The arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu and the revocation of his university diploma are not just domestic political maneuvers. They represent a disturbing symptom of a broader international malaise: the steady erosion of democratic norms and the rise of authoritarian tendencies across both emerging and established political systems. The Turkish case, where a popular opposition figure is systematically disqualified from political life, is emblematic of how democratic procedures are increasingly being used to subvert democratic values.
In Turkey, where the rule of law and judicial independence have been steadily undermined, the İmamoğlu case reveals how legal instruments can be weaponized for political exclusion. Dr. Semuhi Sinanoğlu, in his op-ed published shortly after the arrest, rightly emphasizes the strategic intent behind these actions: to neutralize a credible challenger to the incumbent regime, suppress opposition-controlled municipalities, and preemptively determine the outcome of future elections. His analysis powerfully argues that this is not merely internal repression but a calculated move to consolidate power before a critical electoral test.
Yet, where Sinanoğlu focuses -quite compellingly- on the European response, or lack thereof, my concern expands the frame. His critique that European institutions have lost their soft power due to inconsistency and self-interest is well-founded. Indeed, the transactional geopolitics surrounding Turkey, especially its military role in NATO and its leverage over European security interests, has emboldened the Turkish government to act without fearing significant repercussions. However, Sinanoğlu’s proposal -strategically engaging Turkey through defense-industrial incentives to ensure democratic concessions- though pragmatic, assumes a level of rational reciprocity that authoritarian regimes often lack once domestic consolidation is underway.
Moreover, the European Union’s selective application of democratic principles undermines its normative credibility. Its vocal condemnations in Belarus or Russia contrast sharply with its silence -or even complicity- when violations occur in strategically useful states. For example, Hungary’s consistent democratic backsliding under Viktor Orbán has met with limited institutional consequences despite years of EU scrutiny. Similarly, Egypt’s authoritarianism has been tolerated and even rewarded with financial support in the context of migration control agreements. In the case of Spain and Catalonia, the EU refrained from criticizing Madrid’s harsh response to the 2017 independence referendum, despite widespread reports of police violence. And most recently, the EU’s paralytic and ambiguous response to the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza—where international humanitarian law has been repeatedly breached—further illustrates how political expediency routinely trumps principled action. These inconsistencies reflect an interest-driven, not principle-based, foreign policy.
Further reinforcing this trend, the EU’s own institutional instruments are shifting away from prioritizing democracy. As Ricardo Farinha notes in his March 2025 Carnegie Endowment analysis, “The EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has increasingly sidelined democracy-related commitments in favor of security priorities.” Once intended as a key part of the EU’s democracy-security toolbox, the CSDP now often sidelines governance-related concerns in favor of strategic and defense imperatives. This shift is symptomatic of a broader recalibration, in which democracy is no longer at the center of EU external engagement, but an optional add-on—easily abandoned when inconvenient.
These duplicities are not lost on the public. As with a patient trusting a doctor, or a diner judging a chef, it is not enough to have the right recipe—the practitioner must act with integrity. If the EU claims to defend democracy, it must apply its standards consistently, or risk losing moral authority in the very battles it seeks to influence.
In Romania, for example, a presidential election was annulled not through a strongman’s decree but via the judiciary, due to the leading candidate’s pro-Russian orientation. The absence of a second round marked a quiet democratic rupture that passed with minimal international scrutiny. Likewise, in the United States, a Turkish PhD student’s arrest and visa revocation over a pro-Palestinian op-ed demonstrate that liberal democracies are not immune to the erosion of rights when politics collide with sensitive foreign policy narratives.
At the same time, protests in Serbia and Hungary have drawn hundreds of thousands of citizens to the streets in defiance of growing authoritarianism, corruption, and democratic decay. These mobilizations suggest that a large swath of the public still values democratic freedoms. But they also highlight a dangerous paradox: while civil society resists, governments grow bolder in dismantling accountability mechanisms and centralizing power.
These events reveal not only a crisis of institutions but perhaps a crisis of democratic desire itself. This is the dimension Sinanoğlu does not explore directly. Across many societies, citizens are expressing a growing disillusionment with democracy. Trust in political institutions, from parliaments to parties to the media, is declining. According to recent research published in The Conversation (March 2024), public trust in politics has seen a sustained long-term decline globally. In OECD democracies, only about 30% of citizens report confidence in their national governments, with similarly low levels of trust in political parties and parliaments. In the United Kingdom, trust in government fell from 42% in 2020 to 29% in 2023. In the United States, only 20% of Americans now say they trust the government to do what is right ‘just about always’ or ‘most of the time’. These figures underscore a structural legitimacy crisis, not simply a passing moment of dissatisfaction.
In some contexts, populations are actively supporting strongmen leaders not out of ignorance, but out of a perceived need for order, national pride, or rapid decision-making. The appeal of technocracy, populism, and even authoritarian modernism suggests that democratic legitimacy is no longer anchored in liberal values, but increasingly in performance and identity—a phenomenon well captured by the concept of ‘democratic authoritarianism,’ where institutional forms persist but are ideologically reoriented to serve hegemonic, often populist, projects. This is not merely a democratic recession—it is a transformation. Liberal democracy, with its emphasis on pluralism, minority rights, and deliberative governance, may be giving way to majoritarian or illiberal models that still hold elections but strip them of substance. The result is a form of governance that is procedurally democratic but substantively authoritarian.
The case of İmamoğlu should not be viewed in isolation. It is a warning sign, part of a larger story of how democratic institutions can be hollowed out from within. Defending democracy today requires more than condemning authoritarian practices or crafting incentives. It demands a renewed commitment to the principles that make democracy meaningful—justice, accountability, and participation—and a frank conversation about what kind of governance people truly want in the 21st century.
And perhaps most critically, it requires that the so-called defenders of liberal democracy—the EU, the US, and other champions of freedom—lead by example. When their responses are selective, muted, or transactional, they create a permissive environment for authoritarian regimes to escalate repression with impunity. The İmamoğlu case—and many others—illustrate what can happen when the world’s democratic guardians cease to act as principled stewards and instead behave like reluctant shareholders. In such a vacuum, the ruling powers of the world can—and will—act boldly, knowing that the price of undermining democracy is no longer reliably enforced.
My take should not be misunderstood as an attempt to normalize İmamoğlu’s arrest or the broader anti-democratic developments we are witnessing. Rather, it is an effort to contextualize these events within a wider global trend of democratic retreat—and to name the failures not only of domestic actors but also of international ones who claim to stand for the rule of law, human rights, and democratic governance. Without a principled and consistent stand from these global actors, authoritarianism finds space to flourish unchecked.
Burak Yalım
Director – International Relations Studies Academy (TUIC) in Istanbul
