Dr Hasan Mesut Önder, a distinguished International Relations Expert and Intelligence Research Program Coordinator at TUIC Academy, is offering an assessment of Israel’s assault on Gaza
When addressing Israel’s assault on Gaza, a problem with limited information, one must recognize that the resulting analyses will merely point towards possibilities. The emerging data subsequently determines which of these possibilities is accurate. In this article, we will discuss various probabilities. It is often stated that Benjamin Netanyahu is not an easily manageable leader for Israeli intelligence elites, MOSSAD. Reports suggest that Netanyahu makes decisions based on his political and ideological agendas, either disregarding intelligence input or trying to politicize it.
While intelligence agencies are often viewed as tools that meet the needs of their political clients during the decision-making processes, it is imperative to note that they are also influential security players. This aspect needs to be addressed. Western literature posits that intelligence agencies fulfil the political objectives set by their political clients. However, it should be considered that these agencies have their perspectives on problem-solving, and they try to persuade political decision-makers to adopt those viewpoints. In practice, it is vital to emphasize that a significant portion of the threats a state faces are constructed by intelligence agencies themselves. In this context, the relationship between intelligence agencies and political decision-makers is bidirectional, with intelligence agencies having a dominant role. They are among the state entities best positioned to understand their political clients’ perceptions, vulnerabilities, and agendas. Consequently, intelligence agencies have a more profound insight into how a leader makes decisions, how they can be influenced, and what their political sensitivities and resistance points are. When tensions and disagreements arise between political leaders and intelligence agencies, either party could potentially eliminate the other, given the correct consensus within the security bureaucracy.
MOSSAD IS DISSATISFIED WITH THE GOVERNMENT
Recent media reports suggest strained relations between Netanyahu and the Israeli intelligence elites. There were rumours of former MOSSAD officials participating in protests against the Netanyahu government’s judicial reform and even claims that MOSSAD was directing these protesters.
While there is tension between the Israeli intelligence elites and the Netanyahu government, Hamas launched attacks, capturing numerous Israeli soldiers and killing several others. This extensive assault is perceived as an intelligence failure for MOSSAD, as they either failed to detect the signs or misinterpreted them, resulting in a surprise attack. Strategic-level intelligence failures are common, but operational failures specifically require complete non-collection and non-detection of relevant information.
POSSIBILITY OF WITHHELD ATTACK INFORMATION
Considering the technological capacity of Israeli intelligence agencies, it would be inconceivable for them to refrain from detecting signs of the Hamas attacks launched from seven different regions. If this is indeed an intelligence failure, we might anticipate significant purges within the Israeli intelligence community. However, this possibility is rather slim. Historically, even with a hint of suspicion, Israeli intelligence has undertaken large-scale attacks. In operational intelligence, the key lies in having comprehensive information. Even if a full report is not available, counterattacks can still be based on raw data. Israel does not feel obliged to justify its attacks on the international community. Hence, if intelligence failure is a weak possibility, there should be a discussion on why these actions took place even when the Israeli intelligence community knew of them. If MOSSAD predicted these actions and informed the necessary parties, then appropriate measures were not taken. Alternatively, the Netanyahu government could have intentionally allowed such an event to suppress domestic opposition.
Another possibility is that the Israeli intelligence agencies foresaw these attacks but chose not to share this information with political decision-makers. This raises the question: Would MOSSAD intentionally depict Israel as a state unable to protect its citizens? If such an event serves a broader strategy or policy shift, such casualties might be deemed acceptable. There are two potential reasons MOSSAD might withhold this information from the Netanyahu administration. First, a political crisis could pave the way for military and intelligence figures, who are more aligned with the views of the intelligence elites, to take power. Secondly, this crisis could be utilized as leverage to advocate for a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. Significant crises can persuade societies to accept radical policy changes.
In the short term, the Netanyahu administration might leverage this incident to launch fierce attacks on Gaza and suppress opposition within Israel. However, in the medium term, the Israeli intelligence community could eliminate the Netanyahu administration, which they perceive as a barrier to preserving Israel’s Jewish identity. This could pave the way for political figures who can both implement the two-state solution and persuade the Israeli public of its merits. This possibility also merits consideration. Sometimes, overlooked probabilities in analyses become realities.
For the Turkish version of the article: https://www.karar.com/gorusler/mossad-iki-devletli-cozum-icin-netenyahuyu-tasfiye-etmeye-mi-hazirlaniyor-1794438
Contact with the author: [email protected]
Israel’s assault on Gaza
