almost all (official) information on the number, demographics, economic, educational and employment activities of refugees in Turkey. The Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM) also played a key role in the ESSN, as the Turkish government's Migration Directorate had exclusive responsibility for registering refugees.

Figure 5: Responsibilities of organizations and institutions involved in the Emergency



source: own editing

Conclusion

This book chapter has attempted to explore the international humanitarian food assistance practices for urban refugees in Turkey, analysing the methods applied, the main challenges and the framework for cooperation between international and national actors. It is clear that the expansion of aid programmes for vulnerable urban refugees and the emergence of cash assistance clearly reflected the fact that the refugee situation in Turkey was no longer an acute humanitarian situation that would end in a short period of time, but rather a large-scale, protracted, multi-component crisis in which the Turkish state, together with international aid agencies, had a major role to play. This chapter also showed that the introduction of the ESSN significantly reshaped international humanitarian aid practices in Turkey. It responded to the basic needs of the refugee population with cash assistance, while pursuing long-term poverty reduction objectives. At the same time, the modalities of international humanitarian food assistance used in Turkey, despite their stated objective, may not in themselves be able to promote real durable solutions and mitigate the socio-economic challenges and social tensions arising from the presence of refugee populations. In terms of cooperation between actors, it is

noticeable that humanitarian food assistance mechanisms for Syrian refugee populations in Turkey are implemented in partnership with UN agencies, Turkish government institutions, local and international NGOs. However, humanitarian assistance practices are developed, designed, and applied along well-defined and distinct lines of responsibility, while the various actors involved in the implementation of aid programmes act in accordance with their respective competencies and mandates. Despite the challenges and difficulties outlined above, there is no doubt that the international relief agencies are carrying out humanitarian food operations and playing an important part in addressing one of the world's largest refugee-hosting countries and a complex, protracted and multifactorial displacement situation.

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TURKEY`S INFLUENCE ON KOSOVO`S EU MIGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION

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Introduction

The journey that Kosovo has taken to become a nation-state, which was cemented by the country's proclamation of independence in 2008, has been one that is filled with both chances and problems. This young Balkan state, which is located at a crossroads of geopolitical interests, has been working toward recognition and integration into the European Union (EU) while simultaneously negotiating complex relationships with Serbia, which is its neighbor, and engaging with significant players from across the world. Since Kosovo's declaration of independence, this paper will investigate the path that Kosovo has taken toward joining the European Union (EU). It will also investigate the diverse measures that both the European Union (EU) and Turkey have taken in order to support Kosovo's growth, stability, and aspirations for European integration. This assessment provides light on the common and varied strategies adopted, the problems faced, and the indirect and direct collaborative efforts of the EU and Turkey aimed at defining Kosovo's future within the framework of Europe as a whole. It does so by highlighting the intricate interactions that exist between Kosovo, the European Union, and Turkey.

Kosovo declared its independence on February 17, 2008, having been under UNMIK rule from 1999 to 2008. This was based on a report written by Martti Ahtisaari, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Kosovo from 2005 to 2008. (Kenar & Hodza, 2022). It appeared that after almost a decade of ambiguity, the Albanians of Kosovo would at last be able to govern themselves. The United States and the European Union concluded that the region had no realistic route to independence at first. But they also stated that Albanians should never again be subject to Serbian authority due to the ethnic cleansing done by the Slobodan Milosevic administration. Most Western countries quickly recognized Kosovo as a new state, despite

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strong opposition from Serbia and potential precedent concerns that allowing such independence provides for minority' campaigns around the world (Alioglu, 2021).

The European Union interest in Kosovo

Since Kosovo's 2008 declaration of independence from Serbia, the European Union (EU) has been a major player in the region. The main goals of the EU's engagement in Kosovo have been to advance the nation's democracy, stability, and economic growth (Mexhuani, 2023). The term "Normative Power" describes the EU's capacity to influence the conduct of other nations and global players by advancing its standards and principles, which include democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The EU's normative authority is intimately related to Kosovo's path to EU membership. Since 2008, when Kosovo proclaimed its independence from Serbia, more than 100 nations have acknowledged it, including 22 of the 27 EU members. The exceptions are Spain, Romania, Greece, Cyprus and Slovakia. Kosovo's path to EU membership has been also hampered by Serbia, a contender for EU membership, which does not acknowledge Kosovo's independence (Mexhuani, 2023). Also effecting its membership process, the major blockade for Kosovo`s EU membership is also Serbia`s impediment on EU aspirations, the EU requires mutual recognition from both countries.

In Kosovo, the EU has carried out several programs, some of which are intended to advance economic growth, democracy, and stability. The EU and Kosovo have a framework agreement known as the *Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA)*, which aims to advance social, political, and economic cooperation between the two regions.

The Pre-Accession Assistance Instrument (IPA): A financial tool called the IPA is intended to assist with reforms in nations that are or may be candidates for EU membership. Since 2007, Kosovo has benefited from IPA monetary fund, which is distributed among other things to areas including public administration and governance, employment and education, and justice and home affairs.

The Rule of Law Mission of the European Union in Kosovo, or EULEX: The EU created EULEX, a civilian mission, in 2008 to aid Kosovo's efforts to combat organized crime and corruption as well as the establishment of an independent court. The mandate of EULEX

encompasses oversight and guidance of Kosovo's legal establishments, in addition to aid in the investigation and prosecution of grave offenses, such as corruption in the government and organized crime. Turkey, as a non-member state, is also a part of this civilian mission alongside with the US, Norway and Switzerland (Mexhuani, 2023).

In order to resolve unresolved issues between Kosovo and Serbia, especially the status of Serb-majority territories in northern Kosovo, the EU initiated the Dialogue for Normalization of Relations between Kosovo and Serbia in 2011 (Mexhuani, 2023). With these missions and programs, the EU aims to integrate Kosovo in alliance with its framework, emphasizing human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. The support of the EU could also be seen through economic relations between Pristina and the EU. Since 1999 the EU provided €340 million in loans through the European Investment Bank. (“KOSOVO on Its European Path,” 2023)

Furthermore, The EU is the biggest commercial partner for Kosovo. The EU’s Foreign Direct Investment in Kosovo reached €344 million in 2022. Total volume of trade in goods with the EU was €2.7 billion in 2022 (“KOSOVO on Its European Path,” 2023). Since Kosovo is the shortest route for the transportation of products from the Adriatic Sea (Sea Port of Durrës and Shengjin) to the Black Sea (Sea Port of Varna and Burgas), compared to other ports in the Western Balkans, the area exhibits interest in the growth of trade. This emphasizes the geopolitical importance of Kosovo (Mazrekaj, 2016). He (2016) also stated in his conference paper that, in the next 20 years, trade of goods from Asia to Europe will increase through the Balkan route.

The EU also pays special attention to youth, education and innovation and is helping the Western Balkans implement Youth Guarantee schemes to support youth employment. 364 ‘Young Cells Scheme’ grants have been awarded to public administration scholars in Kosovo (“KOSOVO on Its European Path,” 2023). Young Cell Scheme scholarship program, jointly financed by the European Union and the Government of Kosovo, serves as a sustainable means to bolster public administration reform in Kosovo, aligning it with top European standards (YCS - Young Cell Scheme EU Postgraduate Scholarship Programme for Kosovo, n.d.).

In 2008, Kosovo declared its independence, bringing itself onto the radar of European Union integration efforts. Despite the EU not officially recognizing Kosovo due to disagreements among member states, it has provided structural and financial assistance to support Kosovo's EU integration and international recognition in the long term. The EU has and still promotes

human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in the region through civil missions and programs. In addition to providing ideological support, the EU has traditionally provided considerable financial assistance to Kosovo as it is its biggest commercial partner. They are also very interested in the next generation of Kosovar youth, offering scholarship programs targeting them, to provide further opportunities.

One of the major blocks for Pristina's accession for the EU is the lack of recognition from Serbia, including the non-recognition of its independence by five EU member states. The absence of recognition presents substantial obstacles to Kosovo's path toward European integration, limiting its capacity to actively engage in EU initiatives and programs (Mexhuani, 2023).

Turkey's interest in Kosovo's EU accession

Turkey-Kosovo relations remain at a very good level based on common historical past and friendly ties. Turkey recognized Kosovo, which gained its independence on February 17, 2008, on February 18, 2008, and became one of the first countries to recognize Kosovo. The Coordination Office in Pristina, which became operational in 1999, was elevated to the level of Embassy after the declaration of independence (Türkiye – Kosova İlişkileri, n.d.).

According to the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Turkey pursues policies that support Kosovo's integration into European and Asia-Atlantic organizations. ``Our country attaches importance to Kosovo's stability, territorial integrity, development, integration with European and Euro-Atlantic structures, as well as establishing friendly and constructive neighborly relations in its region. In this context, our country supports the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue Process to ensure stability and peace in the region (Türkiye – Kosova İlişkileri, n.d.).``

In 1999, Turkey has participated in operations to fulfill its humanitarian responsibility to guarantee security and peace prevail in the Balkans, notably Kosovo, because of its historical role and identity (Kapucu, 2021). It is also worth mentioning, Kosovo's flag consists of six stars, addressing the region's multi-ethnic population: Albanians, Bosnian, Gorani, Romani, Serbians, and Turks. In many studies on ethnic groups in the world, Kosovar Turks are not

mentioned but Turkish presence in Kosovo dates to the 5th century with the migrations of tribes such as Oghuz and Pechenegs. After the Ottoman Empire captured Kosovo in 1389, officials, soldiers and merchants settled in various towns in Kosovo and the regular life of the Turks in the region began (Elmas, 2014).

Interdependence basic philosophy of Turkey's foreign policy is to try to create an "interdependence strategy", the first leg of this strategy, which consists of three legs, is to build multiple dialogue channels. In other words, Turkey is now trying to carry out bilateral relations not only through politicians but also on a common ground where statesmen, businessmen and civil society exist, and attaches importance to establishing commercial connections. The second pillar is that there should be no hierarchy between events and cooperation in different areas. This was a result of Turkey no longer perceiving every event from a security perspective. The third leg is the demilitarization of events, that is, in connection with the second change, the security issue is left in the background and dialogue channels are kept open. Any armed conflict happens in the region directly threatens Turkey`s security, trade routes and minor Turkish population in Kosovo (BİÇER, 2013).

Turkey not only support`s humanitarian missions but also is a very generous investor in Kosovo. Foreign investment is crucial for Kosovo's economic development, poverty reduction, and job creation as it is a relatively new nation. Kosovo Turkish Chamber of Commerce (KTTO) was established on July 1, 2008, immediately after Kosovo's declaration of independence, with the joint initiative of both Turkish and Kosovar businesspeople and under the Honorary Presidency of the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Pristina. KTTO aims to increase cooperation and solidarity among its members and to be active in both public and private sector institutions; To contribute to the development of commercial and investment relations between Kosovo and Turkey; To be an advocate for the common interests of its members and to take initiatives to solve possible problems; to encourage the establishment of new business relationships and the evaluation of investment opportunities; In short, it carries out the mission of serving as a bridge in economic relations between Kosovo and Turkey (Dmarketing.me, 2023).

The Central Bank of Kosovo notes that as of the end of 2022, the total FDI stock stood at EUR 6.4 billion. The main investing countries are Germany (16.6%), Switzerland (14.8%), Turkiye

(8.3%), and the U.S. (7.1%). Overall, the EU accounts for 38.7% of total investment (Investing in Kosovo - International Trade Portal, n.d.).

According to the information given by Melis Köroğlu President of the Anatolian Kosovo Businessmen Association, for an interview in May 2023, Turkey has investments in different sectors in the country, from banking to energy. Pristina International Airport, the country's gateway to the world, was built and operated by the Turkish company Limak, and is one of the most important and largest infrastructure projects. It was stated that the Ibrahim Rugova Highway and New Motorway R6, Pristina–Han i Elezit Highway projects were carried out by the consortium formed by the Turkish company Enka and the US giant Bechtel (Ülker, 2023).

It is also worth mentioning, Kosovo`s flag consists of six stars, addressing the region`s multi-ethnic population: Albanians, Bosnian, Gorani, Romani, Serbians, and Turks. In many studies on ethnic groups in the world, Kosovar Turks are not mentioned but Turkish presence in Kosovo dates to the 5th century with the migrations of tribes such as Oghuz and Pechenegs. After the Ottoman Empire captured Kosovo in 1389, officials, soldiers and merchants settled in various towns in Kosovo and the regular life of the Turks in the region began (Elmas, 2014). This historical context can give hints about where this foundation of interest of Turkey in Kosovo`s future in the EU. Turkey has prioritized maintaining stability in political relations with the Balkan countries and continuing the deepening of economic, social and cultural relations. Small population of Turkish people living in Kosovo is also one of the reasons why Turkey is interested in Kosovo`s future and they are fully supporting their EU integration.

The last but not the least, Turkey also offers scholarship program for the Kosovar youth. In accordance with the Implementation Protocol of the Cooperation Agreement signed between the Presidency of the Council of Higher Education (YÖK) of the Republic of Turkey and the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology of the Republic of Kosovo, scholarships are provided to a certain number of students by YÖK to receive undergraduate education at state higher education institutions in Turkey. The monthly scholarship fee to be paid to undergraduate students is 2,000 TL for 2023 (T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı - Embassy of the Republic of Türkiye in Prishtina - Announcements, n.d.).

Conclusion

Since gaining independence in 2008, Kosovo's history has demonstrated the difficulties of establishing a state in a complex geopolitical environment. Kosovo's goal of joining the EU has been central to its path; this goal has been reinforced by the EU's normative authority and its initiatives to promote democracy, stability, and economic development in the area. But obstacles arising from Serbia's non-recognition and opposition from some EU members have blocked the way to integration. Initiatives like the Pre-Accession Assistance Instrument (IPA), the Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), and the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) show how the EU is actively working to promote good governance, fight corruption, and strengthen the rule of law in Kosovo. These initiatives demonstrate the EU's determination to help Kosovo become compliant with EU norms despite the difficulties associated with interstate politics.

In addition, Turkey's early and steadfast support for Kosovo's independence has resulted in strong bilateral ties and diverse participation. Turkey's engagement demonstrates a comprehensive strategy to support Kosovo's stability and development, encompassing infrastructural development, humanitarian relief, economic investments, and educational support. Turkey and Kosovo have strong historical and cultural ties, which have created a special partnership that is vital to Kosovo's social and economic advancement. The EU and Turkey have matching interests in Kosovo, with both parties aiming to establish stability, the rule of law, and the consolidation of democracy. Their cooperation on initiatives such as EULEX serves as an example of common goals in promoting responsible governance and guaranteeing stability within the area.

Both Turkey and the EU provide scholarship programs for students from Kosovo. According to the Implementation Protocol of the Cooperation Agreement between Turkey's Presidency of the Council of Higher Education (YK) and the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology of Kosovo, YK will award scholarships to a specific number of Kosovo students. These scholarships aim to offer financial support to students pursuing their undergraduate degrees in Turkey's state higher education institutions. Funded by both the European Union and the Government of Kosovo, the Young Cell Scheme scholarship program serves as a long-term strategy to support the reform of public administration in Kosovo, aligning it with the highest European standards. Starting in 2004, the initiative provides scholarships to young people from

Kosovo, allowing them to pursue further education at colleges in EU Member States and later contribute to the civil service. Over the course of 12 rounds, the initiative has awarded scholarships for European university studies to a total of 364 students. Although alumni are required to work in administration for three years after graduating, some choose to remain in that position.

Despite these combined efforts, issues remain unresolved. The unwillingness of Serbia to acknowledge Kosovo's independence continues to be a significant obstacle to Kosovo's membership in the European Union. This denial prevents Kosovo from actively participating in EU programs and slows down the country's progress toward integration. To put it in more simple terms, Kosovo is today confronted with the challenges of establishing itself as a sovereign state and therefore still actively working toward becoming a member of the European Union during a pivotal era in its history. The EU's normative impact, in conjunction with Turkey's various and somehow indirect support regarding the EU integration, contributes to a one-of-a-kind network of assistance for Kosovo's development. This is despite the fact that Turkey's assistance is less comprehensive than that of the EU due to the fact that Turkey is a single country. The necessity to remove political impasses and create reciprocal acknowledgment is a challenge that must be overcome to achieve membership in the European Union. As Kosovo continues on its journey toward European integration, the collaboration and assistance provided by the European Union and Turkey serve as the essential pillars that underlie the country's ambitions for peace, prosperity, and inclusion into the European community.

Comparing Turkey's and the EU's policies towards Kosovo, we see similarities in their approaches concerning financial, structural, democratization, and educational aspects, leading to comparable actions and outcomes. Considering the EU's support for Kosovo's EU membership, Turkey's involvement in coordinated projects with the EU in Kosovo, its investments mirroring those of the EU, contributions to Kosovo's economy, participation in projects like EULEX focusing on rule of law and good governance, and providing scholarships for Kosovan youth, it's evident that Turkey supports Kosovo's EU integration and pursues policies that could positively impact this process.

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TURKISH DECISION TO JOIN WORLD WAR II AND THE EFFECTS OF WORLD WAR II ON TURKEY

Yağmur Tuğba Karagülle³¹

Abstract

Turkey has set its foreign policy as “peace at home, peace in the world” since its proclamation by its founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. It continued to pursue its status-quo foreign policy except for some situations, even during World War II by the President İsmet İnönü. He tried his best to keep Turkey out of this war for as long as possible. Despite pursuing a peaceful foreign policy, Turkey had to declare war on Germany in 1945.

The subject’s importance comes from its peculiarity, as Turkey pursued a peaceful foreign policy as its founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk declared. Turkey’s entrance into World War II constitutes an anomaly as it is not a typical move for a country described as peaceful. Furthermore, in the literature of wars, the states that did enter wars are discussed as wars have had direct and indirect effects on those states. Yet, Turkey did not enter World War II until the very end. Yet, it had to suffer its direct and indirect effects since the beginning of the war.

This paper examines the steps Turkey took from being peaceful to declaring war on Germany year by year from 1939 to 1945, as well as the direct and indirect effects of World War II on the Turkish economy, Turkish educational life, and social life through analyzing the parliamentary minutes and relevant written sources with statistical analysis and real numbers.

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I. Introduction

Turkey has set its foreign policy as “peace at home, peace in the world” since its proclamation by its founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. It continued to pursue its status-quo policy except for some situations even during World War II by the Turkish President İsmet İnönü who tried his best to keep Turkey out of this war for as long as possible. Despite being peaceful, it had to declare war on Germany in 1945.

My research question is “How did Turkey enter into World War II after remaining neutral for so long and how were the lives of Turkish people affected after Turkey declared war on the Axis Powers?”. Hence, this paper examines the steps Turkey took from 1939 to 1945, the steps it took from being peaceful to declaring war on Germany year by year, as well as the effects of World War II on the Turkish economy, Turkish educational life, and social life through analyzing the parliamentary minutes and relevant written sources. After the necessary information is given in the paper, I proceed with the analysis of the conditions by adopting the Neorealist International Relations theory.

In the first section, I summarize the events of World War II around the Turkish state to understand the reasons behind the Turkish decision to join the war against the Axis Powers. Then I proceed with the effects of the war on Turkey starting from 1939 in the second section which will be followed by theorizing the conditions of that period through a Neorealist approach.

II. The Path Towards War: Between 1939-1945

Even though many history books describe the Turkish attitude in World War II as neutral, Özden (2013) argues that there is substantial evidence that Turkey was a “non-belligerent ally” during the first, – 1939-1941 – and last phases, – 1943-1945 – of the war, particularly concerning its interactions with Great Britain. By contrast, the second phase of the war, from 1941 to 1943, marks a period in which the belligerent parties were mainly balanced. (p.92) He explains further the arguments claiming that Turkey pursued a balanced policy between the two sides of the war in 1939 are not well-grounded; Turkey actually became closer to Britain in 1939 than it ever had been since the proclamation of the republic (p. 94). Gök (2021) also agrees with Özden about the issue of Turkey not pursuing a neutral policy during World War II. He stresses that the best-describing word for Turkish policy can be the out-of-war strategy (p. 592). During the war, Hale (2012) argues Turkey signed some agreements with

the Allied Powers which made her a belligerent country yet she was not one of the countries that practically fought the war. President İsmet İnönü followed a policy of protectionism and caution (p. 58)

Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu declared that while the diplomatic negotiations were continuing between Turkey and Britain for the mutual aid agreement, the relations with Germany and Italy were also maintained (Gök, 2021, pp. 592-593).

As a result of close relations with Britain since the beginning of the war, Turkey joined with Britain to form a balancing coalition because the threatening Axis powers were stronger. This coalition was established with the Anglo-Turkish Mutual Aid and Assistance Agreement of May 12, 1939, the Franco-Turkish Mutual Aid and Defense Agreement of June 23, 1939, and the Turkish-English-French Declaration of Agreement of October 19, 1939. (Özden, 2013 p.94). Yet, Turkey also avoided harming relations with Germany.

The Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu explained the Turkish foreign policy in his speech at the National Assembly on 8 July 1939: “Peace at home, peace in the world. That is our foreign policy; yesterday we sided with peace, today we side with peace, and tomorrow we will side with peace.” (Gök, 2021 p.592). It is important to note that, despite mentioning the peace occasionally, the Foreign Minister did not talk about Turkey pursuing a neutral policy.

While Turkey sided with peace and expressed it openly, the aggressive policies of the Axis Powers, particularly Italy, in the Eastern Mediterranean were highly disturbing to the Turkish government and pushed Turkey closer to cooperating with Britain. During the same period, Turkish decision-makers also became extremely suspicious of the policies pursued by the Soviet Union. They were concerned about the likely occupation of Turkish territory as a result of a German-Soviet alliance (Hale, 2012, p.52). Furthermore, the expansionist policies of Germany toward the Balkans when the war broke out, increased Turkey’s caution toward Germany. Consequently, those developments and the resulting fear forced Turkey to even closer cooperation with the Allies at the beginning of the war. On the other side, Turkey avoided an alliance agreement with Germany and maintained relations only based on friendship. The first breaking point in Turkey’s relationship with Germany occurred in 1939 when agreements were signed between Turkey and Britain. Additionally, Turkey’s breaking off chrome exports to Germany and her decision to sell all of her produced chrome to Britain until 1943 played a great role in the decline of her relationship with Germany. (Özden, 2013, pp.93-94)

Despite the cooperation and collaboration formed with Britain, Turkey declared neutrality on the same day Italy entered the war in 1940. Yet, following the agreement with Britain in 1939, Turkey was obliged to provide Britain and France with all assistance in her power (Hale, 2012, p.59). Nevertheless, Turkey used her reservation caused by the Soviet threat and stayed out of the war. (Gök, 2021, p.599)

Having been both impressed and unsettled by the military success of Germany until 1941, Turkey decided to revise her close relations with Britain in 1941 to protect her national interests without frightening Germany. Therefore, Turkey in 1941 was content to act on the permanent needs of the state, which were mainly based on survival by sustaining national territorial integrity. As for Italy, its participation in the war and the perceivable effects of the war near the borders of Turkey resulted in the creation of a physical survival strategy. At this point, instead of following an aggressive policy to meet the threat coming from the West, Turkey preferred to establish good relations with the states that were potential threats (Halei 2012, p.55). For this reason, the Non-Aggression Pact was signed with Bulgaria on February 17, 1941. (Özden, 2013, p.97) This also proves the peaceful Turkish foreign policy even though the threat was approaching the state from the West. On 18 July 1941, another Non-Aggression Pact was signed between Nazi Germany and the Turkish Republic (Gök, 2021, p.603)

The most interesting issue is that, after having been allied with Britain against the German and Italian threats in 1939, Turkey started to balance the two great powers surprisingly well on her own in 1941 despite being more inexperienced in the field of diplomacy in contrast to Britain, caused by being a newly born country. Here, Özden argues that the policy of balance pursued by Turkey during this period had another aim, which is unfortunately not specified in other sources: Turkey's desire was for Germany to beat Russia and for Great Britain to beat Germany. (2013, pp. 98-99)

October 1942 was another breaking point in relations between Turkey and Britain. Turkey had the possible means to shorten the war by blocking the way of Axis Powers in the Middle East yet, it emphasized her shortage of all essential war materials and insisted that Germany might want to strike against Britain with a great victory and that Turkey would be an ideal target for such an assault (Deringil, 2004, p.141).

By 1943, the desire of the Allied powers to include Turkey in the war increased. In that context, Churchill and İnönü met at Adana on 30 January-1 February 1943. (Gök, 2021, p.607)

Churchill, in the Adana Conference, on January 30, 1943, told the Turkish President that Turkey would be able to judge for herself any circumstance that might emerge. He included that there might indeed be a minute in 1943 when Turkey would be solid and prepared and Great Britain would have her plans ready. Churchill asked for no engagement, but in his view, it was exceptionally imperative for Turkey to be among the victors. He stated that Turkey should decide on its own and that the call for a decision might come whenever it wants (Özden, 2013, p.102). However, İsmet İnönü stressed their hesitations to join the war on two subjects: the Soviet sovereignty in Europe in case of German defeat and the necessity of Allied support for the Turkish army. (Armaoğlu, 2018, pp. 138-139) While Turkey met with Britain at the Adana Conference, she also avoided harmful relations with Germany. Therefore, İsmet İnönü sent the message that Turkey would not harm Germany even if the situation was dangerous for Germany in the Mediterranean, through the German ambassador to Turkey. (Gök, 2021, p.608) Therefore even if Turkey had closer relations with Britain, she maintained good relations with Germany as well.

Until here, Turkey used all her maneuvers including the reservations it previously put in the agreements it had signed for many reasons such as inadequate military equipment, its powerless economy, and its principal foreign policy that had been set forward by its founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. On the other hand, the Allied Powers had enough reasons to pull Turkey into the war. First, it would uplift the total military power of the Allied Powers even though the military power Turkey had was not enough on its own to fight any enemy. Another advantage would be the use of its geographical position as the Soviet Union had proposed: the use of the Middle East would end the war by providing a shortcut.

This historical panorama has some similarities with the classical situation of some cases in the realm of international relations: one does not get involved in the war while its allies want otherwise. At this point, I believe, Turkish President İsmet İnönü made the right decision by keeping Turkey out of the war since this decision needs to be analyzed in the context of Turkish history as well. Even at the beginning of World War II, Turkey was a country that was born out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. It was an exhausted country of tired people with a devastated economy even without the burden of the 1929 Great Depression on the shoulders of its people.

The Tehran Conference of November 1943 marked a turning point in Turkey's positioning in the war. Turkey's inclusion in the war was insisted upon not only by the British but also by the Soviets; the Soviets believed that the war would be finished sooner with the inclusion of Turkey which was again rejected by Turkey through its reservations. In the Second Cairo Conference, İsmet İnönü used the military deficiency argument as an excuse to avoid entering the war, again (Özden, 2013, pp. 103-104)

However, after the Second Cairo Conference, the British expected a state of bizarre coolness toward Turkey as Britain annulled their military mission and limited war supplies early in 1944. The Allied Powers warned Turkey in April 1944 that they would impose an embargo like those imposed on other impartial nations if Turkey continued to send strategic materials to Germany. The British were not alone in this warning; the United States also supported Britain (Fox, 1959, p.37). Also, in the Second Cairo Conference, Churchill repeated the will of Britain to include Turkey in the war. İnönü agreed to join the war "in principle", yet, for Britain, by the time the necessary shipment for the Turkish army materializes, Turkey would be already out of the war. Therefore the negotiations were suspended and this strategic move prolonged the time for Turkey to stay out of the war (Armaoğlu, 2018, p.315). This was the moment that Turkey feared economic breakdown because of her tough resistance to meeting the demands of the Allies.

Furthermore, Turkey's biggest anxiety source was the empowerment of the Soviet Union and her main hope of protection against this empowerment was support from the Western Allies (Fox, 1959, pp.38-39). At this point, the empowerment of the Soviet Union, thus communism, was a cause for anxiety among the Allied Powers. In other words, communism was gaining power day by day yet there was still an enemy to win over, therefore, this issue was postponed to be dealt with later.

Nonetheless, Turkey decided to please the Soviet Union due to the fear of its advancement in Europe and Nazi Germany being the more imminent enemy. To satisfy the Soviet Union in particular, the Turkish Government deemed it necessary to take some precautions to exclude some Nazi sympathizers from official duty. Fevzi Çakmak was forced to resign from the post of Chief of General Staff by İnönü, followed by Numan Menemencioğlu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Özden, 2013, p.105). Yet, by 1944, the military power of Germany had slowed down noticeably so Turkey, to solidify her relationship with the Allies,

suspended all relations with Germany on 2 August 1944 (Hakkı, 59). In 1945, now Allied Powers forced Turkey to cut all her relations with Japan as well, so, on 3 January 1945 Turkey cut her relations with Japan, too. (Gök, 2021, p.612)

On February 20, 1945, the British ambassador informed the Turkish Foreign Minister Hasan Saka of the Yalta Decision that March 1 was the deadline for a declaration of war on the Axis if Turkey was to be invited to the United Nations Conference (Özden, 2013, p.108). Thus, on February 23, 1945, Turkey declared war on Germany and Japan.

III. The Effects of World War II on Turkish Social, Educational, and Economic Life

Even though Turkey did not join World War II actively, yet, the atmosphere was not guaranteeing this continuity so it had to be ready and mobilized at all times which also affected its economy and especially unsettled the “balanced budget” of the Turkish economy which has been applied since its proclamation (Arslan, 2016, p.4). Being mobilized at all times could not prevent Turkey from being affected by the conditions of the war. The Second World War influenced all fields of life, especially social and economic areas (Boykoy, 2010, p.221).

Between the years 1938 and 1945 Turkish economy witnessed a 27% recession in its GDP (Boykoy, 2010, p.221). This recession caused panic among farmers yet some of the population profited from this atmosphere through stockpiling (Öztürk, 2013, 136-137). In addition to that, because of the 1929 Great Depression, the effects of statism policies gained importance throughout the world. In this era, the state intervention in the economy peaked and the orientation from agriculture to industry gained pace in Turkey. Due to the increasing expenses, the Turkish state had to increase the currency in circulation causing inflation (Dokuyan, 2014, p.26). Despite the statism policies having been pursued since the proclamation of the republic, Yalçın argues that, with the problems brought by the war, the years between 1939 and 1945 can be seen as the stagnation period for statism policies (2012, p.321).

Also, as the export prices rose more than the import prices, the foreign currency and gold reserves increased immensely. Yet, the import and export relations decreased with the foreign countries in the war since the sole aim of the Turkish state was to preserve its neutrality while it also used the agricultural products for its own consumption rather than export. (Şener, 2004, p.74). Apart from the prices, the biggest problem was the recruitment of nearly one million soldiers. The precautions were directed to feed this population of soldiers and

metropolia such as Ankara and İstanbul (Dayıoğlu Erul & Buz, 2019, p.392). This recruitment of such a big population had direct impacts, especially on production.

The most intriguing point is that in Turkey the prices generally rose higher than the prices in belligerent countries which points to the mismanagement of the Turkish economy. (Gözcü, 2018, p.91)

Consequently, to correspond to these challenges, the Turkish government imposed some extraordinary taxes which are still subject to discussion even today. (Dayıoğlu Erul & Buz, 2019, p.394)

A. Effects on Agriculture

Because of the mobilization declared due to the war, nearly 1 million people of the working-age population had been recruited which had negative effects on production and consumption. The mobilization also caused the dispense of non-neglectable sources for the mobilization and defense of the country. The new conditions of the war brought the necessity of searching for comprehensive agriculture policies adapting to the new circumstances. (Şener, 2004, p.74)

In those circumstances, states generally increase the density of their intervention in the economy with criminal precautions, so, they supply the cereals at the prices that it determines in the first place. Yet those precautions come with the problems of black-marketing, engrossing, and stockpiling. Similar to the general habitude of states, Turkey tried to prevent those problems and the scarcity of products caused by dense intervention in the economy with the supply of cereals of the stocks which was enough until 1940 (Şener, 2004, pp.75-76).

1. New Taxes

Even though until 1940, the government of Refik Saydam painted a positive image of the situation, they did not hesitate to impose new taxes in order to correspond to the difficulty of feeding the population of soldiers and the whole population, the distribution of the products to the population and the fear of scarcity (Şener, 2004, p.76). Therefore the first step was to pass the National Protection Law. (Milli Korunma Kanunu, 1940).

a. National Protection Law

To palliate the hardship of scarcity in the Turkish market and prevent the undesired gain of some profitters this law has been passed. This law gave the government almost infinite special authority in cases of full or semi-mobilization and war with another state. On 19 February 1940 with the enactment signed by President İsmet İnönü concerning this clause of the law, justifying the effects of the world war on the Turkish economy this law started to be applied (Öztürk, 2013, p.139)

According to this law, the Coordination Committee, which is to be set up, takes the decisions and applies them directly in the realms of functioning of this law and determination of economic policies. Therefore, thanks to this law the Turkish state justified its intervention in the Turkish economy. It also imposed the use of suitable but idle lands by the state in order to increase production. Furthermore, the import and export of any product that had been produced were subject to the state allowance, the state was able to control all prices, and it was the sole authority to determine the type, price, and quantity of products that were to be imported. All investments in the Turkish private sector also became subject to the state allowance. (Şener, 2004, p.77-78)

Aside from this law, another enactment ordered farmers to sell all their products, apart from planting, to the TMO (Turkish Grain Board). (Şener, 2004, p.80). As one can guess, the most vulnerable group of this enactment was the small farmers as out from this enactment through bribing the officers of TMO and they created the black-marketing of products by selling the products to merchants. With an update on the law agricultural production also came under the jurisdiction of this law so the state loaned seeds to farmers, while new punishments were brought for those who violated the price policies. (Öztürk, 2013, p.141)

Because of the rise of cereal prices, the selling of bread became rationed in metropolia such as Ankara and İstanbul. (Şener, 2004, p.80)

By 1941, the population could not afford even the basic necessities due to the rising prices. Therefore, the government decided to put all trades of food products and necessities under the jurisdiction of Ticaret Ofisi (Trade Office) and all gasoline products under Petrol Ofisi (Petrol Office). (Öztürk, 2013, 142)

Despite all those measures to prevent stockpiling and rise in prices, the National Protection Law caused theft and injustice while it negatively affected the small farmers while

the big ones profited from the law. Yet this law was in force until the 1960s. (Öztürk, 2013, p.143)

Those measures taken during the first three years of the war were not very effective, to the contrary, they paved the way for the rise of cereal prices and could not prevent the creation of black-marketing, stockpiling, and engrossing. In 1942, the new government headed by Şükrü Saraçoğlu was formed due to the death of Refik Saydam which faced the same problems yet chose to apply new and more flexible methods in the face of those problems (Şener, 2004, p.81). The new government tried to intentionally increase the prices to please the farmers yet it did not solve the problem of insufficient production. After this failure, the government thought of the decrease in consumption with consumption limits imposed on cities, yet this attempt also failed to increase production. Then the government started to import wheat which was considerably successful after two failures. (Şener, 2004, pp.82-83)

It is also important to note that, apart from new measures, nearly all limitations brought by the Refik Saydam governments were lifted by the new government in the context of new and more flexible measures, as argued by Şener (2004, p.83).

Due to the attempts to solve the problems of the Turkish population being unsuccessful and the extreme criminal measures for the violations, the reaction of the Turkish people grew towards the government which led to the government change later on.

b. Enactment on the Purchase of Set Ratios of Cereals

The government passed the enactment which was known as “The 25 Percent System”. This enactment aimed at the confiscation of a set ratio of cereals produced by farmers rather than confiscating all of the product which was a product of new and more flexible policies of the government (Şener, 2004, p.83). However, the function had proceeded as the National Protection Law, the rich farmers were protected and some farmers hid their products. Therefore this attempt was also unsuccessful. Another aspect of this enactment was the rise of prices and the increase of the currency in circulation which also harmed the Turkish economy in the forms of inflation, engrossing, and stockpiling. (Şener, 2004, p.86)

c. Tax of Wealth

Despite the general example of solidarity between the private sector and the state during war times, in the case of Turkey, the relations between the two were breaking down. This brought the necessity of a new legal measure to prevent injustice among the Turkish population, in particular, it became a mission of social justice for the Turkish state to take away some of the undesired gains of war profiteers (Öztürk, 2013, p.143). For this purpose, the Saraçoğlu government decided to pass the Tax of Wealth and to introduce this law to the population, the head of government met with the journalists for them to support this tax and create a positive public opinion on the issue (Öztürk, 2013, p.145)

This law was passed on 12 November 1942 (Varlık Vergisi Kanunu, 1942). The tax being ad-hoc is because of the extreme conditions of wartime. The aims were set as a decrease of the currency in circulation, a decrease in the inflation rate, and an increase in the state income by imposing some heavy conditions. (Şener, 2004, p.88)

The main problem with this tax is the ratio of the tax to be collected was not specified clearly but the decision was for the local committees created with the tax, to take (Öztürk, 2013, p.150). So, the functioning of the tax came with the arbitrary treatment of these local committees.

Despite the problems, the tax became successful as the state income increased with a collection ratio of 74% and some decrease in the currency in circulation. (Şener, 2004, p.88)

However, the merchants paying this heavy tax had to close down their shops which would lead to a reduction in production later on. Even with moderate success, this tax was abolished due to foreign and local reactions in 1944. Yet, the Muslim and non-Muslim families having paid the taxes turned against the government which would lead to the government change in 1946. (Öztürk, 2004, p.154)

d. Soil Products Tax

This tax was passed with Law no. 4429 on 4 June 1943 (Toprak Mahsulleri Vergisi Kanunu, 1943). According to this law, the farmers have to pay a set of ratios of their products ocularly which was aimed at an increase in state income. The tax being ocular, the ratio being calculated by the farmers, and the reluctance of the farmers to pay the taxes were some of the problems of this tax. The government wanted to employ some state officers to calculate and

collect this tax yet, in that case, more than $\frac{1}{3}$ of the income would be dispensed to those officers (Dayıođlu Erul & Buz, 2019, p.399).

The main problem with this tax was the negligence of the universality principle such that the ratio of tax collected from Muslims and nonmuslims were different. In addition, those who failed to pay their taxes had to be deported to working camps for a while. (Dayıođlu Erul & Buz, 2019, p.403) Those factors also played a role in government change in 1946.

B. Social Effects

One of the major social effects was the immigrant influx into the country and one of the breaking points of this influx was the German attack on Greece so that many people from the Thrace region and Greek islands had to escape to Turkey, where there were immigrants from Italy, Britain, Greece, Polish, Jewish as well as Turks (Gözcü, 2018, p.91). Sheltering and feeding the population of immigrants imposed another burden on the Turkish economy.

1. Effects on Education

The effects of World War II on educational life showed themselves in the form of the negative reflection of economic problems and developments experienced in the quality of education. The foremost critical factor affecting educational life during World War II was financial insufficiency. The division of the greatest amount from the budget for national defense drove a decrease in allocations for other branches. Allocations separated from schools had remained restricted since the start of the war. The reflection of this situation on education actions was in the form of the incomplete construction business of the school buildings, the inadequacy of buildings, the shortage of teachers, paper, notebooks, books, etc. Due to the limited budget for education, the salaries of teachers and officers weren't paid regularly, because of the war (Boykoy, 2010, p.233).

Apart from the limited budget, one of the problems encountered in the field of education was the inadequacy of paper. The paper shortage led to a rise in paper prices. Also, newspaper pages, notebooks, and books used for education were limited in number and quality (Boykoy, 2010, p.233).

The air-raid protection applications of wartime were also one of the activities affecting educational life. Working hours of the officers in formal institutes and students' lessons' starting and finishing hours were set by the Representation as 09:00-12:00 and 13:30- 17:00.

Break times were diminished and it was provided for students to be at home before it gets dark. A little after half term in 1941, the danger of the war increased and for this reason, it was decided to suspend all schools until 1942. Because of the extraordinary conditions of the war, in the context of defense precautions, secondary and high school students in İstanbul and Trakya regions were permitted to go to Anatolian schools easily and get the certification. (Boykoy, 2010, p.234)

IV. An Analysis of the Case Through a Neorealist Approach

I believe neorealism is the most compatible international relations theory that can describe and analyze the conditions of those states engaged in the war, especially Turkey, in that era. The reason behind my choice is that I take the states engaged in the war as homogenous actors as there are no conflicting opinions within them because the oppositions within those states might be irrelevant for the analysis of the conditions among the states within the international system which has an anarchical nature. Additionally, neorealism argues that the international structure is as important as the actors and their choices in international politics (Waltz, 1979).

Realism has been regarded as the founding theory of the discipline of International Research due to being the first major theory in the field. Its assumptions are based on states being rational actors whose powers rest on their interest in international politics which indirectly points to the maximization of power as the key to the survival of the state. One step further from the classical realist theory, the neorealist approach assumes that the anarchical nature of international relations directly means the lack of a world government. The lack of a world government directly affects the states such that each one ought to pursue a policy of “self-help” because each of them perceives the others as potential rivals rather than cooperation partners. The structural impact of the anarchical nature of international relations pushes states to bandwagon which directly means the small and weak states choose to side with a stronger state for their interests due to the “dangerous” conditions of the anarchy (Waltz, 1979).

When we look deeper into the history of World War II, the motives of all those states might seem relevant and logical: the Allied Powers who aimed at keeping their hegemonic status as it is for the status quo, and the Axis Powers who wished to reconstruct the system through regaining what they had lost with World War I. Regardless of the group they belonged to; their interests in entering World War II had been shaped by their power desires, keeping the

balance of power or changing it drastically, regaining territory they had lost, or gaining more of it which matched perfectly with the axioms of Neorealism.

Between both sides of the war, there is Turkey: an infant state with insufficient infrastructure, economy, or military power to engage in a war even if it did not pursue a peaceful foreign policy and wished to regain territories of the Ottoman Empire before it dissolved. Here, one can argue that neorealism cannot describe fully the attitude of the Turkish Republic. However, the “chess game” played by İsmet İnönü was also shaped by his desire to protect his country by maintaining the status quo and balance of power. In other words, the factors that oriented the Turkish foreign policy towards being peaceful were based on the general foreign policy concerning the defense and protection of the Turkish Republic. Additionally, İsmet İnönü’s attitude can be best described by the defensive neorealism because the limiting element for İsmet İnönü, the Turkish President of that era, is mostly the peaceful foreign policy that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic set rather than Turkey being incapable of entering into the war.

V. Conclusion

To conclude, at first glance, the decision to join World War II does not align with the foreign policy set by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk: “peace at home, peace in the world”. However, with a more comprehensive analysis, one can understand the Turkish government’s motives to prolong the time that it could keep Turkey out of the war. Indeed, it was a peaceful country with economic problems also caused by the Great Depression of 1929 with the inadequacy of military equipment as well. Despite its decision to join the war on the side of the Allied Powers, until that decision, Turkey tried to pursue a neutral policy between the two sides economically and diplomatically. Yet, to pursue this peacefulness more deeply it had to be among the members of the Council that was to be formed after the war. In that context, it had to declare war on the Axis Powers in line with the decision taken at the Yalta Conference.

Even though Turkey pursued a strategy of keeping the nation out of the war as long as possible it could not avoid having wartime economic, educational, and social problems. Some of those problems were temporary, but some would lead to a government change later on in 1946. Yet, since the diplomatic manoeuvres may have failed Turkish Republic had to have a geared-up army and a mobilized population as if it could enter into the war at any moment due to the threats coming from the Axis Powers.

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