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A Letter from The Hague Convict Radislav Krstić: ”I Vote for the Srebrenica Resolution, Never Again Genocide”

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A Letter from The Hague Convict Radislav Krstić: ”I Vote for the Srebrenica Resolution, Never Again Genocide”

General Radislav Krstić of the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS), who was sentenced to 35 years in prison at The Hague for aiding and abetting the genocide in Srebrenica, stated that he himself would vote for the UN Resolution on the Srebrenica genocide. He added that, should he ever have the opportunity, he would go to Potočari to pay his respects to the victims.

In June this year, Krstić’s defense team submitted a request to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, the successor to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, for his early release. The request included a letter written by Krstić himself, in which he expressed deep remorse for his role in the Srebrenica genocide.

In his letter, Krstić stated that he would have voted for the Srebrenica Genocide Resolution, which the United Nations General Assembly adopted in May 2024, and that, if given the opportunity, he would go to Potočari to honor the victims and seek forgiveness.

He also conveyed that if his words reach the people in the former Yugoslavia, they should “pause and reflect – never again.”

The full letter from Radislav Krstić, publicly released by the Mechanism today, is as follows:

“A few days ago, the highest and most important forum in the world, the United Nations General Assembly, voted and adopted the Srebrenica Genocide Resolution. This Resolution designates July 11 as a day of remembrance for the victims of the Srebrenica genocide, condemns any denial of the genocide, and calls upon all people to mourn and remember the victims who must never be forgotten.

Most of the countries in the world voted for this resolution, and I vote for it too, even though I have no right to vote. I have no right to vote because this Resolution mentions my name. My name is mentioned because I aided and abetted genocide, my name is mentioned because I committed an inconceivable and unacceptable crime. I am not asking for forgiveness; I am not seeking understanding because I know that I cannot and should not receive them.

Every moment, every day, I think of the victims of the Srebrenica genocide, I mourn them, and I pray for their souls. I know that the mother and sister of an innocent victim will not believe these words to be sincere. I know that my words cannot ease their pain, that they cannot lessen the suffering that will never fade. I do not expect this, nor do I have the right to ask for it.

I wish for the youth who live in the territories once known as Yugoslavia to read and understand my words. I hope that the people who will live together in these lands when I am gone, if by some miracle these words reach them, will pause and think – never again. Never again war, never again death because someone is of a different faith, nationality, or belief, never again genocide.

I hope everyone understands that genocide cannot be committed by an entire nation, that there are no genocidal nations; the genocide in Srebrenica was committed by individuals, only they are guilty, and they alone should be held accountable for their actions and misdeeds. Regrettably, I am one of them.

I hereby accept the judgments from 2001 and 2004, which established that the forces of the army to which I belonged committed genocide against Bosniaks in Srebrenica in July 1995. I supported and assisted the genocide, knowing that some members of the General Staff intended to commit genocide, knowing that the General Staff did not have enough of its own forces to carry out the executions without using the Drina Corps forces, and knowing that the use of forces under my command would significantly contribute to the execution of the Bosniak prisoners.

I also aided and abetted crimes against humanity by participating in a joint criminal enterprise to forcibly remove Bosniak civilians from Potočari between July 10 and 13, 1995. During this time, I contributed to the creation of a humanitarian crisis that preceded the forced transfer of women, children, and the elderly from Srebrenica, knowing that the civilians in Potočari were subjected to killings, rapes, beatings, and abuse.

I write this letter to the honorable President of the Mechanism in the ongoing proceedings following my request to be released after 26 years, having served my sentence across four countries and seven prisons. The honorable President will make her decision based on law, justice, and the rule of law. Whatever the decision may be, as always, I will accept it without question, as an expression of law and justice.

The honorable President’s decision may be favorable due to my deteriorating health, my age, and the violence I myself experienced in one of the prisons where I served my sentence.

It may also be unfavorable because I am guilty of a grievous crime that is unforgivable. However, regardless of the decision, I ask that this letter be made public, that as many people as possible in my homeland hear my words, and that perhaps my words may at least prompt someone to reflect on the horrific crime in which I participated, the punishment that followed, and the deep, painful but belated remorse I have lived with for decades.

Finally, if I live to see it, if one day I am released, if the President of the Mechanism agrees, and if the families of the victims permit, I would like to go to Potočari one more time in my life to honor the spirits of the victims and to ask for forgiveness.

Respectfully,

Radislav Krstić

The Hague, June 18, 2024″

The release of this letter significantly impacts the awareness and recognition of the Srebrenica Genocide. Krstić’s expression of remorse and acknowledgment of his role strengthens critiques against genocide denial policies. In this context, the resistance to acknowledging historical facts, particularly by the governments of Serbia and Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina, underscores the problematic nature of their denialist stances.

Krstić, a prominent war criminal, openly acknowledges the genocide and his involvement in it, which destabilizes the official historical narratives promoted by the Serbian and Republika Srpska administrations. Policies of denial and the minimization of these events in history books not only disrespect the memory of the victims but also threaten the foundations of a peaceful future. Continuing this denialist approach negatively impacts ethnic tensions in the region and obstructs the healing of societal wounds and the quest for justice.

The public release of this letter not only aids the process of confronting the reality of the genocide but also sends a strong message to the international community. Krstić’s expression of deep remorse for his actions makes the denial policies of these administrations even more questionable. It is crucial that younger generations confront this historical reality and that denialist policies are brought to an end. This is essential not only for achieving justice for the victims of Srebrenica but also for building sustainable peace in the Balkans.

Why don’t People Migrate?

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Why don’t People Migrate?
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 Migration Studies Online Internship Program

Abstract                                                                                                                              

Migration is a complex process shaped by economic, social, cultural, and political factors. However, the reasons why people do not migrate are equally important. This study explores the reasons behind people’s decision not to migrate, focusing on the concepts of voluntary and involuntary immobility. Factors like economic limitations, social ties, cultural adaptation issues, and political restrictions play a role in the decision to stay. I examined these factors and their impact on individuals’ decision to remain in their current location through migration theories.

Keywords: migration theories, non-migration, involuntary immobility, migration processes

Introduction                                                                                                         

Migration is often linked to economic and social mobility in the literature. If they people have economic stability and social acceptance they don’t chose to migrate. However, the decision not to migrate is just as significant, and the reasons behind this choice are complex. People may avoid migrating due to economic, social, cultural, and political reasons. This paper focuses on why people choose not to migrate, offering an analysis through the concepts of voluntary and involuntary immobility. Studies on involuntary immobility, this term explains sometimes individuals cannot migrate for various reasons even though they have the opportunity, and sometimes although they don’t have enough facility, there are many pushing factors that require them to migrate are limited in the literature, but this phenomenon deeply affects people and will likely become a subject of more research in the future. The goal of this study is to examine in detail the conscious and unconscious factors that influence individuals’ decisions to stay in their current locations.

Migration Theories

Migration happens for many reasons, and theories help us understand why people move. By examining the motivations and conditions that drive migration, we can also better comprehend why some individuals choose, or are forced, to stay in their current locations. Migration theories offer a useful contrast, illustrating how certain economic, social, or cultural factors that encourage movement might also create barriers that lead to involuntary immobility. This concept refers to individuals who may wish to migrate but are unable to do so due to constraints like financial limitations, social ties, or political restrictions. Even when migration is possible, some may choose to stay due to strong attachments to their home, fear of change, or lack of access to the networks that facilitate migration for others. Thus, understanding both the factors that drive migration and those that prevent it provides a more complete picture of why some people remain immobile despite the forces that encourage mobility. To fully grasp immobility, it is crucial to first understand the conditions that lead to and sustain mobility.

Wallerstein’s World-Systems Theory (Wallerstein, 1989) looks at migration through the lens of the global economy. It divides the world into core (rich) and periphery (poor) regions. People move from poorer areas to richer ones because richer areas need labor, and poorer areas have people looking for better opportunities. An example is the migration of workers from Turkiye to Germany after World War II. Germany needed workers to rebuild its economy, and Turkish workers were looking for better jobs.

Migration Systems Theory suggests that once migration starts, it often becomes a larger, ongoing process. People who migrate build connections between their home country and the new country, making it easier for others to follow. Over time, what begins with a few people moving can turn into a large-scale migration. (Faist,2000, p.190)

According to the Neoclassical Economic Perspective, the main reason for migration is economic. This theory says that people move to places where they can earn more money and have a better life. Migration will continue until the differences in income and living conditions between countries become smaller. (Adıguzel, 2020, p.30)

Finally, Lee’s Push-Pull Theory (Lee,1966) explains that people decide to migrate due to two main reasons: push factors and pull factors. Push factors are the problems in their home country, like unemployment or war, that make them want to leave. Pull factors are the good things in another country, like job opportunities and safety, that attract them. (Suna&Cereci, 2022, p.198)

While migration theories provide us with a deep understanding of why people move, examining immobility under a different heading allows us to clarify the factors that shape individuals’ ideas about migration. Understanding immobility requires a different perspective, focusing on the constraints and barriers—both voluntary and involuntary—that prevent migration. By addressing immobility theories, we can gain insight into the complex reasons why some individuals are unable or unwilling to move, ultimately offering a more complete view of human mobility and decision-making.

Immobility Theories

There are theories of migration as well as theories of immobility. Migration decisions are not only shaped by the desire to move but also by the choice to stay. Immobility, or the decision not to migrate, can result from both conscious and subconscious calculations made by individuals. When people feel secure, have acces to basic needs, and are socially well placed, they are less likely to seek migration. According to the theory of “the value of immobility”, staying in one place can offer many advantages.

For instance, in institution-specific value, individuals become familiar with the methods, processes, and culture of their workplace, making it more beneficial to stay.

Similarly, in location-specific value, speaking the local language, understanding the political and legal environment, and having social capital like networks and acquaintances provide long-term benefits that influence the decision not to migrate.

On the other hand, the presence of familiar people in a destination country plays an important role in migration decisions, the first-generation migrants, through their community organizations, often help second-generation migrants with housing, transportation, and job finding. A lack of such support can discourage migration who failed to integrate into the new society may further affect the migration decision. (Suna&Cereci, 2022, p.198)

Wolpert’s Stress-Threshold Model (Wolpert, 1965) suggests that factors like economic conditions, job opportunities, social networks and security influence migration decisions. When these conditions worsen, they raise individuals’ stress levels, prompting migration. However, every person has a different stress threshold, which means their reasons for migration vary widely.

For example, the Uyghur people in East Turkistan are experiencing severe oppression under China’s assimilation policies. Despite having valid reasons to migrate, they are restricted from leaving due to political barriers. Many Uyghurs, even when they seek asylum, are denied or delayed in their requests, leading to continued suffering despite the high levels of stress that would typically drive migration decisions. (Carrdus, 2023)

Reasons for Non-Migration: Social, Economic and Cultural Context

Migration presents both risks and opportunities. It requiers certain financial resources, making it a risky decision for those without financial security. People may postpone their migration plans due to the fear of losing their property or financial safety.

In addition, concerns about adapting to the cultural environment of the decision to stay. Many individuals delay migration due to fears of not fitting into the new culture. Women, in particular, often face psychological challenges when they are forced to migrate due to their family roles social isolation and language barriers are common issues that make the migration process harder for women. According to a study on the impact of migration on womens’s mental health, many women struggle with these challenges.  (Tuzcu& Ilgaz,2023, p.57-67)

Although the number of women in high-status, well-paying jobs has increased over the years, this situation is not universal. Similarly, differences between the religion, politics and culture of the source and destination countries are also important factors influencing migration decisions. In France, for example many women are excluded from education because they wear headscarves, (Al Jazeera, French to ban wearing headscarves and abayas dress in school, 27 aug 2023)  a situation that has also occurred in Turkey.  (Al jazeera Turkiye, headscarf ban in Turkiye, how it started/ how it ended? 30 Dec 2013)

Therefore, individuals who already face discrimination in their home country may hesitate to migrate, fearing even worse treatment abroad.

Similarly, Suna and Cereci’s fields studies in Turkey gathered the following perspective from a woman who faced this dilemma:

Woman (30): “My husband is very interested in migrating. A close friend of ours moved to the UK under the Ankara Agreement. I have never liked the idea of migrating because of my social concerns. As a woman wearing a headscarf, I even worry if I will be judged when I go to the beach during summer holidays. If I feel this way in my own country, I can’t imagine going to another country. Beyond my headscarf, I don’t think I deserve the discrimination and humiliation that migrants face.” (Suna&Cereci, 2022, p.202)

On the other hand, children and young migrants may also struggle to adapt to new environments. Language and culture are crucial elements that connect people to their surroundings. In schools where the curriculum is taught in a different language or culture, children may have difficulty adapting and face challenges in continuing their education. This makes it harder for them to move up to the next level of education.

The following table presents an analysis of the differences in educational continuation and levels between citizens and non-citizens in European countries.

The Dynamics Between Migration and Immobility

While the concept of migration has been extensively studied in the literature, the concept of non-migration has not received the same attention. Just as migration is a societal process, so is staying in place, and it deserves an in-depth analysis. In fact, non-migration offers a perspective of solution for many researchers who see migration as a problem. However, staying in place can become a serious issue in the face of challenging conditions such as war, persecution and famine. Out of the 7.8 billion people in the world, only 272 million are international migrants. Some migrate for economic reasons, such as to meet their basic needs, while others migrate to escape political and social oppression or simply to seek a better quality of life. However, billions of people choose not to migrate and remain where they are. (Esipova et al, 2018.)

So, why don’t more poeple migrate, even when there are life-threatening reasons to do so?

This dynamic can be explained by the “desire and capacity model”. Even if people desire to migrate, they may lack the necessary resources or the capacity to make it happen. Migration requiers not just a willingness to leave but also financial, social and sometimes physical resources. Additionally, strong cultural ties, fear of the unknown and social pressures may further inhibit migration decisions even in situations where it might seem necessary. The desire to migrate or stay in place is distinct from the ability to do so. This distinction leads to three different types of immobility: resigned (accepting), voluntary and involuntary immobility. (Carling et al., no. 6 (2018): 945–63.)

Involuntary immobility

This term was first introduced by Jorgen Carling. It refers to individuals who wish to migrate but are prevented by factors such as restrictive immigration policies. Carling also emphasized that large migration flows are often linked to involuntary immobility. For example, in Mozambique, labor migration played a vital role in the social and economic life of drought-prone areas. However, when the civil war broke out, this movement stopped, and the most disadvantaged groups were tapped in their villages due to the conflict. These populations, referred to as “displaced in place” are often invisible in the migration and refugee fields. In addition to those unable to leave their homeland. Joris Schapendonk highlighted that many irregular migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, who aimed to reach Europe, became stuck a result, these migrants experience a form of immobility while in movement. Similarly, refugees who have been forced to flee their countries may remain confined to camps for decades or even generations. Jennifer handmade and Winona Giles argued that long-term refugee situations have become the new normal. “For refugees, waiting is not the exception, but the rule.” Refugees who dare to escape forced uncertainty and seek a new life elsewhere are often seen as security threats. Hyndman and Giles put it: “The good refugee is the one who waits in place.” (Lubkemann&Stephen C., 2008, p.454-75)

Migration and Staying Capacity

In the future, migration is expected to become voluntary rather than involuntary. The capacity to stay is seen as developmental goal, providing people the freedom to achieve well-being in their current location. According to the Capability Approach theory, development should be assessed based on people’s ability to become what they value and have reason to value. From this perspective, exploring the capacity to stay means examining whether individuals have realistic options to achieve their life goals where they are. (De Haas, Hein, 2021)

Focusing solely on the ability to migrate overshadows the significance of staying capacity. While the desire to stay or migrate is important, staying capacity is not the opposite of migration ability. Migration ability refers to the resources -financial, social and human- required for someone to move from one place to another. In contrast, staying capacity refers to having the opportunities and resources to fulfill one’s aspirations in their current location.

It is not simply about remaining stationary; those who cannot realize their goals where they are lack the capacity to stay.

Calls for people to stay in place have been criticized for indirectly supporting migration regimes that restrict freedom of movement. Former UN High Commisioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, argued in 1993 that those affected by crises should have the “rigt to stay” indirectly challenging policies that limit asylum rights. (Hyndman&Jennifer, 2003, p.167–85)

Focusing on staying often leads to measures that restrict freedom rather than enhance well-being. Enhancing staying capacity does not mean reducing migration. Hein de Hass, describes human mobility not simply as the act of moving but as the ability to choose where to live, including the option to stay. From a normative perspective, while many may still choose to migrate, all people should have the capacity to stay if they wish. (Schewel& Kerilyn, 2015)

Policy and Immobility

Policies are one of the critical factors directly influencing individuals’ migration decisions. Their is a wide range of forced and voluntary immobility. Recognizing the different types of immobility can increase the effectiveness of policies.

For example, as research on the efffects of the COVID-19 pandemic grows, it is becoming clear that while the pandemic has increased the need for economic migration among many low-wage workers, public health restrictions have simultaneously limited their ability to migrate. Finding ways to mitigate involuntary immobility is crucial to restoring livelihoods for affected populations. Similarly, it is essential to recognize that in crisis situations, those trapped by conflicts or disasters are often among the most vulnerable. Humanitarian efforts must continue to focus on how best to reach populations that are immobile and how to reduce the likelihood of involuntary immobility in crises. (Mixed Migration Centre, “Impact of the COVID-19 on the Decision to Migrate.”2020.)

Findings of Fieldwork

The field views in this study were taken from Anıl Suna and Sedat Cereci’s research on the reasons to theoretical framework is supported by fieldwork conducted in several provinces of Turkiye, including Gaziantep, Van, Diyarbakır, Batman, Artvin, Rize, Giresun, Balıkesir, Adana and Hatay. In this research, 100 participants were interviewed and the findings revealed diverse reasons for migration or staying. (Suna&Cereci, 2022, p.203)

  • 57% of participants stated that they did not consider migration because they were satisfied with their current situation.
  • 21% of participants expressed that, although they felt the need to migrate, they could not do so due to factors such as lack of direction or financial constraints.
  • 12% of participantsreported that they chose not to migrate due to a strong connection to their homeland, citing reasons such as maintaining their established way of life or patriotism.
  • 10 % of participants giving the answer of I don’t know

These findings highlight how personal satisfaction financial barriers and attachment to one’s homeland can shape individuals’ decisions to migrate or stay.

Table translated by the author from Turkish to English (Suna&Cereci,2022, p. 203).

Conclusion

This study set out to investigate the complex reasons why individuals choose not to migrate, focusing on the interplay of voluntary and involuntary immobility. The decision not to migrate is shaped by a range of economic, social, cultural, and political factors, with voluntary immobility reflecting contentment with current living conditions, while involuntary immobility highlights the barriers that prevent individuals from moving, even when they wish to. Despite the desire to migrate, factors such as financial limitations, social obligations, and political restrictions can constrain mobility, illustrating the multi-dimensionality of immobility.

However, a lack of fieldwork, particularly in the area of involuntary immobility, has limited our deeper understanding of this issue. Field studies that explore the psychological and sociological dynamics underlying non-migration could address these gaps and offer more insight into why some individuals remain immobile despite facing considerable push factors.

Future research should address this phenomenon more comprehensively, as it will help us better understand migration movements and the challenges people face when migration is not a viable option. The findings presented in this paper emphasize that understanding why people do not migrate requires consideration of economic, social, cultural, and psychological perspectives together. Expanding research on involuntary immobility, through fieldwork and theoretical exploration, would contribute significantly to a more complete understanding of this critical area in migration studies.

References

European Agenda Conferences – II: “Migration That Binds Us” – Reassessing the EU-Turkey Partnership

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European Agenda Conferences – II: “Migration That Binds Us” – Reassessing the EU-Turkey Partnership

The European Agenda Conferences II program, hosted by Bursa Uludağ University on October 24-25, 2024, has been finalized. This year’s theme is “Migration That Binds Us,” focusing on reassessing the EU-Turkey partnership. The conference will serve as a comprehensive academic gathering where current developments and challenges in the field of migration will be discussed.

On the first day, following the protocol speeches, Prof. Dr Murat Erdoğan will deliver a keynote speech titled “Migration Trends in Turkey and the World”. After this opening, seven panels with 22 presentations will be held under topics such as migration and climate change, migration diplomacy, migration management, and media and migration.

On the second day, the event will begin with Prof. Dr. Ulaş Sunata‘s keynote speech, “Civil Society in Turkey’s Migration Governance.” Throughout the day, 35 presentations across ten panels will cover digitalization and migration, migration and nationalism, and migration and security. The conference will conclude with various presentations that will provide an in-depth analysis of different aspects of migration.

This significant event is organized in collaboration with the Academic Network for European Union Studies in Turkey (A-NEST), International Relations Studies Association (TUİÇ), Diplomacy Research Association (DARD), Kocaeli University, and Bursa Uludağ University. We extend our gratitude to all the institutions and organizations involved, as well as the contributing academics and experts.

We invite all participants who wish to discuss and evaluate migration in the context of EU-Turkey relations to this academic gathering.

Conference Program

Conference European Agenda II Revision_30_09

Türkiye’s Strategic Engagement with Africa and the UN: A Model of Humanitarian Diplomacy

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Türkiye’s Strategic Engagement with Africa and the UN: A Model of Humanitarian Diplomacy

The United Nations (UN), established in 1945, currently has 193 official member states out of over 210 countries on the world map. While some countries hold observer status, others are in the process of gaining membership and recognition. 

The 79th UN General Assembly (UNGA), themed “Our Common Future,” will take place in New York on September 22-23, 2024. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is expected to focus on the atrocities occurring in Gaza during his address to the assembly. Among the major international issues on the agenda, the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the resulting humanitarian crisis take precedence. Additionally, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, which has persisted for two years, is another significant topic for discussion.

A substantial portion of the UNGA’s agenda concerns Africa, aiming to address global political instability and promote peace and sustainable development. Despite its vast natural resources, Africa remains underdeveloped, with poverty and humanitarian crises drawing significant attention, second only to the Gaza conflict and the Russia-Ukraine war. Türkiye’s Strategic Engagement with Africa

Although Africa has 54 member states within the UN, representing 27% of voting rights in the General Assembly, it remains the least represented continent in the organization. The African Union has long campaigned for more substantial representation. Encouraged by President Erdoğan’s slogan, “The World is Bigger than Five,” the African Union has intensified efforts for greater influence. In response, the United States, one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, has proposed granting two permanent seats to African countries, albeit without veto power. To foster this agenda, Philemon Yang, former Prime Minister of Cameroon, has been elected as the 79th UNGA President. Türkiye’s Strategic Engagement with Africa

While resolutions passed by the UN, particularly the Security Council, may not always be enforceable, as seen with Palestine, the UN remains a powerful platform for raising global awareness and exposing injustices. Türkiye’s Strategic Engagement with Africa

According to the UN Charter, decisions in the General Assembly require a two-thirds majority, underscoring the importance of even the smallest member states. Africa, with its 54 members, holds particular significance, as it is one of the most organized and cohesive regions within the UN. Securing the support of African nations is often one of the most efficient and impactful diplomatic strategies. The interest of major powers such as the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and even Israel in Africa can be attributed, in part, to the influence of these 54 votes within the UN. Israel’s increasing engagement with Africa, particularly in security and defense, is also viewed as a means to secure African support in international forums, including the UN.

Among the countries showing interest in Africa, Türkiye stands out as a unique and sincere partner. President Erdoğan’s personal attention to Africa has yielded significant results over the past two decades. Türkiye’s humanitarian and development-driven approach has redefined its image in the eyes of African nations. The “White Man” narrative has shifted, with many Africans now distinguishing Türkiye as a different, more genuine partner, epitomized by the Anatolian people. This transformation is evident to anyone with ties to Africa.

President Erdoğan’s “The World is Bigger than Five” resonates strongly in Africa. The principle of “win-win” has become a central tenet of Türkiye’s engagement with the continent, fostering equal and mutually beneficial relationships. This approach has contributed to a new diplomatic style that is reshaping Africa’s external relations, much to the frustration of those who resist Türkiye’s influence. Türkiye has become Africa’s new window to the world, with Turkish Airlines playing a key role by expanding the continent’s connectivity.

Investment, trade, education, and healthcare are areas where Türkiye has become indispensable for Africa. Türkiye’s advancements in defense, industry, infrastructure, and transportation have provided a model for African countries. Though this may go unnoticed within Türkiye, Africa often refers to the phrase “like a Turk” as a compliment, acknowledging Türkiye’s role as a source of inspiration.

Despite internal debates in Türkiye, the strategic direction established by President Erdoğan for Africa has not gone unnoticed. Various actors have sought to counterbalance Türkiye’s influence, striving to reassert control over Africa’s future. However, the transformative power of Türkiye’s “Entrepreneurial and Humanitarian Foreign Policy” in the early years of the 21st century is becoming evident, especially in Africa. The significance of Africa’s position within the UN and the attention it receives from permanent members should not be overlooked.

Ömer Faruk DOĞAN
Ankara, September 22, 2024

Türkiye’s Strategic Engagement with Africa

Srebrenica Genocide and Beyond: Call for Papers for a Special Issue

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Srebrenica Genocide and Beyond: Call for Papers for a Special Issue

We are excited to announce a special issue commemorating the 30th Anniversary of the Srebrenica Genocide. This issue, titled “Srebrenica Genocide and Beyond,” will address key themes such as migration, international law, and post-conflict peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina while also exploring comparative global contexts.

Key themes include:

  • Migration, returnees, and internally displaced peoples (IDPs)
  • International law and accountability, with a focus on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
  • Comparative analyses of genocides and crimes against humanity
  • Peacebuilding and reconciliation in post-conflict regions
  • Confronting genocide denial and historical revisionism
  • Global lessons from Bosnia’s experience for conflict prevention and justice

The deadline for submission is March 15, 2025, with an expected publication date of June 15, 2025. We invite contributions in both English and Turkish. For full submission details, download the PDF https://www.tuicakademi.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/After-30-YEARS-SREBRENICA-GENOCIDE-AND-BEYOND-.pdf

This is an excellent opportunity for scholars, researchers, and practitioners in the fields of international law, peace studies, migration, and genocide prevention to contribute.

SUBMISSION HERE – Please choose special issue – Srebrenica Genocide – Journal of International Relations and Political Science Studies

Evolving Türkiye-BRICS Relations: Closely Monitored by the European Union

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Evolving Türkiye-BRICS Relations: Closely Monitored by the European Union

The European Union has been closely monitoring the evolving dynamics in Türkiye’s relations with BRICS, originally formed by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Even before it became a subject of discussion in the Turkish public sphere, the Western media today began making comments, reporting that Türkiye had formally applied for BRICS membership. The significance of Türkiye within the EU, underscored by its participation in the Customs Union and its strong, strategic NATO membership, has brought Türkiye-BRICS developments into focus. Some key political newspapers today highlighted Türkiye’s relationship with BRICS, emphasizing the expansion of BRICS, which is expected to be discussed during the summit scheduled for October 22-24 in Kazan, Russia. It is worth noting that Malaysia, Thailand, and Azerbaijan, a close ally of Türkiye, are also among the countries aspiring to join the group.

In the wake of the global disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ukraine-Russia war that began on February 24, 2022, and the ongoing, intensified occupation of Gaza by Israel since October 7, 2023, the European Union has faced a series of unexpected economic and political challenges. Amidst these concerns, the EU continues to debate the outcomes of internal elections and their potential impact on the future of Europe. Germany, in particular, has witnessed surprising electoral results, and the trajectory of these developments is being closely watched with concern and interest.

While the EU assesses its own shared challenges, its stance towards Türkiye and the future of their relations remains a significant agenda item. After a five-year hiatus, our Foreign Minister, H.E. Hakan Fidan, was invited to the Gymnich, an informal meeting of EU foreign ministers. The invitation of the Turkish Foreign Minister to this forum after such a long period signals that the EU is in search of a new approach regarding its relationship with Türkiye.

Following the re-election of our esteemed President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in May 2023 by the will of the people, reaffirming the nation’s trust, President Erdoğan’s “Türkiye Vision,” in conjunction with Foreign Minister Fidan’s “Enterprising and Humanitarian Foreign Policy,” has garnered considerable attention in the region and positively impacted our relations with the EU. This new Turkish foreign policy, characterized as regional, constructive, and system-transformative, has been noted with interest across various sectors in the EU.

As a result of Türkiye’s steadfast commitment to a multi-faceted foreign policy, the EU felt the need to engage directly with Türkiye by inviting our Foreign Minister after five years to hear Türkiye’s perspectives on key issues. Through this engagement, the EU has witnessed Türkiye’s dedication to its bid for EU membership, reaffirming its commitment to shared treaties. Notably, Türkiye’s stance on the visa issue and the challenges of sustaining the trade volume within the framework of the 1996 Customs Union agreement have reinforced the need for an updated agreement, adapted to the evolving conditions. Not only the Turkish public and trade sectors but also the EU’s industrial and supply centers are keenly awaiting the EU’s stance in response to the growing trade relationships and Türkiye’s increasing significance as a supply hub.

The EU has recognized the growing interest of its economic sector in updating the Customs Union to reflect current conditions, as well as Türkiye’s position on the visa issue. Concurrently, the EU is meticulously observing Türkiye’s engagements with other international organizations, including BRICS. It is for this reason that Türkiye’s evolving relations with BRICS have been a topic of discussion in the EU even before they entered the Turkish public sphere, with articles and commentaries already circulating on the matter.

The EU has directly benefited from Türkiye’s stable and solution-oriented approaches to international challenges, particularly in the areas of energy and food supply, with a particular emphasis on the grain deal and efforts to mitigate the effects of the Ukraine-Russia war in the Black Sea region. Commentaries suggest that the EU’s public and business sectors are increasingly being drawn towards a new approach that more carefully considers Türkiye’s contributions.

The challenges within the EU’s supply chain, exacerbated by Israel’s unjust occupation of Gaza, alongside the logistical complications in the Red Sea and Suez Canal region affecting supply routes from the Far East, have led to daily trade losses amounting to USD 10 billion. Issues such as heightened risk, insurance costs, transportation delays, and rising logistics expenses are pushing consumer costs in the EU up by 15-25%. These issues necessitate a more careful evaluation of the current situation.

Given the multi-faceted challenges on the agenda, the nearly 500 million-strong population of the EU seems to have little tolerance for further economic crises. The growing discontent among EU consumers over rising prices and the industry’s demand for supply chain stability are being acknowledged within the EU. At this juncture, Türkiye’s alternative approaches, especially its role as a bridge in energy, raw materials, and supply chains, alongside the rapidly progressing Middle Corridor and Belt and Road Initiatives, present key solutions not just for Türkiye but also for the EU. These projects offer significant solutions to many potential EU challenges. For these reasons, Türkiye’s alternative initiatives are being carefully evaluated by the EU.

Türkiye’s sincere and stable approach to regional and international challenges is becoming increasingly impossible for the EU to overlook, not just from Türkiye’s perspective but also in terms of EU industry, consumers, and supply chains.

If the EU can constructively assess Türkiye’s alternative approaches and engage with them positively, the potential economic challenges following electoral results in EU countries could be mitigated, providing relief to EU consumers and industries. In this context, the EU’s position towards Türkiye represents a crucial opportunity that should not be missed, one that holds significant potential for the stability of the EU economy and the well-being of its citizens.

Ömer Faruk DOĞAN – Ambassador

Ankara, September 3, 2024.

Announcing the 11th Issue of the Journal of International Relations and Political Science Studies (JIRPSS)

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Announcing the 11th Issue of the Journal of International Relations and Political Science Studies (JIRPSS)

We are thrilled to present the 11th issue of JIRPSS, where we explore cutting-edge research and insightful reviews on a range of topics in international relations and political science. This issue is packed with thought-provoking articles and book reviews that delve deep into contemporary global challenges, offering fresh perspectives and comprehensive analyses. Here’s a glimpse of what this issue has to offer:

🌍 Russia’s Arctic Ambitions: A New Chapter in the Great Game! 🧊

In this article by Shahzada Rahim Abbas and Prof. Dr. Güner Özkan, explore Russia’s strategic maneuvers in the Arctic. As the ice melts, Russia’s ambitions grow, leading to a new geopolitical rivalry in the North Pole. The article, grounded in Realist International Relations theory, examines how Russia balances competition and cooperation, expanding its military and economic presence in this critical region. 🌐 #Geopolitics #Russia #Arctic #InternationalRelations

📰 Partisan Media’s Impact on Minority Groups: A Deep Dive into Polarization and Incivility! 🗣️

Yassine Ismaïli offers a comprehensive analysis of how major news networks like CNN, Fox, and MSNBC portray African Americans, Latinos, and Asians in the U.S. The study reveals the polarizing effects of partisan media coverage, showing how biased narratives deepen societal divisions and fuel incivility. This research is a must-read for those interested in understanding the role of media in shaping public perceptions. 📺 #MediaBias #Polarization #MinorityRights

📚 Celebrating 100 Years of Turkish Foreign Policy: A Multifaceted Reflection! 🇹🇷

Marking a century of Turkish diplomacy, the book “One Hundred Years of Turkish Foreign Policy (1923–2023)” is thoroughly reviewed by Zübeyde Aykaç. Edited by Binnur Özkeçeci Taner and Sinem Akgül Açıkmeşe, this book offers a detailed analysis of Turkey’s evolving foreign policy over the last 100 years, with contributions from expert female academics. The review highlights the book’s exploration of Turkey’s complex international identity and its relations with global and regional actors. 📖 #Turkey100Years #ForeignPolicy #Geopolitics

🏙️ Exploring Migration Dynamics in Istanbul: The Case of Beyoğlu! 🏡

This article by Esra Kaya Erdoğan, Hatice Kurtuluş, and Deniz Yükseker, reviewed by Buket Özdemir Dal, delves into the urban challenges faced by migrants in Istanbul’s Beyoğlu district. The research highlights how local governance and social networks enable migrants to navigate their lives in a rapidly transforming city. This article is essential for understanding the intersection of migration and urbanization in major global cities. 🌆 #Migration #UrbanStudies #LocalGovernance

A Special Thank You!

We extend our heartfelt thanks to all the authors, reviewers, and the editorial team who contributed to this issue. Your hard work and dedication have made this edition of JIRPSS insightful and impactful.

📅 Looking Ahead!
We are now open to accepting submissions for our next issue, which will be published in December 2024. We welcome articles, book reviews, and article reviews that contribute to the ongoing scholarly conversation in international relations and political science.

Submit your work and be part of the vibrant academic discourse in the next issue of JIRPSS!

#JIRPSS #InternationalRelations #PoliticalScience #AcademicPublishing

The Belt and Road Initiative: Turkiye’s Increasing Significance in the Supply Chain

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The Belt and Road Initiative: Turkiye’s Increasing Significance in the Supply Chain

The Belt and Road Initiative

Although we, as the public in Turkey, have not yet fully recognized our region’s geostrategic importance, every incident in our region strengthens Turkey’s position and highlights its increasing significance.

While the Ukraine-Russia war, which emerged after the COVID-19 pandemic in Europe, continues with full force, the efforts of the Houthis in Yemen to take control of the Suez Canal in response to Israel’s occupation of Gaza have significantly impacted global trade. The growing difficulties in the supply of raw materials and consumer goods from the Far East, which has become an indispensable source for Europe’s industrial production and consumer needs, have strengthened the importance of seeking alternative transportation routes, particularly the transportation corridors that include Turkey.

Due to the high-security risks currently present in the Suez Canal, ships carrying raw materials and consumer goods from the Far East are forced to navigate around the Cape of Good Hope and the Horn of Africa, extending the transportation process by at least one month and inevitably increasing transportation costs and the cost of raw materials and consumer goods for Europe by around 15-25%. Most recently, the resurgence of the Ukraine-Russia war in the first week of August has once again heightened activity in European markets. Although the “Belt and Road” project has not found sufficient traction on the Turkish public agenda, it has once again become a topic of discussion in Europe concerning their own supply security.

Especially in Central Asian countries, particularly Kazakhstan, which has historical ties with Germany and still hosts 1.5 million citizens of German origin, the countries along the “Belt and Road” corridor have gained new importance due to the war in Ukraine. These countries, which have gained a new economic momentum, have started to hold different value in the eyes of Europe, and a new process has been initiated for Europe to take advantage of the “Middle Corridor” from these Asian countries with road, rail, and sea networks.

In the proposed design, the agenda includes the transport of containers by train to the Kuryk port in Kazakhstan, crossing the Caspian Sea by ferry to the Alat port in Azerbaijan. A 19-hectare area at the Aktau port is being designed as a container hub, and the completion of new infrastructure works at the ongoing port is expected to maximize efficiency.

Europe considers Kazakhstan, which it defines as the economic powerhouse of Central Asia and expects to facilitate trade between China and Europe, as a significant player. The “Middle Corridor,” which includes road, rail, and sea networks, is considered a key connection point. With the completion of development and renovation works at smaller ports with smaller capacities, alongside the main port of Aktau on the eastern shores of the Caspian Sea, it is predicted that commercial ship traffic on the Caspian could increase at least twofold compared to today, keeping future logistics planning on the agenda.

Due to Azerbaijan’s unique role in this targeted design, the West is expected to quietly allow Azerbaijan to complete its infrastructure investments along the Caspian, setting aside previously encountered radical stances on the Azerbaijan-Armenia issue. With the renewal of the infrastructure at the Alat port and the addition of new facilities, Azerbaijan is also positioned as a significant logistical center for Western supply hubs. The Alat port, which currently sits at the crossroads of various rail and road routes, is expected to handle approximately twenty million tons of cargo annually, raising expectations. Containers from this port are anticipated to reach Georgia and then transit through the Black Sea to Romania or Bulgaria, or alternatively, via the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway to Europe through Turkey.

The “Middle Corridor,” which includes Turkey and has been ignored by Europe until now for various reasons, has regained attention in the West since the Russian army’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Usage of this corridor, which stood at 870,000 tons in 2021, has reached 1.7 million tons today. What makes the Middle Corridor attractive is that it is 2,000 kilometers shorter than its northern alternatives and offers an advantageous travel time. Western shippers state that the Middle Corridor journey can take between 18-23 days, compared to 25-28 days via Russia and 22-37 days along the southern Black Sea route. This situation inevitably brings Turkey to the forefront.

Geographer Frédéric Lasserre, in a study published in March 2023 by the Institute for International and Strategic Relations, stated that “exporters need to mitigate the risks and uncertainties associated with sanctions and the deterioration of relations with Moscow” and that “since the Russian offensive, the northern axes have completely lost their appeal.” He also emphasized that “the banning of Russian shipping companies operating within the European Union and the exclusion of most Russian banks from the global financial system has forced a significant portion of goods to be redirected to the Middle Corridor.”

The World Bank, in a report published in February, noted that “the limitations of the Middle Corridor are rapidly emerging” and pointed out that trade has slowed in the first eight months of 2023 due to infrastructure and logistics deficiencies, but the continued modernization efforts are expected to bring trade on this corridor to 4 million tons by the end of 2024, with usage expected to exceed 10 million tons by 2030.

While the standard differences in the railway network on the Middle Corridor have not yet been fully resolved, which partially hampers the process, efforts by the relevant countries to address the differences in track length on the railways are being emphasized.

Geographer Frédéric Lasserre also expressed concerns about the limited capacity on the Georgian side of the Black Sea, noting that the Poti and Batumi ports are not deep enough for extensive use, and as a result, the Georgian government decided to develop the deep-water port of Anaklia on the Black Sea, with the project entrusted to the Chinese. However, uncertainties in Georgia’s port operations have not yet been fully resolved, raising concerns. This situation makes the alternative route through Georgia to Europe via the Black Sea and Romania-Bulgaria more difficult, once again bringing Turkey to the forefront for transportation.

The assessments suggest that the Middle Corridor is reshaping traditional geopolitical balances, with special emphasis on Turkey’s efforts to gain strategic depth in Turkic-speaking Central Asia. In other words, Turkey is considered the “leading actor” for the viability of the project.

The assessments also highlight China’s dominant presence globally and its significant efforts in developing the 6,000-kilometer-long road, with Beijing investing vast amounts through the Belt and Road Initiative and continuing to show interest, particularly in its close Kazakh neighbor. The Kazakh government has pledged to allocate $35 billion (32.44 billion euros) over 15 years to develop highways and to build 1,300 kilometers of new railways by 2026, emphasizing Kazakhstan’s importance as the only Central Asian state bordering both Russia and China.

Moreover, it is noted that at the beginning of 2024, the European Commission and its financial partners decided to allocate 10 billion euros to develop transportation and logistics in the region. In Astana, Kazakhstan’s capital, 25 companies from eleven different countries are working on the topic, with the efforts coordinated through the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route Association, established in 2013 and formalized in 2017.

As can be understood from the statements and comments mentioned above, the unexpected events in our region and Israel’s unjust, borderless occupation of Gaza have made Turkey an inevitable position for ensuring the continuity of supply in Europe. In this context, the strategic importance of the Organization of Turkic States, established through the initiatives of our President, naturally emerges, along with the additional contribution and benefit it will provide to regional peace and the region’s and Europe’s economy.

Under the leadership of our President, the “New Century Vision” put forth in the new century of our Republic, the “Entrepreneurial and Humanitarian Foreign Policy,” and the new “Regional, Constructive, and System-Transforming Approach” meticulously pursued by our Minister of Foreign Affairs Hakan Fidan, emphasize that the international corridor projects carefully considered within this framework are not only crucial for the countries within the Organization of Turkic States but also play a special role in the continuity of supply chains in Europe and other Central Asian countries, as well as regional peace and stability. While the West may not fully define it, it senses the importance of Turkey’s “New Vision” approach. If our public also embraces this approach, the existing major projects may have the opportunity to materialize much sooner than expected.

Ambassador Ömer Faruk DOĞAN’s original text in Turkish language is here: https://www.tuicakademi.org/bir-kusak-bir-yol-tedarik-zinciri-ve-turkiye/

This is the translation made by the TUIC Academy staff. 

Monitoring Report on Access to the Right to Education in Higher Education After Disaster

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Monitoring Report on Access to the Right to Education in Higher Education After Disaster

This study, which we, the International Relations Studies Association (TUİÇ), have carried out for monitoring the right to access to education in higher education after the 6th February Kahramanmaraş earthquakes, contains essential findings regarding the protection and improvement of the right to education in the post-disaster recovery period. With support from the ETKİNİZ European Union Programme, this study aims to draw attention to the fact that the right to education is a fundamental human right and that it is essential to protect such right in the post-disaster periods.

This report deals with the difficulties and problems encountered in the region after the earthquake and offers suggestions for solutions. The focal point of our study is monitoring access to the right to education in higher education in the aftermath of the disaster, and the data obtained through field observations, focus group studies, and questionnaires have been analysed in this process. Findings contained in the report bear significant importance in identifying the inequalities and barriers experienced in access to the right to education, particularly in higher education.

We thank all TUİÇ volunteers who have had a hand in the accomplishment of this study, to those students and academicians who have contributed to the field works, to our mentorBurcu Yeşiladalı and the ETKİNİZ European Union Programme supporting the Recover Together Programme. Further, we express our gratitude to all representatives of non-governmental organisations and activists who have
contributed to the preparation of the report, and all who have participated in our study.

This report has strategic importance and authenticity on the right basis regarding the overall framework, which draws around the existing problems and provides qualitative and quantitative data. Therefore, we hope the report will be a significant reference document for protecting and improving access to the right to higher education in the aftermath of a disaster. We hope our study will be considered by decision-makers and the public and draw on taking tangible steps to protect and support the right to education at all levels.

You can reach the report from here: Monitoring Report on Access to the Right to Education

 

It’s Alagić’s army, which Murphy doesn’t like

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It’s Alagić’s army, which Murphy doesn’t like

Defence of Bosnia

I was two years old when my family and I were expelled from my hometown. To remove the traces of our existence on that land, the authorities of the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska changed the name of Skender-Vakuf (to Kneževo). They also demolished both our mosques. One of them, Ali-dede Iskender’s, was built in 1643. Until the 20th century, the imams were my ancestors (hence the surname).

Before we escaped, the White Eagles or some similar paramilitary unit came to town. Back then, we weren’t allowed to spend the night in houses, but we slept in the nearby forest. I remember (from later stories) that my father proudly pointed out that he stayed in the house, and that, as he says, if he was attacked by at least one Chetnik, he would take him to the other world. Fortunately, we escaped before it came to that. Defence of Bosnia

Probably the plan was just to expel us. We were an absolute minority. According to the 1991 census, only 7% of Bosniaks and 89% of Serbs lived in the territory of the municipality. The most serious crimes occurred in municipalities, where Bosniaks were the majority or half of the population. Prijedor, Zvornik, Sanski Most, etc.

We, the people of Skender were not killed en masse, but the people of Prijedor were killed in the area of ​​our municipality. The Korićan rocks, where more than 200 Bosniaks from Prijedor were executed, are located on the territory of the Skender-Vakuf municipality.

In the novel The Dog and the Contrabass, one of the most important contemporary Serbian writers, Saša Ilić, writes about the sanitation of the land in Korićani. Someone offered 50 marks for each exhumed corpse to cover up the traces of the crime, but it was impossible to work because of the heat and the flies.

Kamenjar radiated heat that, mixed with the gases of decomposition of human bodies and the buzzing of thick greenish flies, rose upwards. When Topisirević (one of the heroes) reached a body in a blue adidas tracksuit, through which the top of the rock went like a knife, spilling the contents of the stomach out, a swarm of goldfish tried to reach him. Defence of Bosnia

They blinded him for a short time, sticking to the glasses of his mask, under which he found it increasingly difficult. He chased them away in vain, new flies came and stuck to the glass, as if they didn’t want to let go of their prey at any cost, etc. Defence of Bosnia

We escaped with our lives, first escaping to our relatives, to Bešpelj, a mountain village in the Jajače municipality. Once the artillery attack started, we all fled to the shelters, only, as I was told later, my brother went outside to collect shrapnel in the midst of the shelling. I was accidentally cut on the shoulder by a relative on Bešpelje with a motorcycle while he was cutting wood. I was only two years old. It’s a miracle he didn’t cut off my hand. And now I have a huge star scar on my right shoulder.

In the end, retreating further across Busovača, we ended up in Zenica. One of my first memories is listening to the attacks on the Bihać enclave on the radio. I think it was the winter of 1994. I remember the elders saying that if Bihać falls, Bosnia will fall. Its boundaries are really like the boundaries of our skin. Her disappearance would equal the Day of Resurrection, which the Qur’an describes with the words: “On that day, man will cry: ‘Where should he run?’ Nowhere!” There is no refuge!” Defence of Bosnia

Before I became aware of myself and the world around me, before I gained the power of memory, a crucial moment happened, which confirmed that there would be refuge after all. The Seventh Corps liberated Vlašić. It was one of the biggest victories of our army, that is, the biggest defeats of Republika Srpska. “If Karadžić said that Vlašić was the cap of Republika Srpska, I took off their cap,” said then the commander of the 7th Corps, Mehmed Alagić. Defence of Bosnia

In its report on the war in Bosnia, the CIA states that “the capture of Vlašić was strikingly visible evidence of the development of the RBiH Army, and it raised morale to a great extent in the ranks of the Bosnian government.”

As CIA analysts point out, the key moment was when General Alagić captured Paljenik, the highest peak of Vlašić. Defence of Bosnia

“The victory,” says the CIA, “was ultimately the victory of the infantry, who fought their way through terrible terrain to win in hand-to-hand combat – which had been the basic tactic of the RBiH Army since the beginning of the war.” However, the operation differed from the previous ones with visible improvements in equipment, planning, organization and execution.” Defence of Bosnia

“UN military observers and Western journalists,” says the CIA, “reported well-equipped Army units, carrying adequate light weapons, ammunition, body armor, helmets and radios.”

I remember, through the fog – and it could have been during the war, or after the war – that as children we sang:

From Kupres to Vlašić, there is one strong force,

it’s the Alagić army, which the Chetniks don’t like.

On one occasion, relatives, also expelled from Skender-Vakuf, came to Janjići, near Zenica. Since we Skenderans didn’t have our own songs, we sang (I remember well) a refugee song about the neighboring town of Kotor-Varoš, which had the same fate. Defence of Bosnia

Kotor-Varoš, don’t give up, don’t give up,

Hey bazaar, dear friends,

Kotor-Varoš, will punish the enemies,

God willing, we will return…

Until the end of the war, our people hoped that the army would free Skender as well. That hope almost became a reality, in the fall of 1995, during a major offensive by the Army (and Croatian forces) in northwestern Bosnia. The fifth and seventh corps liberated Sanski Most, Ključ and Bosanski Petrovac.

In his war diary Ljiljan i pepeo, Bernar-Henri Levy writes that on September 22, 1995, he met Mehmed Alagić at Vlašić.

After driving along a steep road lined with pine trees, Levy and his team reached the plateau, where General Alagić’s command post was located in a log cabin.

“Will we see him?” writes Levy, “Will he, who is rumored to hate journalists, or despise them, do us the honor, to receive us, to talk?”

Alagić takes them, says Levy, to Babanovac, then to the village of Cisava and finally to Mudrike (where, by the way, my maternal grandmother is from).

“Finally,” writes Levy, “we arrive at Mudrike, the last Bosnian position before the front line. We are a hundred meters from the Serbs – and five kilometers as the crow flies from Skender Vakuf, the last fortified town that defends the approach to Banja Luka, where Mladić has amassed his men and men.”

Levy says that, at one point, he asked Alagić what would happen if, at some point, the government from Sarajevo ordered him to stop the offensive.

“We will do,” says Alagić (quoted by Levy), “like Dudaković in Bihać – we will say ‘the order has not arrived’! It’s a wonder how disorganized our communication system is.”

And then, says Levy, Alagić added with a laugh: “Or [we will] be like the Israelis, who politely listened to their American mentors, but were in a hurry to do what was on their minds.”

That didn’t happen in the end. We did not act like Israel. Quod licet Iovi, non licet bovi. Many say unfortunately. I say maybe fortunately. In the fall of 1995, the fighters of the 5th Corps sang:

Dude take, don’t negotiate,

Our army will create borders.

Krajina overcame the crisis,

Now we all know the Drina is close to us.

However, the generals obeyed the authority of our government (as the army should do). As recorded in the film Sana 95 – an unfinished victory, Dudaković and Alagić pretended to be deaf for several days, tried to occupy as much territory as possible, and then, with a bottle of whiskey, they celebrated the end of the war.

Although Skender-Vakuf was not liberated, as well as many other places, our government did the right thing by signing the Dayton peace. Although unjust, it was more just than the continuation of the war. Reality, especially wartime, is too unpredictable. Just as the Serbian authorities could not even dream that, regardless of the fact that they had total military superiority, they would come to the brink of collapse, so we also cannot know what would have happened if we had rejected the American peace process and continued the war ourselves, because (and that is often forgotten) At the end of September 1995, after the drowning of HV soldiers in the swollen Una, Tuđman said that the Croatian forces would not continue.

From the conclusion of the Dayton Agreement until today, the United States has been the most important partner of Bosniak and pro-Bosnian politics in general. However, this does not mean that we should throw ourselves at their feet or allow them to treat us with disrespect.

The American Embassy’s statement condemning the monument’s erection to Mehmed Alagić is an example of disrespect and even unacceptable insolence towards this country.

What else can be said about the Embassy’s claim that “the citizens of this country deserve better than to honor a person accused (sic!) of war crimes by erecting a grandiose monument on Mount Vlašić”?

Speaking about Alagić, who has not been convicted, in the same tone as about those who have been legally convicted of genocide, extermination or persecution (which the American Embassy is doing in this case) is out of place and even disgusting. Especially if we bear in mind that, just a few days ago, Benjamin Netanyahu, who was indicted before the International Criminal Court accused of the systematic starvation of Gaza, was greeted with a storm of enthusiasm in the American Congress. If we are already moralizing, then quod licet Iovi, non licet bovi does not apply.

Unlike Netanyahu, Mehmed Alagić was neither accused of systemic crimes, such as genocide and crimes against humanity nor was he convicted before the court of history, as Milošević was. If he was found guilty, there should not be a monument to Alagić. But even then, he could not be equated with the perpetrators of genocide, extermination or persecution because the first principle of international law is that not all crimes are the same. Defence of Bosnia

However, Ambassador Murphy’s disrespect towards us is not the biggest problem. The problem is that those who should not be able to answer him. Those in charge of defending the dignity of this country have trampled on that dignity. Here, I am primarily thinking of Denis Bećirović, who, as the sponsor of the monument’s erection, first accepted the invitation to participate in the ceremony but, in the end, did not appear. He didn’t even send his envoy. And after the statement of the American Embassy, ​​it is clear why. Defence of Bosnia

The United States helped this country survive, but if people like Mehmed Alagić had not stood up to the aggressor in 1992, there would have been nothing to help three years later. The United States is still helping to preserve the peace and statehood of BiH, but if we throw ourselves at their feet, they will have nothing to help. If the bullet could not kill Alagić, but the humiliation did, why does this country think it will survive in the state it is in now?

HARIS IMAMOVIC Bosnia

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